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ABSTRACT
The terms “mixed legal systems” and “legal transplants” are
used frequently in comparative law. What they denote exactly, is difficult to ascertain: what does the mixité consist of, what are its ingredients or building blocks; which types of mixité exist, how are
legal transplants transformed in the receiving legal system? Comparative lawyers often resort to metaphors when they try to describe
and explain these complex phenomena: metaphors from cooking,
music, horticulture or biology. Whenever there are mixtures, transformations, or transmutations, metaphors from the philosophical
concepts of alchemy are at least equally illuminating.
This article discusses the different problems of conceptualising
and describing mixed systems and legal transplants by using alche-

∗ Professor of Commercial Law, School of Law, University of Glasgow;
PhD in Private Law (University of Vienna); LLM in Comparative and Intellectual
Property Law (University of London).
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mistic ideas and metaphors. It also gives an introduction to the philosophical concepts of alchemy in outline, and, in the appendix, in
more detail, because lawyers are usually unfamiliar with alchemy.
Yet, alchemy was central to the historical development of philosophy
and the natural sciences, as well as to theology, from antiquity well
into the late seventeenth century. However, anyone in search of the
mystical and the occult will be disappointed: many serious alchemists in the Renaissance period were predecessors of modern chemists. They were early researchers and scientists, and so were the
concepts they developed and believed in.
Keywords: philosophical concepts of alchemy, mixed legal systems,
legal transplants, comparative private law
I. INTRODUCTION
The concepts and terms “mixed legal systems” and “legal transplants” are well-known and used regularly in comparative law
scholarship. What they exactly denote and what they try to refer to
is highly contentious; in fact there does not seem to be much agreement among comparative lawyers about their meaning at all. This
article wants to show that these problems of comparative law are
philosophical ones. They are strikingly similar to ideas and concepts
of natural philosophy from Aristotle onwards. Perhaps the most influential practical application of the speculations and observations
of natural philosophy was alchemy. It was alchemy, from neoplatonic times in antiquity until the early eighteenth century with the
gradual beginning of modern chemistry, which gave the theoretical
speculations about transformation, metamorphosis, change of animate and inanimate matter—whether physical or spiritual-conceptual—the practical aspect and the experimental outlet. Within their
practical discipline of law, comparative lawyers often wrestle with
theoretical concepts when trying to explain complex legal phenomena they may not be able to understand fully. Their methods, frequently speculative and imaginary, share a number of similarities
with the old alchemists’ approach.
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The following discussion will start with an outline of the concepts of alchemy (section II). It will then deal with the differences
between alchemy and modern chemistry and the relevance of notions of alchemy, rather than chemistry, to an analysis of academic
debates in comparative law (section III). The last two sections will
discuss the interesting parallels between comparative law scholarship and alchemistic thinking in relation to the concepts of mixed
legal systems (section IV) and legal transplants (section V). In an
Appendix to this article, an outline of the development of philosophical notions of alchemy until the beginning of modern scientific
thinking will be provided: although not strictly speaking necessary
for the understanding of alchemistic metaphors in comparative law,
this section gives further background information on a form of philosophical thought that is unfamiliar nowadays but shaped philosophical and theological concepts until the start of the eighteenth
century.
II. CONCEPTS OF ALCHEMY
Alchemy is normally understood as being the art of making gold
from base metals (chrysopoeia), but in a broader sense, it is the art,
craft, and most importantly, the philosophy, which enables the transformation of one metal, or more generally one form of matter, into
another: the transmutation. Thus, alchemy consists of two branches:
the artisanal practical one in which recipes are developed and applied in a laboratory, and the philosophical one in which alchemist
activities give effect to philosophical theories. 1 From the time of antiquity and until the eighteenth century, only seven metals were recognised, the five base metals—mercury, tin, iron, copper, lead—and
the two noble metals, silver and gold. 2 The change from one metal
1. LAWRENCE PRINCIPE, THE SECRETS OF ALCHEMY 13 (U. of Chicago Press
2013).
2. Alchemists made a macrocosmic connection to the universe: gold corresponded to the sun, silver to the moon, copper to Venus, iron to Mars, mercury or
quicksilver to Mercury, lead to Saturn, and tin to Jupiter. See ERIC JOHN
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to the other was not considered a change of metals, that is, from one
to a different kind of matter, but a change of form of the same matter
as an underlying principle. 3 The transmutation was understood not
to occur automatically, but with the assistance of an agent, usually
mercury, sulphur 4 or other inorganic or organic matter and artisanal
practices, such as heating, distillation, condensation and various
other activities. The prepared substance, mixture or agent was often
referred to as the philosophers’ stone, the tincture or the elixir. 5
A fundamental idea of alchemy was that the alchemist does not
create new substances, but assists in completing the course of nature: the “new” substance is already contained in the original (base)
substance, and through the transmutation, initiated by the alchemist,
nature is only perfected. A book highly regarded by alchemists, and
unusually lucidly written for a work on alchemy, the New Pearl of
Great Price (Pretiosa Margarita Novella) by Petrus Bonus of Ferrara, written around 1330, 6 made that principle quite clear 7:
The fact is that, in producing gold, the Art of Alchemy does
not pretend to imitate the whole work of Nature. It does not
create metals, or even develop them out of the metallic firstsubstance; it only takes up the unfinished handiwork of Nature (i.e., the imperfect metals), and completes it (transmutes
metals into gold). It is not then necessary that Nature’s mode
of operation . . . should be so very accurately known to the
Artist. For Nature has only left a comparatively small thing
for him to do—the completion of that which she has already
begun . . . . Nature herself is set upon changing these metals

HOLMYARD, ALCHEMY 153 (Penguin Books 1968), for the usual alchemical/astronomical-astrological symbols.
3. F. SHERWOOD TAYLOR, THE ALCHEMISTS 16 (Paladin 1976);
HOLMYARD, supra note 2, at 21.
4. The terms “mercury” and “sulphur” should not be understood only in the
narrow meaning of modern chemistry, see PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 36.
5. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 123 (on the making of the philosophers’ stone);
see also ATHANASIUS KIRCHER, BOOK 11 MUNDUS SUBTERRANEUS 268 (3d ed.,
Apud Joannem Janssonium 1678) for a seventeenth-century explanation of the
philosophers’ stone.
6. HOLMYARD, supra note 2, at 141.
7. PETRUS BONUS OF FERRARA, THE NEW PEARL OF GREAT PRICE 152-153
(A.E. Waite trans., J. Elliot 1894).
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into gold; the Artist has only to remove the cause which hinders this change (i.e., the corrupting sulphur), and then he
can depend upon Nature for the rest.
Today we know that a change from a base metal to gold by transmutation is impossible, but well into the late seventeenth century
even sceptics and representatives of the Scientific Revolution, such
as Robert Boyle, reported to have witnessed a successful transmutation. 8 However, we can change base metals into gold today, by way
of changing the atomic structure of the original element; although it
can be an issue how stable the new element is. Indeed, in 1980 scientists in the U.S. used a particle accelerator to change a small
amount of bismuth into gold. The problem was that it cost $10,000
to produce a tiny amount of gold worth one billionth of a cent, 9 so
digging for gold will remain the only economically efficient option.
III. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ALCHEMY AND MODERN SCIENCE
AND CHEMISTRY, AND THE RELEVANCE FOR COMPARATIVE LAW
What distinguishes the modern natural sciences from alchemy is
that the modern sciences make structured and methodical observations, report these clearly to communicate them to fellow scientists
for testing and verification, and deduce general natural laws from
the findings through experiments. Anything that cannot be observed
in experiments or otherwise is not accepted, and a comprehensive
interpretation of the world, partly based on speculation, is avoided.
The modern natural scientist usually stays away from natural philosophy, very much in contrast to the early modern scientists of the
seventeenth century. Modern science does not seek to integrate its
specific findings in a holistic philosophical interpretation of the

8. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 168-170.
9. MARK MORRISSON, MODERN ALCHEMY: OCCULTISM AND THE
EMERGENCY OF ATOMIC THEORY 135 (Oxford U. Press 2007).
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world, but adds to the body of knowledge in small, limited, objectively verifiable portions, through experimentation and observation. 10
Alchemists share with the modern chemist the need for practical
laboratory work, but for a different purpose: their knowledge derived from speculation and tradition, and their work was the attempted implementation of theory, not experiment that may yield an
underlying natural law. 11 The “work,” in the specific alchemic
sense, was primarily the elaboration of the philosophers’ stone (for
the transmutation). Only after that “work” knowledge in general
could be obtained, such as general principles of transmutation or
change in natural processes—concepts that ultimately derive from
Aristotelian thinking. The alchemist’s “work” only completes the
unfinished handiwork of nature, and the knowledge the alchemist
seeks to obtain from it is to be universal and all encompassing. 12
With the exception of striving for universal and holistic
knowledge of the world, the scientific approach of lawyers is more
similar to the alchemists than to the modern natural scientists. There
are no natural laws in law, human laws are indeed man-made; the
rules derive from tradition (particularly visible in the principle of
stare decisis of common law systems, but also any kind of customary law and civilian ius commune) and speculation (legal concepts
which are human intellectual constructs), and interpretation of authoritative texts, similar to the way in which alchemists obtain their
theories.
The lawyer operates through textual interpretation. Thus, law is
not a natural science (and strictly speaking not a social science) but
a historical-hermeneutic science—Hermes as the mythical father of
alchemy and the spiritus rector of the science of understanding and
interpretation of communication, hermeneutics, is an obvious connection. Whether law is also a hermetic science is for non-lawyers
10. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 177-178.
11. Id. at 178-179.
12. PETRUS BONUS, supra note 7, at 153, 169-170, 186-187.
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to decide; in any case, it should not be in a democracy founded on
transparency and public accountability. Law is based on authority,
not on natural laws elicited by observation and experimentation, and
it is normative, not factual. The parallel is especially visible in Christian alchemy that is also underpinned by moral (and legal, normative) tenets, which the alchemic “work” illustrates or completes. For
instance, the religious (moral/normative) concept of transubstantiation is mirrored by the alchemic transmutation. 13
Like the alchemist’s practical work in his laboratory, the lawyer’s work is also practical, as any legal practitioner who drafts a
contract would readily confirm, but this work is not designed to gain
any scientific knowledge from it. Yet, historically, a lawyer would
have considered the application of the laws, down to his “work” of
drafting a contract according to the law, as ultimately giving effect
to laws of Nature or immutable religious laws from God, similar to
the alchemists. The idea of the origin of law in God appears clearly
in the institutional writings of jurists as late as in the seventeenth
century when they discuss the sources of law. 14
Why is the history of the ideas of alchemy relevant to comparative law in particular? It is true that legal concepts, such as that of
specification, have alchemistic features, or are based on the same
philosophical concepts that would also contribute to the making of
alchemy. 15 More importantly, however, comparative lawyers, especially those discussing mixed legal systems, inadvertently use some
forms of alchemistic thinking.
13. PIERRE MUSSO, LA RELIGION INDUSTRIELLE 293 (Fayard 2017).
14. See, e.g., the Scottish institutional writer JAMES STAIR, THE INSTITUTIONS
OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 76-77 (David M. Walker ed., U. Presses of Edinburgh
& Glasgow 1681); see also the French institutional writer JEAN DOMAT, 1 THE
CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER: TOGETHER WITH THE PUBLIC LAW iii-iv (William Strahan trans., J. Bettenham ed. 1722).
15. The Sabinian School, influenced by the Stoa, was of the opinion that matter, even if manufactured and processed, remains essentially the same (therefore,
the original owner retains ownership), while the Proculians, in line with Aristotelian thinking, thought that processing changes matter because the form changes
and a new thing arises (thus, the manufacturer acquires ownership). See DIG.
41.1.7.7 (Gaius, Common Matters or Golden Things 2); see also MAX KASER,
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Isaiah Berlin, not without a certain distancing irony, has famously divided thinkers into hedgehogs and foxes. The hedgehog
relates everything to a single central vision, one system, and one
universal organising principle. Everything the hedgehog understands, feels, and says, has significance only within and in the light
of that principle. In contrast, the fox pursues many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some factual psychological or physiological way, with no underlying moral
or aesthetic principle. Plato, Dante, Pascal, Hegel, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Ibsen, Proust are hedgehogs, Berlin says. While Herodotus,
Aristotle, Montaigne, Erasmus, Molière, Goethe, Pushkin, Balzac,
Joyce are foxes. 16 Berlin also considers Tolstoy to be a fox, although
Tolstoy would have believed to be a hedgehog. 17 One could add
Voltaire, Hume and Alexander von Humboldt to the list of foxes
(who may also have believed to be hedgehogs), and, particularly important for comparative law, Herder, although Herder himself said
almost nothing about law specifically. 18
It is self-evident that the sciences and the bureaucracy of scientific pursuit and of universities strongly favour hedgehogs who
strive for discovering or developing a consistent, all-encompassing
system or theory, a set of axiomatic principal rules as the foundation
of everything, without contradictions, and based on some unquestioned notion of reason. Lawyers and legal theorists are no different.
Although the old science of law in particular mirrors the intellectual
history of mankind since antiquity, so that it blatantly shows the
contradictions, irreconcilabilities and irrationalities of rules
throughout the centuries, lawyers flee into the specialisation of some
DAS

RÖMISCHE PRIVATRECHT: ABSCHNITT. DAS ALTRÖMISCHE, DAS
VORKLASSISCHE UND KLASSISCHE RECHT 429 (2d ed., C. H. Beck ed. 1971).
16. Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, in THE PROPER STUDY OF
MANKIND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 436-437 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer

eds., Pimlico 1998).
17. Id. at 438.
18. Andreas Rahmatian, European Copyright Inside or Outside the European
Union: Pluralism of Copyright Laws and the “Herderian Paradox,” 47 INT’L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 918 (2016).
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areas of doctrinal law to pursue undisturbed the ideals of a kind of
oneness and of universal consistent rules. Anyone who realises irreconcilable contradictions, who is not afraid of noticing irrationalities and inexplicable evolutions, reconsiderations and reinterpretations of ideas and rules divorced from originally different contexts,
and who can live with value pluralism (not to be confused with value
relativism) 19 and even with the inherent paradox that the single, universal organising principle consists in being a conglomerate of incomparable and irreconcilable fundamental values and laws, that
person is a fox. This may be depressing for some, but for an intellectual historian or polymath (one often entails the other) this is inevitable, and for a comparative lawyer it is advisable.
Where ideas and notions influence each other, often in unexpected ways, and transmute to different concepts, so that causalities
can only be presumed but not ascertained, and where there is no
clear answer as to origin, characteristics or reason, then this situation
has alchemistic features. Thinkers who do allow these features into
their research and their thought could, beside the categories of
hedgehogs and foxes, perhaps be named alchemistic thinkers as opposed to Cartesian, mechanistic or causal thinkers.
Mixed legal systems obviously have elements of ideas of alchemy, but scholars of mixed legal systems think of themselves certainly not as alchemistic thinkers and often consider themselves as
hedgehogs, although they really are foxes (or should be). However,
their understanding of their object of study improves if they are open
to the idea of alchemist thought, independent of any endeavor of
turning base metals into gold, because a philosophical comprehension of alchemistic concepts has nothing to do with irrationality,
mysticism or unscientific study and experimentation.

19. See Isaiah Berlin, Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European
Thought, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF
IDEAS 76-82 (Henry Hardy ed., Fontana Press 1991) (on the value pluralism—not
value relativism—of Vico and Herder).
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IV. METAPHORICAL PARALLELS OF ALCHEMISTIC IDEAS IN LAW:
MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS
One has to make a few cautionary preliminarily comments about
the category of “mixed legal systems.” The phenomenon of mixed
legal systems or mixed jurisdictions 20 certainly exists, but usually
scholarly endeavours in this field are prompted by political aims as
much as by an increase of scientific knowledge. This starts with a
narrow demarcation of the field of study among orthodox scholarship: a mixed system is supposedly only a combination of Roman
law-inspired civil law and English law-inspired common law; the
representative legal systems being Scotland, South Africa, Quebec
and Louisiana. Based on these models, the “mixed system” concept
is sometimes even further limited: civil law and common law must
be the basic building blocks in the system; a mere mixture of laws
does not suffice. Furthermore, this mixture is supposed to be exclusively western, rooted in the Romano-Germanic and Anglo-American systems. 21
This restriction in the mixed system definition also chimes
nicely with the segregationist overtone of the whole conception.
First, it leaves out the whole area of indigenous customary laws of
the “western” mixed jurisdiction of South Africa in the spirit of the
Apartheid era—with which orthodox mixed systems scholars incidentally never really had a serious difficulty. 22 Secondly, it is conceived as a bastion for the pure and superior civil law besieged by
20. A distinction between these two terms, as suggested in Esin Örücü, The
Boundaries of Unity: Mixed Systems in Action, 3(1) J. COMP. L. 1, 2 (2008), appears to me not fruitful.
21. Daniel Visser, Cultural Forces in the Making of Mixed Legal Systems, 78
TUL. L. REV. 47 (2003); VERNON PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTION WORLDWIDE:
THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 8-9 (Cambridge U. Press 2001).
22. Compare Visser, supra note 21, at 74 (who at least discusses this problem
briefly), with PALMER, supra note 21, at 8, 24 (who does not discuss this problem
at all); see also Kenneth Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV.
18 (2003), who mentions positively the political changes in South Africa, but
gives the wrong impression that there was almost no interaction of scholars and
scholarship possible and happening before the fall of the Apartheid regime. For a
more accurate picture of the appreciation (or not) of the customary laws in South
Africa, see Caroline Nicholson, Globalisation v Glocalisation: No Contest; Legal
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the surrounding common law that tries to water down or even eradicate the indigenous national civil law roots of the system in question. 23 The distinction between “purists” (civil lawyers), “pollutionists” (common lawyers 24) and “pragmatists,” which has sometimes
been used to denote different types of scholars in their approach to
their mixed system and the civil law component in it, 25 only underlines this segregationist attitude. The supremacist spirit in race, law
and religion is palpable. The curious quest for purity in the law (in
particular) means that the “mixed system” apostles do not actually
want a mixture, but see themselves as valiant warriors against the
“pollutionists.” 26
It has been said, however, that in the 1950s the orthodox mixed
system movement was “born of fear for the future of the civil law
tradition,” while now the current interest is “founded more on national self-discovery and self-confidence.” 27 Perhaps, but the
boundary to an inward-looking narcissistic legal nationalism still
seems blurred. Codification of the mixed private law, with implicitly
turning to a civil law system by giving up the feature of the seemingly cherished civil law/common law mix, remains a popular project in any case. 28 Furthermore, in a strange contradiction to the
identitarian nationalism that this mixité purports to represent and
Comparison, Mixed Systems and Legal Pluralism, 45 COMP. INT’L. L. J. S. AFR.
258, 263 (2012).
23. This description is of course pointed, but one may only look at the language deployed, see e.g., Reid, supra note 22, at 21: “the civil law jewel in the
common law setting;” id. at 18, n. 61: “the assimilators are well armed” (citing T.
B. Smith).
24. That term “pollutionist” denotes “usually . . . Anglo-Americans (or English-speaking nationals) who, at least in the extreme cases, may only speak the
English language and have only common-law legal training.” PALMER, supra note
21, at 32. This mirrors T. B. Smith’s extreme view that a mixed system is a civilian
system that had been under pressure from the Anglo-American common law and
has in part been overlaid by that rival system of jurisprudence, see id. at 7.
25. PALMER, supra note 21, at 32.
26. See id. at 33 and n. 46, Palmer concedes that “acrimonious and affective
language has marred much of [mixed system] scholarship” and refers to critics
pointing out that especially South African scholarship has been spoiled by emotional jingoism and chauvinism.
27. Reid, supra note 22, at 18.
28. Id. at 36.
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maintain, particularly in Scotland, the mixed system is considered
as a blueprint for harmonisation or unification of private laws across
Europe. 29
What the actual mixed nature in each jurisdiction consists in, and
how it is to be ascertained and understood, seems to be far more
difficult to describe, and scholars start (and often finish) with an academic and general discussion about what mixedness means and implies. 30 In fact, an analytical study of the way in which that mixité
manifests itself can prove rather complicated, may show contradictions in the mixed system conception and depends much on personal
interpretation. As if seeking to avoid any doctrinal analytical study
of their law, orthodox scholars of the mixed system idea often resort
to lengthy discussions of the history and lore of famous academics
who have studied here and there, have influenced this and that other
great scholar, or have written this and that profound study within
their legal system. 31 Sometimes they also give an outline of past or
present syllabuses of law degrees that apparently safeguard the law
from descending into the abyss of the unsystematic and chaotic common law. 32

29. See, e.g., Hein Kötz, The Value of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV.
435, 436, 439 (2003); even scholars from outside mixed systems jurisdictions see
the mixed systems as being in a good position to make an important contribution
to the harmonisation of European law. That was in the early 2000s. After the financial crisis of 2009 and many other problems which the EU is preoccupied with,
the project of a European Civil Code is presumably dead, and that should be welcomed; see Andreas Rahmatian, Codification of Private Law in Scotland: Observations by a Civil Lawyer, 8 ED. L. REV. 31, 54-55 (2004).
30. E.g., Reid, supra note 22, at 19-20; see also PALMER, supra note 21, at 7:
“There has never been an accepted definition of a mixed jurisdiction and it would
be premature to try to offer one here.”
31. For Scotland, see Reid, supra note 22, at 8-17; including the usual lengthy
description of T. B. Smith’s academic career and the comment about T. B. Smith’s
mixed system activities and research, that “the impression lingers of a one-man
band,” id. at 15. For South Africa, see Visser supra note 21, at 54-56, 61-62; “the
Dutch government and universities made it increasingly difficult for South Africans to study or do research in the Netherlands, perhaps because they felt that they
particularly wanted to distance themselves from the sins of apartheid perpetrated
by their kinsmen.” Id. at 62.
32. Visser, supra note 21, at 59.
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Civil law trained lawyers will notice that orthodox mixed system
aficionados are much better versed in the workings of the unloved
common law 33 than of the loved civil law, and they do not let their
romantic love of codified private law in civil law systems being disturbed by actual civil lawyers’ knowledge. 34 Unsurprisingly, a Roman law specialist would not want to have Celsus or Ulpian walking
into his class either and tell him that they have a different recollection of their legal deliberations at the time and that the Digest is really an unreliable patchwork. The private and commercial law of
Scotland at least is clearly bent towards the common law with considerable influence of civil law concepts and rules in certain areas.
However, such a finding would be unwelcome, and so one carries
on dreaming of some mystical civil law ideal, not irritated by reality,
which confers comforting nationalistic identity and inward-looking
difference, something lawyers are generally favourable to anyway,
even without the crutch of a “mixed system” idea. This caricaturing
portrayal of the orthodox and prevalent mixed system discussion
only shows the difficulties one encounters when one seeks to determine the essence and purpose of that “mixed system” idea.
The defensive and chauvinistic tone of the mixed system debate
may prompt a researcher to discard this kind of mixed system conception. Although it is the orthodox and prevalent conception, one
may start questioning whether it has any scientific value at all. Leaving aside the unpleasant political overtones, the arbitrary definition
of a legal system as a mix between common law and civil law potentially starts with a false premise, because before codification, the
civil law was also a “common law.” It was customary law, and, apart
from the more formal court structure and decisions that could oper-

33. Reid also acknowledges this; see Reid, supra note 22, at 36.
34. See, i.e., Rahmatian, supra note 29, at 31, demonstrating how one would
have to go about the codification of private law for the purpose of a Scots Civil
Code (generally a popular project among Scots mixed-system academics for preserving Scots law), although this article had no effect whatsoever in Scotland.
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ate as precedents, it was a phenomenon not too dissimilar from African customary laws. 35 Nevertheless, it is telling that such a connection has been ignored: that only shows again a certain segregationist attitude in the scholarly approach. After the reception, 36 the
ius commune was influenced by Roman law to a varying degree.
This ius commune, especially the later usus modernus pandectarum, 37 was by no means uniform across the European continent (neither in space nor in time), although some adherents to the European
legal unification project seem to assume this. 38 Taking one prototype of orthodox “mixed system” scholarship, Scots private law, one
has to state that this is uncodified common law, in both senses of
this term.
However, one need not give up on mixed system conceptions
altogether. In case of a properly understood mixité the conceptual
characteristics of the mix and its discussion can resemble alchemistic features. The problem is that a rejection of the orthodox mixed
system conception does not help determining what a mixed system
is. Some say that mixed systems do not actually exist as a separate
legal family, they are hybrid systems of existing legal families.39
Others, however, regard all legal systems as mixed, covertly or
overtly, a realistic starting point and therefore appealing. 40 There are
variants of this view, for example, mixed systems have been defined
as those with substantive attributes and methods derived from two

35. Andreas Rahmatian, Termination of Marriage in Nigerian Family Laws:
The Need for Reform and the Relevance of the Tanzanian Experience, 10(3) INT’L
J. L. POL’Y FAM. 281, 284, 309 n.11 (1996).
36. FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE 71 (Tony
Weir trans., Clarendon Press 1995).
37. Id. at 160.
38. Zimmermann Reinhard, Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative
Law, and the Emergence of a European Legal Science, 112 L. Q. REV. 576, 576,
579-582 (1996).
39. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 72, 204 (3d ed., Tony Weir trans., Oxford U. Press 1998).
40. Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System? Exclusion or Expansion?, 3
J. COMP. L. 34, 35 (2008); H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE
WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 37 (3d ed., Oxford U. Press 2007).
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or more systems generally recognised as independent of others. 41 A
broader approach finds the idea of the mixed system as a third legal
family too constraining because that only adds another monolithic
legal “family” to the civil law and common law families. It is also
Eurocentric and does not take account of all sorts of other variants
across the world. 42 More open approaches to an interpretation of the
mixed system phenomenon try to overcome a certain ethnocentricity
(western, European), which can obviously be encountered in all debates within comparative law, not only in relation to mixed systems. 43
Legal systems are all combinations and overlaps of different influences; there are no purely “home-grown” legal systems. A classification of forms of mixes along a spectrum has been suggested,
from a simple mix (or hybrids with civil and common law as their
ingredient), to complex mixes (hybrids with civil law, common law,
religious law and customary law in different combinations) and legal pluralisms (dualist systems with layers of law co-existing and
applicable to different members of the population). 44 Legal pluralisms are a very important category for the African laws for example,
with the academic distinction between indigenous customary laws,
received/transplanted Western laws (common law if under the influence of the former British Empire), and where applicable, Islamic
law (mostly according to the Maliki or Shafi’i Sunni schools). However, these seemingly clear layers of laws are also in a constant flux
because of the socioeconomic interactions and changes in modern
African societies. Therefore, customary laws are not neatly separated from other laws and not necessarily observed by indigenous
peoples only. 45
41. Nicholson, supra note 22, at 265.
42. Örücü, supra note 40, at 34-35.
43. PIERRE LEGRAND, COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND
TRANSITIONS 240, 260 (P. Legrand & R. Munday eds., Cambridge U. Press 2003).
44. Örücü, supra note 40, at 38, 46, 51.
45. Anthony C. Diala, The Concept of Living Customary Law: A Critique,
49(2) J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 9-12, 15-16 (2017).
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The discussion often employs interesting culinary or biological
and horticultural metaphors. For example, the “Italian salad bowl”
where the salad dressing covers the ingredients, but the (socio-culturally and legal-culturally different) ingredients are still clearly detectable (example: Algerian law); or: “When legal systems are considered as overlaps, combinations, marriages and offspring, terminology such as fertilisation, pollination, grafting, intertwining, osmosis and pruning can illuminate the processes of the birth of mixed
systems.” 46
Culinary, horticultural or not, such metaphors are not too distant
from alchemistic ideas. The mixed system idea (especially in its less
Eurocentric form) presupposes a certain notion of oneness of a kind
of philosophical matter called “law.” Neither the alchemists, indebted to platonic and neoplatonic (and subsequently Arab) thought,
nor comparative lawyers, perhaps also, but inadvertently, influenced
by (Neo)Platonism, are really clear about the nature of their metaphysical all-encompassing substance. However, comparative lawyers assume that every form of law can be combined with every
other form of law in principle, regardless of socio-cultural and legalcultural similarities and differences because they are varieties of the
same oneness. This is similar to what the Emerald Tablet (or Emerald Table) 47 says that was highly influential in the development of
alchemy, although the connection with the sun, the moon, and the
planets is not something that lawyers would agree with. 48
46. Örücü, supra note 40, at 39, 47.
47. Eric John Holmyard, The Emerald Table, 112 NATURE 525, 526 (1923);
see also PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 32.
48. At any rate, modern lawyers would not agree. In the Middle Ages, the
Renaissance, and until the beginning of the eighteenth century, it was commonly
assumed that all laws ultimately derive from God and man-made laws could not
contradict these (Christian natural law theory), and that God created the world
with everything being propelled according to (God’s) natural laws (that is, the
laws of nature, like the celestial mechanics). At that time, Christian alchemists
and lawyers were not far apart. There were of course alchemists who were lawyers, and some colorful figures and rogues, like the English alchemist Edward
Kelley (1555-1597), who was John Dee’s assistant. See HOLMYARD, supra note
2, at 206-208; but it would be necessary to determine whether their legal writings
(if any) were noticeably influenced by alchemist conceptions.
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This ubiquitous substance is a notion of the pneuma, 49 and law
imbued with pneuma is living law, changing under cultural and legal
influences—influences which may create a mixité. The shortcomings of the orthodox scholarship on mixed systems become apparent
again: the orthodox approach is static in that it seeks to preserve defensively a perceived status quo of a certain accepted mixedness to
maintain legal (and political) identity or even to reverse the mixedness to return to the purportedly purer and superior original system,
usually a civil law system. A modern understanding of mixed systems will always emphasise the continual fluidity and change: law
is living, imbued with pneuma or “spirit.” That “spirit” constitutes
the socio-cultural force that shapes and changes laws and influences
the type and level of mixedness over time. 50 Where the mixedness
is close, the ingredient laws either “react” and become a new chemical compound, or, if it is less close, form an alloy or a chemical
mixture or solution. The mixture of different laws is least advanced
in case of a heterogeneous mixture, where the components remain
discernible, like water and oil: many versions of legal pluralism
would be examples of this phenomenon. In comparative law, one
also finds notional compounds that are mixed with components and
form together a heterogeneous mixture. There are many other varieties. Nonetheless, different from the modern chemist, the comparative lawyer will find it difficult to break down all the components
to elements out of which all matter is made. Theoretically one reduces, for example, the aspects of a formation of contract, a kind of
legal molecule, to certain forming atoms (offer, declaration of will)
and sees how these elements appear in different legal systems. There
are such endeavours, especially in view of harmonisation projects of
private law across Europe, and not necessarily convincing ones. 51 It

49. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 16.
50. E.g., Örücü, supra note 40, at 47.
51. E.g., Anon., The Common Core of European Private Law, 4(4) UNIF. L.
REV. 937, 937 (1999); see also THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW,
https://perma.cc/BB49-GVFE.
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is also easier to find such “atoms” if the variations of laws are limited, because the study confines itself to Europe only, for example.
Comparative lawyers, especially if they want to avoid the trap
of Eurocentrism or ethnocentrism, are normally compelled to take a
more holistic view and find themselves on the side of the alchemists
by assuming philosophical-comprehensive substances or “legal systems,” like the Aristotelian four elements 52 or the seven metals, such
as Patrick Glenn’s seven principal legal traditions of the world. 53
Sometimes the seven metals are reduced to two in the narrow traditional interpretation of mixed systems as a mix between civil and
common law systems only (are these the noble metals gold and silver?). However, the number does not matter, important is the idea
of an ultimately metaphysical substance, the legal system, the legal
tradition, the legal culture, even “legal science,” 54 a concept that defies clear definition, particularly as natural science would understand it, like “philosophical mercury”: alchemists often used the
terms “philosophical mercury” or “philosophical sulphur” where the
ingredients were not mercury or sulphur, but were supposed to act
like these, because these two elements (in a modern chemical sense)
were commonly used as agents for changes (chemical reactions). 55
In relation to changes, what about the philosophers’ stone and
transmutation? Here the mixed system conceptions also show certain similarities. As discussed, the philosophers’ stone is as much a
metaphysical concept as a chemical reality. The stone was often

52. ARISTOTLE, ON THE HEAVENS [304a]. Obviously, Aristotle did not invent
this idea of the four elements, but referred to earlier Greek philosophers.
53. GLENN, supra note 40, at 344.
54. The reason why “legal science” is mentioned here is that the description
of the law always has a prescriptive or normative effect and, therefore, shapes the
object of description through the description, as one would expect from law as a
hermeneutic-historical normative science; on the hermeneutical method in comparative law, see, e.g., GEOFFREY SAMUEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW THEORY AND METHOD 108 (Hart Publ’g 2014). The natural scientist, particularly the astronomer, can only describe the existing laws of the planetary movements: whether he describes these laws or not or describes them wrongly, has no
influence whatsoever on the revolutions of the planets.
55. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 122.
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seen as acting as a purging fire that burned out the impurities from
base metals that prevented them from becoming pure gold. Other
authors, more in the Aristotelian line of thinking, 56 considered the
stone as containing the (Aristotelian) form of gold already which,
when projected onto a base metal, replaced the original form with
that of gold. 57 As Petrus Bonus describes 58:
But we only just melt the imperfect metals over the fire, and
then add to them the philosophers’ stone, which, in a moment of time, imparts to them the form of gold, thus changing and ennobling their nature, and conserving their own
proper metallic humour.
That procedure is always a completion and perfection of nature,
not a change to nature’s course. 59 There were many possible ingredients of the philosophers’ stone—mercury and sulphur being the
most common 60—but the method of making the stone was rather
similar: heating the mixture, for a long time with equal temperature,
in a glass vessel with a long neck being “hermetically sealed,” and
if that did not explode (a rather common accident), then various
other treatments, especially reheating of the black, later white, finally red mixture (“red elixir”) followed. 61
It may come as a surprise, or may even create slight irritation,
that “mixed system” scholarship effectively operates along similar
lines. There is this indefinite and ambiguous change between form
and substance, between ingredient and “elixir” or “philosophers’
stone.” When two legal cultures are mixed, does that create a new
legal system with a new legal culture? What is the legal culture: an

56. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS [1039a-1039b].
57. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 126.
58. PETRUS BONUS, supra note 7, at 154.
59. Id. at 153.
60. Also as a philosophical concept, see e.g., PETRUS BONUS, supra note 7,
at 312: “there is but one Philosophers’ Stone . . . Its external sulphur of vulgar
quicksilver is foreign to it; its inward sulphur belongs to its own nature, and into
this it must be converted by our magistery.”
61. Description by PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 123-124.
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ingredient? Or, is the elixir like “philosophical mercury and sulphur”? Mixes are obviously also processes, as chemical processes
are, only that the lawyers cannot really ascertain them, and nor could
the alchemists. Some mixes explode (dysfunctional hybrids where a
transplant of laws does not work 62), some lead to phenomena that
are open to different interpretation (e.g., in Scotland: mix of civil
law and common law or encroachment of historical civil law by
common law), similar to the speculative and equivocal recipes of
alchemists, which can be extremely difficult to interpret and recreate, even where they were real recipes. 63
Sometimes legal mixes are considered as transmutations, as incorrectly as in alchemy. Sometimes transmutations are not seen as
the important issue. In alchemy, many alchemists regarded making
gold through transmutation (chrysopoeia) as the highest and ultimate goal, 64 while Paracelsus, for example, showed little interest in
transmutational gold making.65 In comparative law, the representatives of a comparative legal science who compare legal systems and
their mixes for the purpose of transnational legal unification seek to
exercise some transmutational work out of the ingredients, and the
thick commentaries of European law projects of various kinds may
serve as a kind of philosophers’ stone, and are as inefficient as the
real one in alchemy. 66 In contrast, the particularists 67 who strongly
oppose legal unification, often start out from a mystical oneness in
their diversity, that there is the substance, in many differences, but

62. Burkina Faso and Micronesia are examples given by Örücü, supra note
40, at 47.
63. For a description of testing alchemists’ recipes by modern chemists, see
PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 140-143.
64. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 13.
65. HOLMYARD, supra note 2, at 170.
66. E.g., Study Group on a European Civil Code, HWP-EuP 2009,
https://perma.cc/SM8R-RWAZ; see also, e.g., CHRISTIAN VON BAR & STEPHEN
SWANN, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN LAW: UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT vii-ix (Oxford U. Press 2010); see also Ole Lando, Have the PECL Been a Success or a
Failure?, 17(3) EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 367, 367 (2009).
67. See Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60(1) MOD. L. REV.
44, 44 (1997).
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still discernable, of a Volksgeist, a national character which shapes
the national laws, a legal mentalité. Transmutation to a new, higher
substance (unified law) is not desired, but the existence of this mystical substance is postulated: a distinct (immutable?) culture, a law
imbued with this culture, which in this way adopts a distinct legal
mentalité, so that supposedly not even legal transplants are possible. 68 The form is contained in the existing culture, a form that can
only be found in other phenomena, but never changed, only perfected through the scholar’s “great work,” except through violence
in form of cultural imperialism, as (transmutational) legal unification would be. When reading about the same and the different and
its relationship to the “oneness” in comparative law, perhaps obscured by impurities of postmodernism, 69 one cannot help thinking
of the scholarly occult and esoteric, which always accompanied alchemy as well, and one feels reaching out for the Emerald Tablet:
“That which is above is from that which is below, and that which is
below is from that which is above, working the miracles of one. As
all things were from one.” 70
There is a further quite uncomfortable parallel: the search for the
philosophers’ stone in alchemy as well as in comparative law is futile. Alchemy discovered many useful substances and reactions on
its way, but metallic transmutation is chemically impossible.
Equally, one can make shadowy, ethereal comparisons of legal systems, but a transmutational legal unification is impossible, as much
as it is impossible to ascertain an irreducible difference distilled as
a quintessential mystical substance called legal culture, legal tradition, legal mentalité or national character—another version of the
“pneuma.” It appears that this substance is somehow unalterably engrained in “nature,” and the lawyer with his art can only bring out
and complete the work of nature, but cannot create anything anew.
68. See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” 4
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111, 111 (1997).
69. See, e.g., LEGRAND, supra note 43, at 256-260.
70. Holmyard, supra note 47, at 526.
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In actual fact, the legal mentalité or national character becomes dissolved in the aqua regia of intellectual history, like gold.
As a particularist myself who does not see anything beneficial
in the necessarily crude unification of legal systems, for example in
the form of codified European private law, I nevertheless maintain
that there is no “natural” immutable legal mentalité or culture or (legal) tradition or national character. These phenomena do exist, but
they are entirely man-made; they do not derive from a mystical
source, an alchemistic brew of culture, tradition, language, education, art and so forth. 71 Education and art already indicate a manmade origin. Any kind of culture, including legal culture can be created in a deliberate or directed way, through education, political activity, propaganda, forces of modern society, which shape and are
shaped by politics, historical accidents, wars, the media and other
political and social factors. There is no deus ex machina and no
pneuma or spiritual force emanating from, and transcending, “the
people.” This also has to be taken into account when one relies on
Herder’s ideas of “national character” or distinct culture, which are
otherwise fruitful for comparative law. 72 Traditions are “invented”
and arbitrary, often accidental, and there is nothing deterministic or
immutable about it, neither from a biological nor from a cultural
perspective. This is particularly true of legal traditions, because the
most principal sources of law, statutes and court decisions, are indeed rules deliberately created by human will. The forms and methods of solutions adopted by these legal rules are culturally shaped,
but not culturally determined, and each law can deliberately and arbitrarily break from, and contradict, a tradition at any time: there is
no ascertainably “true” tradition in law. David Hume rightly observed that “it may safely be affirmed that jurisprudence is . . . different from all the sciences; and that in many of its nicer questions,
71. Rahmatian, supra note 18, at 918.
72. See Rahmatian supra note 18, at 918-919; see also LEGRAND, supra note
43, at 265-268. Legrand does not take these differentiating factors into account
when invoking Herder.
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there cannot properly be said to be truth or falsehood on either
side.” 73
As a result, legal traditions, their mentalité and their mixité
change, and necessarily so, either through deliberate acts or through
the more or less uncoordinated doings of a great number of humans
shaping the law through its making and application over the course
of history. Therefore, legal transplants can exist and they do exist
very often. However, the interpretation as to what legal transplants
really are also contains some alchemistic thinking.
V. ALCHEMISTIC PROCESSES: RECEPTION OF LAWS AND LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS
The discussion about the possibility of legal transplants is wellknown 74 and need not be restated at length. Some say that transplants and massive and continuing borrowing of rules and institutions were the prevalent features in the development of legal systems. Legal transplanting and legal borrowing (an equivalent term)
help explain reasons for legal change, and different types of transplants can be discerned. 75 The other extreme view is the complete
rejection of the possibility of legal transplants. If legal transplants
are said to exist and to account for change in the law, this argument
must “unavoidably reduce law to rules and rules to bare-propositional-statements,” and rules are then wrongly considered as solitary
and detached from power and the divergent interests in society. 76
Both views ignore the variability of these “abstract” legal rules in

73. DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 308 (2d ed., Sir Lewis Amherst
Selby-Bigge ed., Clarendon Press 1963).
74. For discussion, see MATTHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 195-200
(Cambridge U. Press 2014); see also the brief helpful summary by Esin Örücü,
Law as Transposition, 51 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 205, 206 (2002).
75. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS. AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 29, 107 (U. of Georgia Press 1993); see also Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and European Private Law, 4 ELEC. J. COMP. L. § VI (2000).
76. Legrand, supra note 68, at 120.
AND
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different cultural environments too much. In which way the distillation of legal cultures and a legal mentalité appears in a specific legal
rule or legal institution cannot be determined clearly in the first
place, and how it manifests itself in the new cultural and legal environment depends on all sorts of social, political and generally cultural factors, as one can see in the reception of English common law
in Anglo-Muslim law in Pakistan or in legal systems in Commonwealth Africa, for example. The comparative lawyers of both sides
have no real idea of the constituent elements, as a modern chemist
would however have, but rather have a vague and philosophicalspeculative, not primarily empirical, understanding of the chemical
compounds as a means for perfecting the “great work” in philosophical-religious-cultural terms (or they claim that this is impossible),
like the old alchemists. 77 They do not appreciate the chemical reactions the transplanted matter has with the new cultural substances.
A more practical and realistic solution between these two extremes has been proposed, the “legal transposition.” This metaphor
from music stresses that “[e]ach legal institution or rule introduced
is used in the system of the recipient, as it was in the system of the
model, the transposition occurring to suit the particular socio-legal
culture and needs of the recipient.” 78 Nevertheless, this metaphor
from music also has its shortcomings. In a transposition, neither the
intervals between the notes, nor the harmony, melody and the
rhythm are changed in any way. If one transposes a piece in a-minor
to e-minor, it is the same piece, a fifth higher (or a fourth lower),
nothing else. Far more happens if there are legal transplants or receptions of laws, and if one pursues that musical metaphor, then one
would have to compare these situations of legal receptions (a better
term anyway) to a set of different variations over an invariant ground
bass, for example, like a chaconne. What that legal equivalent to the
constant ground bass really is—the constituent invariable essence or

77. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 178-179.
78. Örücü, supra note 74, at 207.
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element—can be described more accurately with an alchemistic
metaphor.
The alchemists were never clear about what exactly made a philosophers’ stone—mercury and sulphur seemed to have played a
central role—but they knew, for example, that mercury and sulphur
can react with each other, which can produce cinnabar (mercury sulphide, HgS) known since antiquity as a red ore for making a red
pigment (vermillion) and for obtaining pure mercury. The alchemists did not know that mercury and sulphur were “elements” in the
modern chemical sense, but they knew of the chemical reaction and
they knew how to extract liquid mercury (through roasting crushed
cinnabar in kilns). In a similar way, the transplant or transposition
of a legal rule or institution leads to certain changes or “reactions”
in the receiving legal system, and although one may not know what
the legal “elements” of these legal rules are, one can use these rules
for legal change or “reaction.” The principal difference is that the
alchemist or chemist is bound by natural laws, which he only makes
use of; he has no influence over them and the chemical reaction happens necessarily according to these laws. The lawyers, however,
have all possible influences over the “reaction” the imported legal
rules are supposed to effect, for law making through borrowing is as
man-made as indigenous law-making. A practical problem is that
lawyers do not necessarily appreciate the (presumed) meaning of the
borrowed laws and may therefore not foresee unintended consequences, but the fact that effects of human endeavours are not fully
understood by humans themselves does not mean that they are subjected to natural laws. Every sociologist can attest to that.
Another reason why comparative lawyers also think more like
alchemists rather than like modern chemists is that lawyers (especially in the common law world) have a clear aversion against the
idea of a legal science and analysis which would elicit, distil or crystallise legal elements or legal “bricks” that can operate in different
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legal and cultural settings, though frequently with different effects. 79
It is an overstatement, and often plainly wrong, to consider legal
rules and institutions in their entirety as completely and inseparably
connected to their original cultural, political, social and linguistic
context. There is nevertheless the frequent claim that law is tied to a
particular legal system, and apparently there cannot be any possibility for abstraction that transcends the concrete example of a specific
jurisdiction. 80 If humans had always thought like that, we would not
be able to learn foreign languages and mathematics would never
have come into existence. In fact, subconsciously and unacknowledged, all lawyers effectively abstract when they adapt foreign legal
rules and institutions to their own legal system. 81
The result of these distorting interpretations of legal transplants
is that those who do not cope with difference drive forward legal
unification, those who adore difference deny any abstraction that
may detach the concept from its (Western) cultural background (remember: the abstraction of the so-called Arabic numerals and the
number zero were invented in non-Western India), and even the
common-core seekers tend to be wrong-headed despite their potentially acceptable starting point: their endeavours are also designed
to achieve seemingly effective large-scale unification, which makes
individual receptions and transplants superfluous in the future, as if
that were possible or desirable. What all these lawyers have in common is that they work, quite scientifically and practically, in their
legal laboratories to give effect to a non-empirical speculative phil-

79. A rare early example that sought to distill such general legal concepts,
principles or elements, though with no practical effect, can be found in LORD
KAMES, HENRY HOME, ELUCIDATIONS RESPECTING THE COMMON AND STATUTE
LAW OF SCOTLAND (W. Creech ed. 1777).
80. The real reason for this common attitude among lawyers is not the supposed purely indigenous cultural uniqueness of their legal system, but the attempt
at retaining a monopoly in the local legal profession that keeps out the competition
of lawyers trained in a different legal system.
81. For a discussion on transplantations and their problems and effects, see
Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV.
1, 7-8, 12, 17-18 (1974).
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osophical or religious all-encompassing concept that defies scientific proof, as it was with the old alchemists. Nevertheless, the alchemists were aware of that, while the modern lawyers are not.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article is an example of the history of ideas; it does not suggest that comparative lawyers must become hobby alchemists to understand their own discipline better. However, the discussion has
shown that the ways of thinking and argumentation by comparative
lawyers in relation to mixed legal systems and legal transplants have
much in common with the concepts of natural philosophy and their
practical application by the alchemists until the early eighteenth century. Law is an eminently practical discipline, like alchemy, and has
at the same time a philosophical-speculative underpinning, like alchemy with its underlying natural philosophy that is largely absent
in the modern natural sciences. This speculative quality makes law
part of the arts and humanities, and where we have interactions between different “matter” in a philosophical sense, such as different
legal institutions or whole legal systems in comparative law, we
reach the terrain of metaphorical alchemistic reactions and processes.
Comparative lawyers fear to be foxes and want to be hedgehogs:
they want one all-embracing theory of unification or one theory of
total immutable difference throughout history. They do not want to
realise that difference itself is changing like an unstable chemical
compound. Sometimes there is more convergence and sometimes
more divergence, a divergence that cannot be solidified as an unchangeable fact or, in contrast, denied altogether. The mixedness of
mixed systems is equally unstable. The laws and their mixes are always changing, like the living and breathing bodies of the humans
who make them, and they do appear as metaphorical examples of
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alchemistic metamorphosis. As was said in an important book of alchemy from the thirteenth century, with the title Book of Hermes
foreshadowing Francis Bacon 82:
Human works are variously the same as natural ones, as we
shall show in fire, air, water, earth, minerals, trees, and animals. For the fire of natural lightning and the fire thrown
forth by a stone is the same fire . . . . But the artificial are
even better than the natural . . . . The natural wild tree and
the artificially grafted one are both trees . . . . Nor does art
do all these things; rather it helps nature to do them. Therefore the assistance of this art does not alter the natures of
things. Hence the works of man can be both natural with regard to essence and artificial with regard to mode of production.
We cannot create life, as particularly the Paracelsian alchemists
believed, but we can recognise that the artificial products of human
thought, such as law, may be as mutable as the living creatures of
nature.
APPENDIX
AN OUTLINE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NOTIONS OF ALCHEMY
UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF MODERN SCIENTIFIC THINKING
Alchemy did not start with Aristotle, but some of Aristotle’s
texts on the constitution of matter contained central concepts alchemy would take up, 83 especially passages of On the Heavens and
of On Generation and Corruption, stating that there are four elements with connected properties (fire—hot and dry, air—hot and
moist, water— cold and moist, earth—cold and dry), 84 and there can
be mutual transformation of the elements. 85 Particularly important

82. WILLIAM NEWMAN, NATURAL PARTICULARS: NATURE AND THE
DISCIPLINES IN RENAISSANCE EUROPE 321, 324-325 (A. Grafton & N. Siraisi eds.,
MIT Press 1999).
83. HOLMYARD, supra note 2, at 21.
84. ARISTOTLE, ON GENERATION AND CORRUPTION [330a-330b].
85. ARISTOTLE, supra note 52, at [304b-305b].
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was the fourth book of Aristotle’s Meteorologica, 86 a largely unknown text today because it is contradicted by modern science in
practically every point. This is partly also the result of the fact that
the Greek philosophers observed and speculated upon observation,
but they did not experiment. The fourth book is important for alchemy, because it discusses processes of change in the four elements
(“generation” and “destruction”/“decay,” whereby the properties of
the elements, hot and cold are “active,” moist and dry are “passive”);
these concepts shall also explain the processes living creatures undergo (growth, decay/rot). 87 The effect of heat is concoction (an idea
of maturity, produced by heat, it comprises the forms of ripening,
boiling and roasting), while cold leads to inconcoction (comprising
rawness, scalding and scorching). 88 Aristotle discusses further the
outside effects on various combinations of properties of the four elements, for example boiling 89:
Boiling, as a general term, is concoction by moist heat of the
undetermined material present in the moisture of a thing, but
the term is properly applicable only to things cooked by boiling. This material . . . is either of an airy or watery nature.
The concoction arises from the fire in the moisture . . . . Bodies which contain no moisture, like stones, cannot [be
boiled], nor can bodies which contain moisture but which are
too solid for it to be mastered, like wood.
This conceptual, metaphorical, and symbolic classification of
matter and its transformations was profoundly influential on what
was later to become alchemy and its notions, imagery, symbolism
and mysticism. 90 The important idea is that matter can transform: in
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the Aristotelian concept of
transformation and change by nature or by force (through an agent
86. WILLIAM NEWMAN, ATOMS AND ALCHEMY: CHYMISTRY AND THE
EXPERIMENTAL ORIGINS OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 67 (U. of Chicago Press
2006).
87. ARISTOTLE, METEOROLOGICA [378b-379b].
88. Id. at [379b-380a].
89. Id. at [380b] (Translation of this passage by H. D. P. Lee).
90. For typical images, see ALEXANDER ROOB, THE HERMETIC MUSEUM:
ALCHEMY & MYSTICISM 405-406 (Taschen 2016).
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outside the body itself) did not only concern matter, but also mathematics and music. 91 In every case, the idea of change or metamorphosis contains the kernel of alchemist transmutation. Another passage, from Book III of the Meteorologica, makes this even more apparent 92:
[E]ffects produced by exhalation . . . when enclosed in the
parts of the earth . . . [are] two different kinds of body, being
itself twofold . . . . For there are, we maintain, two exhalations, one vaporous and one smoky; and there are two corresponding kinds of body produced within the earth, ‘fossils’
[here: minerals or stones] and metals. The dry exhalation by
the action of its heat produces all the ‘fossils’ . . . . Metals
are the product of vaporous exhalation.
This exhalation or vapour comes from the spirit (pneuma) that
also encompasses matter and is the active principle of all things. 93
These vapours pass through stone and, when they condense, they
can form metals. Later, the alchemists based the idea of transmutation on this thought; they then also considered “dry vapour” as
meaning sulphur and “moist vapour” denoting mercury; from that
the alchemist theory derives that all metals are made of mercury and
sulphur. 94 However, these two substances were not necessarily the
true chemical elements, but also other material, therefore the term
“philosophical mercury/sulphur” was often used. 95 As many alchemists operated in secrecy they frequently used cover-names, by
naming substances with (confusingly) different names or by using
allegorical expressions, which makes it very difficult to decipher old

91. PETER PESIC, MUSIC AND THE MAKING OF MODERN SCIENCE 44-45, at 74
(MIT Press 2014).
92. ARISTOTLE, supra note 87, at [378a].
93. See Theophrastus Paracelsus, Archidoxis, Book 4, in DER HIMMEL DER
PHILOSOPHEN 27 (Greno 1988): “The quinta essentia is namely the life sprit of
the thing” (and can therefore not be extracted from living creatures, only from
matter).
94. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 20-21; see, e.g., PETRUS BONUS, supra note 7,
at 187.
95. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 122.
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alchemist instructions today. 96 There were several variants to the
principle of these two fundamental substances; Paracelsus, for example, said that all metals derive from mercury, sulphur and salt. 97
The all-embracing pneuma or breath 98 (for living creatures the
“breath of life”) emphasised the idea of oneness, an idea which also
appears in the concept of there being one underlying substance beneath the constantly changing appearance of things: most Greek philosophers adopted this idea of monism. 99 The substance or changing
things were not the pneuma itself, but matter imbued with pneuma.
That aspect of oneness is central to one of the earliest texts of alchemy, the Emerald Tablet attributed to Hermes Trismegistus (The
thrice-blessed Hermes), a neoplatonic text probably from the second
or third century CE, in Arabic, but of Greek-Egyptian origin. 100 A
passage of the Table reads 101:
As all things were from one. Its father is the Sun and its
mother the Moon . . . . Feed the Earth from that which is
subtle, with the greatest power. It ascends from the Earth to
the heaven and becomes ruler over that which is above and
that which is below.
This legendary “Hermes” was also understood to be the Egyptian god Thoth, corresponding to the Greek god Hermes, the messenger between the gods and mortals. The obscure text is a central
96. See PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 146-152, who has tried (successfully) in a
laboratory some of alchemistic allegorical descriptions which are, and are to be
understood as, chemical processes.
97. Paracelsus, Über die Natur der Dinge, Book 1, in DER HIMMEL DER
PHILOSOPHEN, supra note 93, at 101.
98. On that notion in Greek philosophy in the context of alchemy, see
PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 16.
99. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 14.
100. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 30; HOLMYARD, supra note 2, at 97; see
FRANCES YATES, GIORDANO BRUNO AND THE HERMETIC TRADITION 2-6, 13, 18
(Routledge 2002), on the various hermetic writings (especially the “Poemandres”
or Pimander, in Greek, being the “Corpus Hermeticum”) under the name of Hermes Trismegistus, which were translated in the Renaissance by the philosopher
Marsilio Ficino in 1463. The Pimander was very influential on the Renaissance
humanists. The Emerald Tablet is not contained in the Pimander, and it only exists
in Arabic, although an original Greek version is likely.
101. Holmyard, supra note 47, at 526 (translated from the Arabic). There were
several variants, see, e.g., HOLMYARD, supra note 2, at 98.
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source for alchemic ideas and the well-known imagery of many alchemistic pictures in later periods. The text and other hermetic writings under the name of Hermes Trismegistus were particularly influential on Renaissance alchemy. It contains elements of the macrocosm or celestial world, of the microcosm or terrestrial world, the
connection of the substances with the stars and planets, and emphasises the monist idea (“all things were from one”). 102 That idea of
oneness is also the basis for the alchemistic thought that the precious
metal is already contained in the base metal; the alchemist does not
create new substances, but only completes nature. 103 This completion would be effected particularly by the philosophers’ stone, which
was the “it” (“Its father is the sun . . . .”) for the alchemists. 104 There
were numerous interpretations of the Emerald Tablet in alchemistic
texts over the centuries. 105
However, this is not to say that alchemists were necessarily
speculative mystics; many were not. They were early experimenters
and virtually the only laboratory workers, contrary to the ubiquitous
Aristotelian speculative natural philosophy in the Middle Ages and
the Renaissance, and in this regard preceding Francis Bacon’s
appeal for research experiments and his emphasis on the inductive
syllogism. 106 As early as in the 1330s, Petrus Bonus said in his New

102. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 32; see also ROOB, supra note 90, at 9-10, 44,
171.
103. See PETRUS BONUS, supra note 7.
104. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 32.
105. See, for example, the commentary on the Emerald Tablet (Schmaragdt
Tafel) of the seventeenth-century German alchemistic text Von den verborgenen
Philosophischen Geheimnussen der heimlichen Goldblumen und Lapidis Philosophorum [On the hidden philosophical secrets of the cryptic flowers of gold and
the philosophers’ stone], together with a characteristic alchemistic image, ANON.,
OCCULTA PHILOSOPHIA: VON DEN VERBORGENEN PHILOSOPHISCHEN
GEHEIMNUSSEN DER HEIMLICHEN GOLDBLUMEN UND LAPIS PHILOSOPHORUM 50
(Johann Bringern ed. 1613); and the image of “the complete work of the philosophers” (Das gantz Werck der Philosophen), id. at 70.
106. FRANCIS BACON, THE PHYSICAL AND METAPHYSICAL WORKS OF LORD
BACON, INCLUDING THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING AND NOVUM ORGANUM 814, 384-386 (Joseph Devey ed., George Bell & Sons 1886).
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Pearl of Great Price that 107:
[T]he vulgar herd are of necessity led to regard the Alchemist as a kind of sorcerer or magician . . . . I stoutly maintain
that the Art of Alchemy is clear and true, and founded upon
Nature; that its products are as truly silver and gold as the
precious metals which are produced in the bowels of the
earth . . . .
Early “proper” chemistry, at any rate from the Renaissance period, was not a mystical secret, but the mastery of rules about chemical procedures and the organisation of this knowledge and a standardised terminology, so by no means “unscientific.” Perhaps the first
examples of that systematic approach were Andreas Libavius’s (c.
1555-1616) influential publications, especially his letters on chemistry. 108 Where the alchemists conducted practical experiments and
developed laboratory equipment (with distilling, separating 109 as a
central method 110 or the sealing of flasks or crucibles 111 for burning
metals or boiling substances, hence the expression “hermetically
sealed” 112), they were indeed the direct predecessors of modern
chemists. 113 The experimental artisanal (and dirty) side of alchemy
(or chemistry) was a main reason why alchemy did not obtain the
university status of mathematics, physics and astronomy in the Middle Ages. 114 Lavoisier, who is considered to be the founder of modern chemistry, unsurprisingly described in his Traité élémentaire de
107. PETRUS BONUS, supra note 7, at 102-103. See also PETRUS BONUS, supra
note 7, at 51-52: “Alchemy resembles other arts in the following respect, that its
practice must be preceded by theory and investigation; for before we can know
how to do a thing, we must understand all the conditions and circumstances under
which it is produced.”
108. BRUCE MORAN, DISTILLING KNOWLEDGE: ALCHEMY, CHEMISTRY AND
THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 8-9, 100-102 (Harv. U. Press 2005).
109. Chemical separation (Abscheiden, Scheidung) is a central concept for
Paracelsus, see id., at 72; see also PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 141.
110. MORAN, supra note 108, at 11-15; see also TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 40.
111. The name of such vessels has a theological origin: the melting, burning,
grinding, vaporizing were seen as “tortures” of the metals, like the tortures and
crucifixion of Jesus (crucible has the Latin root of cruciare), see PRINCIPE, supra
note 1, at 69.
112. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 123.
113. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 146.
114. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 85-86.
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chimie (1789) experimental practices that derived from alchemy,
such as weighing, pulverisation, filtration, decantation, evaporation,
crystallisation, distillation, sublimation, and so on. 115 The theoretical side of modern chemistry started especially with Robert Boyle116
who was influenced by the atomism of the earlier German physician
and alchemist Daniel Sennert. 117
Influences of Alchemistic ideas, not only the practical-mechanical side, but also the philosophical side, were strong in the Early
Modern period, but they can be traced to the present day. The importance of Hermetic thinking (which shaped Alchemistic thought)
for Giordano Bruno, Marsilio Ficino 118 and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, to name some important philosophers of the Renaissance,
is well known. 119 Galileo was not much interested in the alchemistic
idea of the oneness of the microcosm and the macrocosm, for he
devoted his studies to the movement of the heavenly bodies. However, his demonstration that the heavenly bodies appeared to be of
terrestrial material 120 was in some way returning to the alchemistic
thought of oneness, and at the same time departing from it, because
the argument of heavenly bodies being of terrestrial material stands
115. ANTOINE-LAURENT LAVOISIER, ELEMENTS OF CHEMISTRY IN A NEW
SYSTEMATIC ORDER, CONTAINING ALL THE MODERN DISCOVERIES, Part III 291,
295, 357, 363, 365, 375, 379, 384, 388 (William Creech ed., Robert Kerr trans.
1790) (description of the instruments and operations of chemistry).
116. Robert Boyle, The Sceptical Chymist, in 2 THE WORKS OF ROBERT
BOYLE: THE SCEPTICAL CHYMIST AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF 1661 205, 218223, 229-233 (Michael Hunter & Edward B. Davis eds., Pickering & Chatto
1999); see also ARTHUR L. DONOVAN, PHILOSOPHICAL CHEMISTRY IN THE
SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: THE DOCTRINES AND DISCOVERIES OF WILLIAM
CULLEN AND JOSEPH BLACK 102-106 (Edinburgh U. Press 1976).
117. NEWMAN, supra note 86, at 160.
118. Marsilio Ficino translated fourteen treatises of the Corpus Hermeticum
(which he named the “Pimander”), see YATES, supra note 100, at 21. Some of the
passages relevant to the development of alchemistic thinking are treatises I.14-16,
X.11-19, and XI.2-17, see HERMES TRISMEGISTUS, THE THEOLOGICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF HERMES TRISMEGISTUS, CHRISTIAN NEOPLATONIST
7-9, 60-63, 68-74 (John D. Chambers trans., T. & T. Clark 1882).
119. YATES, supra note 100, at 66, 91, 130, 137, 210; see also TAYLOR, supra
note 3, at 156.
120. Galileo Galilei, Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems (1632), in
GALILEO GALILEI, THE ESSENTIAL GALILEO 193-194 (Maurice A. Finocchiaro ed.
& trans., Hackett Publ’g 2008).
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against the idea of heavenly matter, which much of alchemical theory postulates. 121
Paracelsus, usually regarded as a the father of medicinal chemistry, considered the giving of a drug to patients for healing and the
prolongation of life as a version of the process of the transmutation
of the five base metals (“incomplete metals”) into the noble metals
silver and gold with the means of a “tincture,” originally a variant
or even synonym of the philosopher’s stone. 122 Giving the medicine
(the alchemistic idea of a tincture) to the patient is for Paracelsus an
act of the purification of the human body that frees it from diseases,
like the purification or transmutation of the base metals that makes
them to the noble metals, silver and gold. 123 Alchemy of the School
of Paracelsus is characterised by a monist organic, evolutionary dynamism with a close association to, and interaction with, organic
substances and living creatures, and not being restricted to the transmutation of metals and other inorganic matter: nature and its transformations are also organic and living changes within an all-encompassing universe. 124
Kepler based his defence of the heliocentric system in no small
part on notions of Christian alchemical thought: the physical universe appears like its invisible creator—the centre as the Father, the
surface as the Son and the intermediate space as the Holy Spirit,
which points to a heliocentric universe. 125 Copernicus himself referred to Hermes Trismegistus directly when he gave an allegorical
explanation in his De Revolutionibus orbium caelestium (1543): “In
the centre of all rests the sun . . . . Trismegistus calls it a ‘visible
121. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 156.
122. See, e.g., KIRCHER, supra note 5, at 268: “Hoc [lapis philosophorum] alii
Elixir vocant; alii Tincturam, quae omnia metalla in aurum, argentumque substantialiter tingit . . . .”
123. Paracelsus, Ueber die Tinktur der Physici, chapters 6-7, in DER HIMMEL
DER PHILOSOPHEN, supra note 93, at 196-197 .
124. ALEXANDRE KOYRÉ, MYSTIQUES, SPIRITUELS, ALCHIMISTES DU XVIE
SIÈCLE ALLEMAND 109-110 (Gallimard 1971). On the idea of the Homunculus in
Paracelisan alchemy, see NEWMAN, supra note 82, at 326-327.
125. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 202. For a contemporaneous alchemist visualisation, see ROOB, supra note 90, at 58-59.
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god,’ Sophocles’ Electra, ‘that which gazes upon all things.’ And so
the sun, as if resting on a kingly throne, governs the family of stars
which wheel around.” 126 An influence of neoplatonic or hermetic
(alchemist) thinking can be presumed, 127 but it has also been argued
that Copernicus simply restated the usual tropes or topoi of classical
education, without a specific hermetic influence. 128
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when there
was a new rise of interest in alchemy, 129 Goethe felt attracted to the
holistic alchemist idea of the unity of the microcosm and the macrocosm, which appears not only in various passages of his Faust,130
but also in the approach in his Farbenlehre. 131 In the twentieth century, Werner Heisenberg would be inspired by the system for the
organisation of the real world proposed in Goethe’s Farbenlehre in
his 1942 Order of Reality [Ordnung der Wirklichkeit]. 132
These brief comments on the history of science shall show that
alchemic ideas consisted not only of some obscure and occult notions from a long bygone era, but influenced considerably scientific
thinking in the beginning of the modern sciences. This is not surprising if one remembers that one root of scientific as well as alchemistic theories were Aristotle’s writings on natural philosophy, especially his Physics. The study of this treatise was required for the
degrees in arts at medieval universities (in Paris from the 1250s).
During the Middle Ages and the Modern Age, lawyers also had
126. Nicolaus Copernicus, On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres (De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium), Book 1, chapter 10, in ON THE SHOULDERS OF
GIANTS: THE GREAT WORKS OF PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY 7, 31-32 (Stephen
Hawking ed., Running Press 2002).
127. YATES, supra note 100, at 172.
128. Dilwyn Knox, Ficino and Copernicus, in MARSILIO FICINO: HIS
THEOLOGY, HIS PHILOSOPHY, HIS LEGACY 399, 411 (Michael J. B. Allen, Valery
Rees, & Martin Davies eds. 2002).
129. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 90-92.
130. E.g., Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust I, in JOHANN WOLFGANG VON
GOETHE, WERKE, VOL. 3: HAMBURGER AUSGABE 500-503, verses 425-438 (Erich
Trunz ed., Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag 1982).
131. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, GOETHE’S SÄMMTLICHE WERKE IN
VIERZIG BÄNDEN, VOL. 40, 71 (J. G. Cotta 1840).
132. WERNER HEISENBERG, ORDNUNG DER WIRKLICHKEIT 53 (2d ed., Piper
1989).
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some contact with alchemistic ideas within their general philosophical education when they took their law degrees.
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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the attitude of the Polish legal elite regarding the adaptation of French civil law introduced on the Polish
territories in the Duchy of Warsaw, established by Napoleon in
1807. While addressing the Polish example, it underscores the universal nature of problems engendered by legal transfer and by the
social reactions to foreign solutions. It sheds light on the state of
mind of Polish enlightened elites, on their approach toward new legal instruments and on the challenges of adapting them to the socioeconomic conditions of a semi-peripheral country. The Polish situation in the early 19th century provides evidence that some representatives of the late-Enlightenment generation remained attached
to the universalist, all human vision of civilizational progress and
shared natural law instruments for its accomplishment. On the other
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hand, in reaction to this attitude, the opposite view had already
started to crystallize. It pointed to the uniqueness of conditions of
development in any given country and nation. According to this
view, civil law should account for this specificity and be adjusted to
the national character.
Keywords: legal transplant, legal transfer, French Civil Code, Polish
territories, adaptation, 19th century, civil law, foreign legal solutions
and institutions, national identity
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 1, 1808, the French Civil Code (which in its major part
remained in force in this region until the end of World War II 1) was
implemented in the Duchy of Warsaw established by Napoleon. 2 It
is difficult to overestimate the significance of this event for the development of law and for the socio-economic transformations that
occurred in 19th-century Poland. However, a real opportunity to abrogate this legal act in its entirety presented itself soon after its implementation, in the wake of Napoleon’s fall.
The objective of this article is to present the attitude of the representatives of Polish legal elites toward the Napoleonic Code during this critical period. Following the defeat of France, once the
Duchy of Warsaw was occupied by the Russian army, Polish elites
were engaged, starting from 1814, in works over complex transformation of the heretofore existing legal order, in connection with the
plans of the victorious Tsar Alexander I, who intended to replace the
1. The Duchy of Warsaw was a Polish state established by Napoleon I in
1807 from the Polish lands ceded by the Kingdom of Prussia under the terms of
the Treaties of Tilsit. The Duchy was held in personal union by one of Napoleon's
allies—King Frederick Augustus I of Saxony. Following Napoleon’s failed invasion of Russia, the Duchy was occupied by Prussian and Russian troops until
1815, when it was formally partitioned between the two countries at the Congress
of Vienna. See PIOTR S. WANDYCZ, THE LANDS OF PARTITIONED POLAND 43-64
(U. Wash. Press 1974).
2. It was not until 1946 that certain provisions of the Napoleonic Code,
which regulated some general issues as well as provisions of substantive and succession law, were repealed.
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Duchy of Warsaw with a restituted Kingdom of Poland. During this
period, the elites gained considerable freedom to work out and turn
into reality, upon the Tsar’s approval, their own legal and political
vision and to evaluate the legacy inherited from Napoleon.
The discussed circumstances under which the plans to abrogate
the Napoleonic Code took shape, and their attendant debate regarding the optimum choice for going through with the legal transformation, were deeply anchored in the specific Polish conditions.
They strongly connected with the political turbulences, which affected the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Kingdom of Poland
in union with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) in the late 18th and the
early 19th century. From 1765, during the Age of the Enlightenment, monarch Stanisław August Poniatowski, and the new, reformation-minded, Polish authorities struggled to overcome a multilayered crisis and chaos that took over the country in the mid-18th
century. 3 This attempt ended catastrophically, as the forcefully reformed state (especially in the period of activity of the so-called
Four-Year Sejm 1788-1792 4) was first halted in its tracks as a result
of the foreign intervention, and subsequently, as an effect of the partitions by neighbouring super powers, wiped off the European map
in 1795. Thus, the stub state in the form of the Duchy of Warsaw,
established by Napoleon several years later in 1807, albeit dependent on France, restored faith in the restitution of Polish statehood.
In considering the history of Poland, one must bear in mind that
the attachment to national identity was particularly strong among
Poles. Their country for centuries, especially in its golden age of the
late 16th and early 17th century, had existed on the political map of
Europe as a superpower, which added to their sensation of national

3. See JÓZEF GIEROWSKI, THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH IN
18TH CENTURY: FROM ANARCHY TO WELL-ORGANISED STATE (Polska
Akademia Umiejętności 1996).
4. See BOGUSŁAW LEŚNODORSKI, DZIEŁO SEJMU CZTEROLETNIEGO (17881792) [THE WORK OF THE FOUR-YEAR SEJM (1788-1792)] (Wydawnictwo
Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich 1951).
THE
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pride. Moreover, this state’s specific culture, legal, and political distinctions strengthened the sensation of uniqueness of the Polish nation, especially among the nobility. In the late 17th and early 18th
century, on the other hand, as a result of the gradual demise of the
state and the socio-economic standing of the country, not only the
separateness, but also the civilizational distance between Poland and
Western European countries deepened, as the latter had entered a
new phase of dynamic development. Despite the foregoing, this distance began to shorten during the Enlightenment era, in connection
with the aforementioned reforms of the times of Stanisław August
Poniatowski and the world-view transformations of Polish elites.
The popularization of the Enlightenment ideology and of occidentalism, once again, following the Renaissance era, began to provide
fertile soil for the transfer of Western European ideas, and—consequently—legal institutions. 5 In considering the issue of transplantation of the Napoleonic Code to the Polish territories, this must be
taken into account. Of particular significance was the fact that the
legal transfer took place in a special historical moment, in the midst
of a liberal world-view revolution that swept across Europe after the
era of Enlightenment and following the experiences of the French
Revolution. The elites of European countries faced a host of new,
19th century, challenges, which were drastically different from the
ones of previous times. Modernization aspirations, expressed primarily in the striving to turn liberal ideas into reality, clashed with
the reactionary desire to bring the old order of things back and to
prop it up with traditional national institutions. In the Polish circumstance, just as in the rest of Central Eastern Europe, still in the early
5. See Anna Klimaszewska, Histoire du droit, in DROIT DE LA POLOGNE 1213 (L.G.D.J. 2016); Michał Gałędek, The Problem of Non-Adaptability of
National Legal Heritage. Discussion on the Reform of Civil Law in Poland in the
Course of Work of Reform Committee in 1814, 8 ROMANIAN J. COMP. L. 7, 9-10,
12-13 (2017); Anna Klimaszewska, La responsabilité civile des associés des sociétés commerciales dans le droit polonais - les influences de la culture juridique
française et les influences des autres cultures, in LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE EN
FRANCE ET EN POLOGNE 131-35 (Zbigniew Hajn & Dagmara Skupień eds., Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego 2016).
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stages of capitalist transformation, this would have meant an aboutface toward feudalism and maintenance of the formal legal privileges of the nobility. Still, on the Polish territories, the process of
socio-economic transformation was temporarily halted by the Napoleonic Wars and the subsequent economic crisis. The situation
was unclear, and the choice regarding the future path was still a great
unknown.
Considering all of the above, the research material analyzed by
us is to help verify how the representatives of the Polish legal elites
(a country of semi-peripheral character) engaged in the process of
redevelopment of the binding legal order. We also verify how they
assessed the opportunities and threats carried by the transplantation
of a foreign law, in this case the Napoleonic Code, which was perceived as a modern law that served the desired modernization objectives.
II. THE CIVIL REFORM COMMITTEE AND THE NAPOLEONIC CODE
The widespread criticism of the French law, heaped at the Code
within the few years since its transplantation (reception), stemmed
mainly from the fact that its provisions hurt the interests of the privileged groups; more specifically, the clergy and the nobility. The
erstwhile Vice-President of Warsaw, Stanisław Węgrzecki, noted
this “sonorous scream against the Code.” He observed:
[H]ardly anyone supports it; even those who do not know it
at all, who have not read it, clamour that it is not attuned to
our climate . . . . A nobleman is frightened of the code, so as
to not lose his power over the peasants, he is pained by being
put in the same tribunal with a townsman and a peasant, by
having the same succession laws apply to him and to the
townspeople . . . . Clergymen suffer over having to relinquish
religious rites to freedom of conscience and worship. 6
6. Stanisław Węgrzecki, Vice-President of Warsaw, Przestrogi do utworzenia Królestwa Polskiego [Warnings Concerning the Establishment of the
Kingdom of Poland] 126-27 (Mar. 20, 1813) (The Princes Czartoryski Library,
National Museum in Cracow, manuscript, ref. no. 5242); STEFAN KIENIEWICZ,

274

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 11

The negative attitude of the public opinion toward the Napoleonic Code stemmed from an emotional rejection of foreign law,
which was contrary to native customs and traditions. 7 This hostility
was on the rise, stoked by the gatherings of nobility (especially at
Sejms 8) and by the inimical propaganda of the Catholic Church. 9
Criticism was fuelled by Code provisions that guaranteed equality
before the law, in the area of civil law, regardless of birth, nationality, and religion. The correct implementation of the Code thus required a rearrangement of social relations, 10 especially since the
Code was clearly anchored in the principle of primacy of positive
law. The landed gentry felt this posed a constant threat to their privileged position. 11 This was complemented by the hostile attitude of
the Catholic Church. The Church fiercely opposed to the provisions
relating to registrar’s offices and lay marriages, as what had thus far
been a holy union, could now be dissolved contrary to the canon
law. 12 Fear of upturning the social relations and of downgrading the
position of the nobility and of the clergy translated into a landslide
of criticism against the transplanted law.
TADEUSZ MENCEL, & WŁADYSŁAW ROSTOCKI, WYBÓR TEKSTÓW ŹRÓDŁOWYCH
Z HISTORII POLSKI W LATACH 1795-1864 [SELECTION OF SOURCE TEXTS ON THE
HISTORY OF POLAND IN YEARS 1795-1864] 188 (Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe 1956); see also TADEUSZ MENCEL, FELIKS ŁUBIEŃSKI: MINISTER
SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI KSIĘSTWA WARSZAWSKIEGO (1758-1848) [FELIKS ŁUBIEŃSKI:
MINISTER OF JUSTICE OF THE DUCHY OF WARSAW (1758-1848)] 64-70 (Towarzystwo Naukowe Warszawskie 1952); WŁADYSŁAW SOBOCIŃSKI, HISTORIA
USTROJU I PRAWA KSIĘSTWA WARSZAWSKIEGO [HISTORY OF THE SYSTEM AND
LAW OF THE DUCHY OF WARSAW] 203 (Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe
1964); Tadeusz Mencel, L’Introduction du Code Napoléon dans le Duché de Varsovie (1808), 2 CZASOPISMO PRAWNO-HISTORYCZNE 141, 181-82 (1949) [hereinafter Mencel, Introduction du Code Napoléon].
7. Gałędek, supra note 5, at 16-17.
8. Mencel, Introduction du Code Napoléon, supra note 6, at 146-47, 167,
185.
9. Id. at 182-84.
10. Id. at 148, 152, 153.
11. Id. at 152, 154-55, 180-81.
12. Piotr Pomianowski, Z problematyki rozwodów w Księstwie Warszawskim
[On the Problem of Divorces in the Duchy of Warsaw], 2 CZASOPISMO PRAWNOHISTORYCZNE 103, 108-10 (2013); Michał Gałędek & Anna Klimaszewska, Prace
Komitetu Cywilnego Reformy nad nową regulacją małżeństw katolickich w 1814
r. [Works of the Civil Reform Committee on the New Regulation of Catholic
Marriages in 1814], 3 KRAKOWSKIE STUDIA Z HISTORII PAŃSTWA I PRAWA (2017).
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The negative perception of the French law was also the effect of
how it had been introduced in the Duchy of Warsaw. The Constitution of 1807, as well as Code civil des Français, was octroyed by
Napoleon without consultations with the Polish political elites. 13 As
a result, both the satisfaction of this directive through the official
acknowledgement of the French Civil Code as the code in force, as
well as the organization of the judiciary fashioned after the French
one and the subsequent transplantation of the French civil procedure
and penal law, 14 took place in an atmosphere of resistance. This resistance was effective in regard to penal law: the Penal Code and the
Code of Penal Procedure were never adopted. There were also attempts to undermine the initiative of the government of the Duchy
of Warsaw on the part of a significant portion of the Polish political
elites. Other circumstances also did not aid the gentle transplantation
of French law, the chief circumstances being the difficult socio-economic situation of the Duchy, which was in a virtually permanent
state of war, combined with the general ignorance of the rules of
French law and the mechanisms of operation of modern codes. Time

13. MICHAŁ GAŁĘDEK, KONCEPCJE I PROJEKTY NOWEGO USTROJU
ADMINISTRACJI DLA PRZYSZŁEGO KRÓLESTWA POLSKIEGO [CONCEPTS AND
PROJECTS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM FOR THE FUTURE KINGDOM OF
POLAND] 54 (Arche 2017); MARIAN KALLAS, KONSTYTUCJA KSIĘSTWA
WARSZAWSKIEGO [CONSTITUTION OF THE DUCHY OF WARSAW] 38 (Państwowe

Wydawnictwo Naukowe 1970); Marceli Handelsman, Z dziejów Księstwa
Warszawskiego. Geneza Księstwa i jego statutu [From the History of the Duchy
of Warsaw. Genesis of the Duchy and its Constitution], in STUDIA HISTORYCZNE
[HISTORICAL STUDIES] 130, 195 (E. Wende i spółka 1911); Mencel, Introduction
du Code Napoléon, supra note 6, at 146-48.
14. ANNA KLIMASZEWSKA, CODE DE COMMERCE – FRANCUSKI KODEKS
HANDLOWY Z 1807 R. [CODE DE COMMERCE – FRENCH COMMERCIAL CODE OF
1807] 187-88 (Arche 2011); Anna Klimaszewska, Francuski Kodeks handlowy
w Królestwie Polskim [French Commerce Code in the Kingdom of Poland], in
SYSTEM POLITYCZNY, PRAWO, KONSTYTUCJA I USTRÓJ KRÓLESTWA POLSKIEGO
1815-1830 [POLITICAL SYSTEM, LAW AND CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF
POLAND 1815-1830] 187-88 (Lech Mażewski ed., Von Borowiecky 2013); Anna
Klimaszewska, Le droit pénal Français sur les territoires polonais – voyage à
travers les siècles, in LE CODE PÉNAL. LES MÉTAMORPHOSES D’UN MODÈLE 18102010 59-62 (Chantal Aboucaya & Renée Martinage eds., CHJ 2012); Anna
Klimaszewska, The Reception of the French Commercial Law on the Polish
Lands in the First Half of the 19th Century, 2 J. EUR. HIST. LAW 48 (2015).
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was needed to implement the new law. However, the absence of internal stability and the unreadiness of the state apparatus to apply
the new laws did not favour this process.
In this situation, it is not surprising that the collapse of the
French protectorate was met with an energetic initiative to repeal
altogether the foreign, imposed law, crippled in practical application, for reasons that did not necessarily have anything to do with its
maladjustment to the specificity of the Polish society. In 1814, the
fate of the French law seemed to have been set in stone. The Napoleonic Code was faced with “a strong and diverse opposition.” 15 The
formal procedure, whose intention was to abrogate the French private law, was initiated with a decree of Tsar Alexander, issued on
May 19, 1814 by which he established the Reform Committee. 16 In
this act, the tsar entrusted selected representatives of the Polish political elites with the task of drafting a complex reform of legal and
systemic relationships, which could serve as the foundation for the
future Kingdom of Poland. One of the decree’s provisions ordered
the undertaking of steps leading to the abrogation of French private
law and to its replacement with laws better suited to the national
customs and the Polish specificity, inspired in the first place by the
pre-partition law of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 17 The tsar
ordered that:
Le Code Napoléon civil et de procédure judiciaire devrait
être aboli le plus tôt possible. On pourrait intérimalement y
substituer les lois polonaises, le Statut de Lithuanie, ainsi
15. Szymon Askenazy, Zagrożenie Kodeksu Napoleona przy utworzeniu
Królestwa Polskiego [Threat of Napoleonic Code at the Beginning of Kingdom of
Poland], in SZKICE I PORTRETY [SKETCHES AND PORTRAITS] 374 (Biblioteka
Polska 1937).
16. Hipolit Grynwaser, Kodeks Napoleona w Polsce [The Napoleonic Code
in Poland], in 1 PISMA [WRITINGS] 71 (Wydawnictwo Zakładu Narodowego im.
Ossolińskich 1951); Anna Zarzycka, Próby zmian Kodeksu Napoleona w
Księstwie Warszawskim w latach 1814-1815 [Attempts at Changing The
Napoleonic Code in the Duchy of Warsaw 1814-1815], 1 KRAKOWSKIE STUDIA Z
HISTORII PAŃSTWA I PRAWA 175, 175-78 (2004).
17. Rozkaz stanowiący komitet reformy [Decree of Reform Committee Establishment] 6 (May 19, 1814) (The Princes Czartoryski Library, National Museum in Cracow, manuscript, ref. no. 5236).
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que les formes judiciaires usitées avant l’introduction de la
procédure française. Le Comité discutera si les codes doivent être abolis entièrement ou en partie, et à quelle époque
cette abolition pourrait avoir lieu. Il proposera aussi un plan
et la composition d’une Commission séparée à créer qui
sera chargée de la rédaction d’un nouveau Code civil, criminel et de procédure, de même que l’organisation définitive
de l’ordre judicaire . . . . 18
The Reform Committee was composed of the representatives of
contemporary elites, the majority of whom were well-known for
their “hostility toward the French legislation.” 19 Franciszek
Grabowski, a Lublin advocate, became involved in the attempts to
abrogate the French law as quickly as possible. He headed the Legislative section, responsible, among others, for the reform of civil
law. He was supported by a numerous group of other Committee
members, representing various fractions that opposed the Napoleonic Code. 20 However, even regardless of their personal views, and
primarily in the face of the clear directives from the monarch, no
one in the Committee questioned the fact that its members were to
push toward the complete abrogation of the French law. The field
for discussion was open only as regarded the method of performing
this operation. 21
In matters connected to the reform of private law, Antoni
Bieńkowski, an adversary of Grabowski and a respected appellate
judge in the Duchy of Warsaw, stood out from the rest. He effectively convinced the others that, pursuant to the will of the tsar, the
purpose of the Committee is to decide whether the French codes are
to be abrogated “in entirety or partially” and to present “a plan to
establish a separate committee,” which would take care of drafting
18. Askenazy, supra note 15, at 375.
19. Grynwaser, supra note 16, at 71.
20. This group included, among others, Fr. Józef Koźmian who represented
the clergy and was vehemently committed to fighting the lay Code; Józef Kalasanty Szaniawski, a pro-clerical politician; Stanisław Zamoyski, the conservative
Galician magnate; and Tomasz Wawrzecki who represented conservative Lithuanian nobility.
21. Gałędek, supra note 5, at 17-21.
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the new codification. 22 From there, he concluded that the tsar had
not ordered the immediate abrogation of the French law. Therefore,
the Committee should focus on determining which provisions
should be upheld, and which require immediate repeal and ad hoc
replacement with other regulations. Also, in the personal opinion of
Bieńkowski, cautious and moderate course of action regarding the
abrogation of Napoleonic laws was highly recommendable, as it was
the model that was supported by the “experience of all other countries.” 23
As succinctly put by Bieńkowski, the Committee’s task was to
determine the path “to go from the Napoleonic Code to the new era
of jurisdiction” and to establish the general rules, “which must now
be laid as regards civil law and procedure.” 24 In order to make this
objective a reality, Bieńkowski “dissected all the Civil Code titles in
order,” dividing its provisions into those, which (1) “as harmless,
should be maintained until the date set for the implementation of a
different book of laws yet to be drafted,” and into those, which (2)
“as inconvenient, opposed by the public opinion and bothersome,
should be repealed right away without much further ado, to be replaced by laws more in line with the wishes and interests of citizens.” 25
The dissection perfomed by Bieńkowski showed, however, that
there were very few provisions placed in the second category by
him. He believed it recommendable to repeal the title Of Acts Before
the Civil Authorities and regulations pertaining to the institution of
legal mortgage, which should be abrogated “as contrary to good

22. Protokół posiedzeń Komitetu Reformy [Minutes of Reform Committee
session] 17 (The Princes Czartoryski Library, National Museum in Cracow, manuscript, ref. no. 5233) [hereinafter Minutes of Reform Committee].
23. Id. at session 18, 197. The initiator of the entire undertaking, Adam Jerzy
Czartoryski, certainly shared this view. See Aleksander Kraushar, W setną
rocznicę Kodeksu Napoleona [Centenary Anniversary of the Napoleonic Code],
22 GAZETA SĄDOWA WARSZAWSKA 332 (1908).
24. See Minutes of Reform Committee, supra note 22, at session 14.
25. Id. at session 4, 18 (July 10, 1814).
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faith and public safety.” Primarily, however, he believed it indispensable to replace the provisions contained in the title Of Marriage, as
“the title runs contrary to the principles of Catholic faith, according
to which a marriage once contracted between Catholics cannot be
terminated, and this title allows for such termination by mutual consent,” and in the chapter entitled Of the respective rights and duties
of married persons as “the legal joint ownership as prescribed in this
chapter is contrary to the domestic property relations.” 26 No other
regulations, according to him, required the immediate legislative interference.
Subsequently, Bieńkowski began his work. On October 23,
1814, the new draft bill of marriage law, which was to replace titles
5 and 6 of Book 1 of the Napoleonic Code, was brought to the
agenda of the plenary session. 27 Discussion over its provisions
lasted throughout the next few sessions and ended with the adoption
of the first part of the draft, regulating personal matrimonial law.
The debate over the second part, regulating matrimonial property
law, was interrupted. The Committee decided that this area of the
French law did not require immediate amendments. The sessions
finished with the conclusion that:
[S]ince a separate commission is to be appointed to establish
anew the general legislation, for the time being only those
portions of law are undertaken, which require immediate action, thus in the matrimonial law, only that is changed what
runs contrary to the religious relations and allows divorces,
while the rest, pertaining only to civil regulations and contracts in marriage, not in breach of this union, may be left to
be dealt with by the said commission, as whatever is
amended now, could be once again changed by the commission, and such new law would last a short period and leave a
lasting trace in the court cases, which would only aggravate
26. Projekt do zniesienia i zmiany niektórych kodeksowych części [Draft to
Repeal and Amend Certain Parts of the Code], 251 (Oct. 23, 1814) (The Princes
Czartoryski Library, National Museum in Cracow, manuscript, ref. no. 5236); See
also Minutes of Reform Committee, supra note 22 at session 20, 186-87 (Oct. 13,
1814).
27. Minutes of Reform Committee, supra note 22 at session 32, 208-09 (Oct.
23, 1814). See Gałędek & Klimaszewska, supra note 12.
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the chaos generated by frequent changes in law. For this reason, the Committee has decided to postpone the second part
of the draft until the establishment of general legislation. 28
At the November 20 session, Bieńkowski presented yet another
document, the “Plan for the Civil Code.” The document was preceded with an introduction, from which it followed that in the future
works over the national codification, the Napoleonic Code would
serve as one of the auxiliary materials in drafting the new code. 29
However, Bieńkowski did not even suggest that this would be of any
major significance. The plan that he presented was approved by the
Committee and it was to become an action plan for the future codification commission. 30
The Committee ceased its activity in June 1815. The opponents
of the Napoleonic Code were only able to point out a few legal areas
and institutions that, according to them, required immediate amendment “in the national spirit.” In balancing the discussion and the
reached arrangements, it may be concluded that the blade of accusations by the Committee members was turned not on civil law, but
rather on the French procedure, especially with regard to the enforcement proceedings. 31 Confronted with the clear dispositions of
the tsar, the Committee Members did not try to defend the Napoleonic Code. Despite the absence of a matrix based on which they
could build a new code, they did not dare suggest that this role could
be fulfilled by the existing code. On the other hand, however, they
undermined the possibility of its application in Polish circumstances
only in reference to some isolated specific provisions, pointing out
mainly the harmful effects of maintaining the norms of personal
28. Minutes of Reform Committee, supra note 22 at session 33, 237 (Nov. 3,
1814).
29. Wstęp przy wprowadzeniu planu do Kodeksu Cywilnego [Introduction
to the Plan of Implementation of the Civil Code], 288-90 (Nov. 20, 1814) (The
Princes Czartoryski Library, National Museum in Cracow, manuscript, ref. no.
5236) [hereinafter Introduction to the Plan of Implementation of the Civil Code].
See Gałędek, supra note 5, at 21-26.
30. Minutes of Reform Committee, supra note 22 at session 44, 277 (Nov.
24, 1814), and at session 45, 279-80 (Nov. 27, 1814).
31. Grynwaser, supra note 16, at 60-62, 67-68, 70.
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matrimonial law. Moreover, in support of Bieńkowski's plan, they
accepted his concept, according to which the Napoleonic Code
could become one of the points of reference in further works over
the new codification, although they did not indicate in any way that
it deserved special treatment. The analysis of French law was recommended owing to the fact that it was one of the laws that had been
binding on the Polish territories and which had been tested in practice. It should also be noted how the works of the Committee had
been summarized by one of its members, Andrzej Horodyski:
[T]he entire . . . work of the Civil Committee was rather the
effect of joy about the announced change of the domestic
matters for the better, rather than [of] cold calculation, and it
originated from . . . impatient zeal to bring improvements as
soon as possible, and the zeal . . . did not recognize in advance the state of domestic matters, instead opting to work
over their complete reform, accordingly to own inspiration
and facts drawn from the unreliable memory. 32
III. THE NAPOLEONIC CODE IN MEMOS OF A. WYCZECHOWSKI AND
J.W. BANDTKIE
Directly after the discontinuation of the Reform Committee’s
activity, on September 25, 1815, the Codification Commission was
appointed. The Commission was obliged to avail itself of the
Committee’s output. The fundamental objective of abrogation of the
French private law to be followed by the replacement with new
national codification was still in place. The members of the
Codification Commission included Jan Wincenty Bandtkie, a
notary, historian of law, and professor at the Warsaw School of Law
(soon thereafter he became Dean of the Faculty of Law and
Administration of the University of Warsaw) and judge Antoni

32. See Hubert Izdebski, Ustawa Konstytucyjna Królestwa Polskiego z 1815
r. [The 1815 Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland], in 1 KONSTYTUCJE POLSKI
[CONSTITUTIONS OF POLAND] 190 (Marian Kallas ed., Państwowe Wydawnictwo
Naukowe 1990).
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Wyczechowski, one of the most renowned and active jurists of the
Duchy of Warsaw. 33
Bandtkie and Wyczechowski were first asked to draft memos
regarding the possibilities and methods of turning the idea of national codification into reality, and to outline the preparation steps
necessary to develop this work. Both tasks were fulfilled in December 1815. The problem faced by both authors of the memos was a
formidable one. The political elite, formed previously by the Reform
Committee, seemed adamant in its striving to do away forever with
French laws, which were to share the fate of Napoleon himself. They
were aware that—in the words of Wyczechowski—the “widespread
wish” of the (noble) nation was to “return all the way to the old
Polish laws.” 34 Wyczechowski was seconded by Bandtkie. 35 He
wrote: “We often hear the passionate pleadings of illustrious men to
immediately forgo the laws of today, as overly confused, circuitous
and knotty, or else malformed for the nationality, climate and character—and to restore the respect for old, domestic law, or at least for
the Lithuanian Statute.” 36 In the choir of voices demanding the abrogation of the Napoleonic Code, its fate seemed to be set in stone.
33. See Stanisław Kutrzeba, Jan Wincenty Bandtkie, in POLSKI SŁOWNIK
BIOGRAFICZNY 258-260 (Polska Akademia Umiejętności 1935); Anna Rosner,
Jan Wincenty Bandtkie 1783-1846, in PROFESOROWIE WYDZIAŁU PRAWA I
ADMINISTRACJI UNIWERSYTETU WARSZAWSKIEGO 1808-2008, [PROFESSORS OF
THE FACULTY OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW
1808-2008], 23-25 (Grażyna Bałtruszajtys ed., LexisNexis 2008); see also
Wojciech Witkowski, Warszawa jako ośrodek polskiej nauki prawa w dobie
zaborów [Warsaw as a Center of Polish Science of Law in the Era of the
Partitions], 1 KRAKOWSKIE STUDIA Z HISTORII PAŃSTWA I PRAWA 41, 47-48
(2015); Zarzycka, supra note 16, at 176.
34. Antoni Wyczechowski, Myśli względem prawodawstwa narodowego
[Thoughts on National Legislation] 80 (The Princes Czartoryski Library, National
Museum in Cracow, manuscript, ref. no. 5259).
35. See Jan Wincenty Bandtkie, Myśli o zmianie prawodawstwa krajowego
[Thoughts on the Changes of National Legislation] (Dec. 7, 1815), reprinted in
Władysław Sobociński, Jan Wincenty Bandtkie obrońcą Kodeksu Napoleona
(Przyczynki biograficzno-naukowe i memoriał z 1815 r.) [Jan Wincenty Bandtkie
As Defender of Napoleonic Code (Biographical and Scholarly Contributions and
the 1815 Memo)], 3 Rocznik Lubelski 145, 165-76 (1960).
36. Id. at 173. The Lithuanian Statute, last redacted in 1588, was a 16th-century collection of laws that formally remained in force in the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania until well into the 19th century. The remarks that it may become one of
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Nevertheless, both Wyczechowski and Bandtkie were vehemently
opposed to what appeared inevitable. Within the year, the situation
seemed to have changed. Former high-ranking officials and judges
of the Duchy of Warsaw, heretofore, as in the case of Bieńkowski,
rather cautious and reserved in expressing their opinions, began to
play an increasingly important role in the Polish authorities. It is
without a doubt that many of them had become convinced of the
advantages of the Napoleonic institutions. Up until then, however,
either they did not have the opportunity to engage actively in its defence, or they were frightened to reveal their attachment to ideas
advocated by Napoleon.
We may, therefore, presume that in the latter half of 1815,
Wyczechowski and Bandtkie were able to defend the Napoleonic
Code to a greater extent than before. In doing so, in their memos,
they both pointed out that along with the establishment of the Duchy
of Warsaw, the octroyment of its constitution, and the implementation of the Napoleonic Code, a new era that “differed in many aspects” from the former one, had begun. 37 The pre-partition Kingdom
of Poland as well as Polish territories under Prussian and Austrian
rule in the late 18th and early 19th century were still feudal states.
Formally, feudalism was not abolished until the introduction of the
constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw, which declared all equal before the law. The Napoleonic Code brought this principle to life, and
Wyczechowski presented it as a work that had “flown out of the new
spirit of philosophy and of the French Revolution.” 38 For him, the
reform of legal relationships brought by the Napoleonic Civil Code
(and, along with it, by the “supplementing” codes, received also on
the Polish territories: Code of Civil Procedure and Commercial

the foundations for the future Polish codification must have surely been in connection with the erstwhile plans of the future Kingdom of Poland to once again
be united with Lithuania under the sceptre of the Russian Tsar Alexander.
37. Wyczechowski, supra note 34, at 75.
38. Id.
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Code 39) was a fundamental one, as it thoroughly changed social relations. At the same time, it was at odds with the organization of the
private law sphere under Prussian and Austrian partitions, and even
more so with the Polish pre-partition feudal reality. Yet, it nonetheless responded to the spirit of the new times, and it bore the mark of
progressive codification in the universal dimension. Wyczechowski
made it clear that the transformations connected to the introduction
of new ideas to Polish territories had taken root and that there was
no going back, and that the knowledge of the French Civil Code
after a few years since its implementation became “most widespread” among the Poles. 40 He believed there was no return to the
old laws because he could not imagine that it would be possible to
restore the feudal and estate relations in the same shape in which
they functioned in the pre-partition legal space. He observed that
even in France “the principles from times before the Revolution are
not being brought back.” 41
Thus, Wyczechowski asserted that the modernity of the Napoleonic Code as compared to all other legal systems that had been
known in the Polish territories, “consisted mainly in its system of
generalization,” 42 that is in being a universal law. He fully supported
a reform that recognized only one code in the country, with uniform
principles applicable to all, and agreed for “the provincial law, statutes and customs [to] disappear [as well].” 43 Moreover, the reception of the French Civil Code caused the revolutionary and Enlightenment “maxims” to “diffuse throughout all the details of legal relationships.” 44 He listed the following:
Officials of the vital records registry office were introduced,
as well as civil marriages and divorces. A change of relationships between owners of land assets and peasants took place.
The succession rights based on old feudalism disappeared.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 78.
Id.
Id. at 76-77.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Id. at 75.
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The inhabitants of the country who used to have separate
rights were made equal in legal relationships will all other
people. At first, all these changes were reflected more visibly
in internal relationships than in the Prussian and Galician
laws, which, although different in detailed solutions from the
old Polish laws, stemmed from a common system. 45
In the opinion of Wyczechowski it was “the part which deals
with the law of persons” that “is an emanation of new ideas of philosophy and a result of the French Revolution.” 46 It did not have to
mean its automatic discrediting, as, according to Wyczechowski: “it
does not signify that the current order of things is . . . contrary to all
the principles of the Code [of Napoleon] on law of persons.” 47 He
cunningly suggested that, since they were upheld even in France,
despite the restoration of the House of Bourbon, they should not be
rejected, but “rather explored and better understood.” 48 Moreover,
Wyczechowski held up the German states as an example, indicating
that:
[They] universally boast of knowing how to put the principles of the French Revolution to use, but without falling prey
to revolutionary events. In the North, the Prussian monarchy
adopts into its legislation the principles of this part of code
of persons, which it finds of convenience for its country. 49
Nevertheless, Wyczechowski tried to remain cautious in his
overt advocacy of the Napoleonic Code as an embodiment of the
heritage of the French Revolution. Still, he presented the view that
“the principles so openly and solemnly expressed by the French
Revolution, although not all of them may be applied in every country and to the objectives of each government, must not be rejected
merely because they are fruit of a revolution, but rather explored and
understood better.” 50

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 75-76.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 77-78.
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Yet, the Napoleonic Code had another side to it, which was not
overlooked by Wyczechowski either. He observed that “[it] is not a
new creation, but rather a collection of laws from the previous
times.” 51 This seeming contradiction stemmed from the fact, noticed
by Wyczechowski, that the Napoleonic Code efficiently reconciled
or combined new liberal, lay, and anti-feudal principles and institutions with the substratum of extensive and valuable pre-revolutionary French legislation and legal doctrine. Therefore, in an attempt to
neutralize, at least partially, the massive criticism hurled at the
works authorized by Napoleon following his debacle,
Wyczechowski remarked: “We have previously heard praises of the
Code, today we hear words of condemnation. But both the praises
and the condemnation are directed at the ruler who is considered the
author of the Code, [while] a more thorough exploration of the
sources will prove this to be a mistake,” as the roots of the work can
be traced all the way back to the Roman law. 52
This combination of the old with the new came to the fore in
analysis of the Code’s contents. This is why, in relation to “praises
and condemnation directed at the contents of the law,”
Wyczechowski was of the opinion that the various “main parts” of
the Code should be approached differently. He argued that:
the part that deals with the so-called law of things (Ius Rerum) is based partially on the centuries-old maxims of the
Roman law, which prevailed in France more visibly than anywhere else, without a mixture of national and foreign laws
and customs, maintaining its original shape, and thus cannot
entail any great novelties. 53
Wyczechowski, similarly to Bandtkie, and Antoni Bieńkowski
before him, assumed that there were many common areas in the
Polish and French laws, as both legal orders had drawn from the
same source. This, in turn, had to lead them to the conclusion that

51. Id. at. 76.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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adaptation of the Napoleonic Code on the Polish territories was possible.
In analyzing these issues, Wyczechowski first and foremost noticed that Poles, had become a “Christian nation,” and began to lose
their “original laws and customs.” Wyczechowski also noted that
“[r]eligion has brought these nations together as one family . . . ushered in from foreign lands, it also ushered [into Poland] foreign laws
and customs,” 54 creating fertile soil for the sensation of common
cultural identity. Wyczechowski was of the opinion that the spreading of Christian religion constituted a natural stimulus for the Polish
legal system to follow the same path as other European systems.
According to him, it was caused by the fact that, along with religion,
“Roman law, and partially also canon law” became the “source law
for all Christian nations.” 55 From this, he drew the conclusion that
“what we call today the national Polish law” is nothing else but
“mere modifications of Roman and canon laws which grew out of
the mixture of these laws with national laws and customs; [as well
as] out of the influence of neighbouring laws and customs.” 56 Therefore, the tendency to uniformize legal systems, observed by
Wyczechowski, resulted from the shaping of a shared Christian European legal legacy, a certain body of ideas, principles and institutions that emerged from the foundations of Roman and canon laws.
Thus, since the Napoleonic Code was based on Roman laws, it had
to have certain similarities to the Polish legal culture, which had
shaped from the same substrate.
Bieńkowski followed a similar logic. In his document, entitled
“Introduction to the Plan of Implementation of the Civil Code,”
which he presented at a Reform Committee session on November
20, 1814, he argued that even if it is necessary to abrogate the Napoleonic Code and even if:

54. Id. at 62.
55. Id. at 62-63.
56. Id. at 62.
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it is commendable to write a new civil code for our nation, it
seems that not to use the tested European code, drawing both
from the general principles adapted to our national needs and
from their defects to be avoided, would be to show insufficient diligence in such important work. 57
This is due to the fact that he perceived the “greatness of the
Code . . . to stem from the delivery of the general rules,” 58 which are
common for various nations, as they originate from a common
source. He asserted that “having read . . . collections of civil acts,
one may not deny that they all nearly unanimously contain the same
general rules of law; some taken from the Roman law, others from
common sense supported by experience.” 59 It is only “in the more
detailed” matters that the perfection of a code “hinges on adjusting
them to the national interests” and character. 60
On the other hand, Wyczechowski most certainly noticed what
Bandtkie had stated expressis verbis: that “complaints against the
Code and yearning for the volumes of law and the Lithuanian Statute” from the conservative noble circles were primarily a reflection
of their particular interests to restore the formal legal privileges of
the noblemen. 61 They were both of the opinion that this should be
opposed, not only owing to the egoistic motivations of the privileged
class, but also because to bring back the old order would clash with
the desired direction of transformations, in which Poland managed
to turn precisely thanks to the Napoleonic reforms.
Wyczechowski also listed other reasons for the antipathy towards the Napoleonic Code, suggesting that they are not determined
by its substantive contents nor construction shortcoming, but rather
by circumstances stirred by such a deep-cutting structural reform,
57. Introduction to the Plan of Implementation of the Civil Code, supra note
29, at 288.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 288-289.
60. Id.
61. JAN WINCENTY BANDTKIE, PRAWO PRYWATNE POLSKIE : NAPISANE I
WYKŁADANE PRZED ROKIEM 1830 [POLISH PRIVATE LAW WRITTEN AND TAUGHT
PRIOR TO 1830] 59 (W Drukarni Banku Polskiego 1851); See also Bandtkie, supra
note 35, at 160.
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additionally based on the transfer of a foreign law. In his opinion,
the criticism of the French law stemmed from the following reasons:
(a) “no law can be fully applicable to a foreign country;” (b) “the
laws of the [Napoleonic] Code introducing such a deep reform of
personal laws must arise the hesitation of many;” (c) “the laws of
the [Napoleonic] Code are enforced by our own countrymen, who
have not had sufficient time to thoroughly scrutinize its spirit, and
so the errors of execution may be viewed as shortcomings of the
legislation itself;” (d) “knowledge of the [Napoleonic] Code laws is
the most widespread, and so it is more exposed to attention than all
the other foreign laws” (thus, it is easier to identify its shortcomings,
with the assumption that other, less known laws, are free of them);
(e) “conditions and modifications with all the above mentioned laws
[Prussian law, Austrian law, and Polish pre-partition law] are executed,” meaning that depending on the facts of the case as well as
the time, and place of events causing legal consequences, they may
be subject to different laws taken from various legal orders in force
at a given time and in a given territory, pursuant to the rule that “each
case must be judged according to the laws under which it occurred;”
(f) Polish lawyers come from different schools: Polish, Prussian, or
Austrian, as “differences in education influence even matters
straight from the Code, as each one likes to interpret and explain
things in line with their own principles.” 62 Therefore, the reasons
listed by Wyczechowski for resistance against the French private
law may be viewed as universal, accompanying to a greater or
smaller extent each transplantation of a new legal system. Yet,
French law, even though partially imposed by force, was not met
with the same hatred that had once befallen the Prussian and Austrian law after the partitions of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
This is due to the fact that the transplantation of the Napoleonic
Code had been sanctioned by Poles themselves, although unwill-

62. Wyczechowski, supra note 34, at 78, 80.
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ingly and under pressure. Therefore, the situation was different. Because of this, according to Wyczechowski, in 1807—unlike in
1815—it was harder to believe that “our countrymen would agree to
accept the laws of the nation from whose rule they were becoming
liberated.” 63 Moreover, in his opinion, it could not be underestimated that the Polish justice system had had enough time to acquaint
itself with the French institutions.64
On the other hand, Jan Wincenty Bandtkie, who in a way backed
up Wyczechowski, focused on emphasizing the value of the Code,
although with the reservation that he did not consider it “a work of
superhuman greatness” and admitted that it “had its imperfections,”
even in “the general order, that is in the layout and connections of
individual matters.” 65 Regardless of the above, he indicated that “the
French legislation is one of the latest ones,” which was to imply that
it was the most highly developed, especially since it must be remembered that, as probably the most outstanding Polish historian of law
emphasized at the time, “[t]he French nation has excelled in solid
teaching of the law” for a long time, “longer even than the Germans,
and can still boast of a high level of academic education.” 66 As a
confirmation, Bandtkie cited the names of Jacques Cujas, Hugues
Doneau, Denis Godefroy, and Antoine-François Brisson. 67 Furthermore, in reference to the history of drafting the Civil Code, Bandtkie
observed that “its authors . . . put the advisory provisions of Justinian
to an excellent use, as well as the legal acts and domestic and foreign
legislative books.” 68 He recommended this work as one of reliable
elaboration, based on solid preparation and comprehensively collected and analyzed normative materials. Also, the quality of the
63. Id. at 73.
64. It did not happen after the liberation from the Prussian rule. This is because, in 1807, Polish elites were unable to foresee “how greatly the Prussian laws
and solutions could still be convenient to us,” since up until then their application
had been reserved for Prussian officials only. Id.
65. Bandtkie, supra note 35, at 145, 169, 171.
66. Id. at 168.
67. Id.
68. Id.

2018]

NAPOLEONIC CODE & POLISH TERRITORIES

291

Code’s legislative technique, which according to the truly impressed
Bandtkie elevated it above other European codes, confirmed the
thoroughness of this work. In his opinion, the Code’s authors “outmatched with their succinct style all the earlier legislations, often
hopelessly wordy.” 69 Bandtkie also praised “the amazing . . . connections and harmony between the detailed and the general” and
added that: “there are no useless academic provisions [in the Code],
only orders; it is always the voice of the legislator, not of the teacher.
Unlike in the Prussian law, there is no mix-up of principles of governing with various other objects of legislation.” 70 Certainly, the Napoleonic Code stood out in comparison with the rambling, digressive, and moralizing Prussian Landrecht, which is its predecessor on
the Polish territories. As exemplified by Bandtkie’s statement, the
style of the Prussian codification and similar acts from the 18th century had already become defunct by the early 19th century, as opposed to the technique of the French legislators of the Napoleonic
era. This old fashion, Prussian, style arose the reservations of people
such as Bandtkie, representatives of the more notable parts of the
Polish legal elites. 71 Bandtkie noted that in confronting the French
and Prussian legislations, he was inspired by the evaluations formulated by German scholars. He observed, referring especially to the
work of Ernest Wilhelm Reibnitz, “that even the German themselves, [though] sparing with praise, nowadays admit to the superiority of French legislation and will surely avail themselves of it.” 72
For all these reasons, this professor of law summed up his argument
by asserting, “it would be haughty to assume that the French law, in
its entirety or at least in its majority, is imperfect.” 73 In his opinion,
the Civil Code did not deserve to be abrogated in full. 74

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 168-69.
Id. at 168.
Id.
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Wyczechowski, on the other hand, pointed out that the qualities
of the Napoleonic Code and other French acts became even more
visible in the Duchy of Warsaw owing to the legal chaos that
emerged over the previous period of more than ten years. He advertised the French law, presenting it as the bedrock of stability in times
when “nearly each family feels the results of upheavals of legal relationships, which occurred repeatedly” 75 in late 18th and early 19th
century. Wyczechowski ventured as far as to assert, perhaps with
exaggeration, that “there is not another nation in Europe in which
the laws would be changed as often and at such short intervals,” 76
but he added:
[Not] only all of our legal relationships have become entangled, we lost even more in the confusion of ideas and customs. There is no unity, which represents the feature, soul,
and strength of a nation, and which comes with long work
and shapes through national education. Each court must have
judges educated in different schools: Polish, Prussian, and
Austrian. There are virtually none who would be equally
well-versed in all of them. All the judges had to study a foreign law, that is: the [Napoleonic] Code and although they
have not yet explored it thoroughly in such a short period of
time, it became the sole code that could be dubbed national,
as all have equal knowledge of it. 77
This also stirred negative evaluations to the Napoleonic Code,
not uniformly interpreted in various regions. For this reason, in the
opinion of Wyczechowski, it should not surprise anyone that:

75. Wyczechowski, in balancing the damage caused by Napoleonic Wars
which had recently rumbled through the Polish territories, observed that:
As of yet . . . no one has been able to recognize and calculate the extent
[of suffering]. It will only reveal itself when everything is back in the
ruts of calm and all can get to clarifying and establishing their property
relations. At this point, and no earlier, we will finally see the obstacles
and hindrances, we will bump into unexpected ruins of private properties; this entire great whirlpool into which we have been hurled by the
frequent changes of law [that had occurred in previous years].
See Wyczechowski, supra note 34, at 61.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 79.
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[I]n a collection of such divergent forces, interests push forward slowly and with great obstacles. What seems perfectly
clear to one, is odd to another, as it does not fit in with the
principles of his school. The outcome of nearly all disputes
is subject to more uncertainty than anywhere else. If cases
originating from Polish, Prussian, and Austrian times were
examined by Polish, Prussian, and Austrian lawyers themselves, then we could predict that they will agree with each
other on some matters, but the sum total of opinions of members of different schools is difficult to predict. 78
Bandtkie’s view was similar, as he was of the opinion that the
Napoleonic Code should be upheld, with only such amendments that
would be justified by “imperfections” of some of its institutions.
These imperfections fell into two main categories of: (1) ineffective
solutions and (2) solutions incompatible with the “teachings of morality and the state of our civilization.”79 According to Bandtkie,
“[f]utile and tortuous formality,” favoured the abrogation of the
French institution of care (as the example of a first category institution), which should be “returned to the direct competence of
courts.” 80 Similarly, the abrogation of the secret mortgage was justified with the harmfulness of this institution which, in the opinion
of Bandtkie, was “an advantage to [very few], while to the general
population, [it was] a danger and an obstacle to obtaining credits.” 81
For this reason, he postulated that it should be replaced with a solution “similar to Prussian laws.” 82 He also believed it would be recommendable to simplify prenuptial agreement provisions, after the
Prussian model, “yet with the maintenance of cautionary measures
prescribed by the French Code.” 83
The second group included, in his opinion, the need to abolish
divorces, but he also believed that, regardless of the clergy’s pres-

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 79-80.
Bandtkie, supra note 35, at 170.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sure, marriage annulment should remain an option (based on premises established in accordance with the relevant religious laws)
available to lay courts, “as the opinion of clerics will always be onesided in this respect.” 84 Bandtkie also believed that, if need be, clergymen should be entrusted with the task of running the vital records,
as long as it would be considered their public law duty. 85
With this, he closed the catalogue of justified amendments,
which shows that Bandtkie was a vehement advocate of maintaining
the French Civil Code with just some minor modifications of its contents. He thought that the national codification was a pipe dream, a
mirage. Yet, he was careful not to make his opinion too obvious in
his memo. He stated, however, that if: “for national honour, in order
to avoid [at any price] the rule of foreign laws, the need to draft
entirely new codes were recognized, in such case it would be more
recommendable to take example from the Austrian and Bavarian
legislations, subsequent to the French legislation.” 86 In this approach, progressiveness seemed to impose foregoing national legal
tradition as a relic, even though only a quarter of a century old, since
it was already completely incompatible with the expectations of the
new world. Bandtkie left no illusions, though the work on this code
“would perhaps take a number of years of work of people unburdened with any other duties.” 87 First and foremost, however,
Bandtkie recommended the return to formal legal perfection of the
Napoleonic Code, next to which the Bavarian and Austrian codes
could only play “an auxiliary and secondary role.” 88 He was clearly
enchanted with the “succinct, supple, and noble style of the French
legislation,” which should always “be held up as the standard, the
model” for new codes. 89

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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It is very telling that he did not refer to them as “national.” Thus,
letting it be known that he did not believe in such a reconstruction
of the pre-partition law, which would result in the final outcome of
a truly national codification. It is also of significance that in the proposed amendments, he never brought up the usefulness of any institutions of Polish pre-partition law. His considerations also avoided
even the symbolic mention of the national legal tradition. With the
exception of lay marriage, he focused on those fragments of the Napoleonic Code, which he considered objectively ineffective, and
proposed their replacement with other solutions, but not drawn from
the old Polish law, but rather from other foreign legal systems
known to him, that is Austrian or Prussian. Just as in the case of
Wyczechowski (born in 1780), it could be influenced by the fact that
Bandtkie (born in 1783) never had any practical contact with Polish
pre-partition law. Moreover, it should be noted that Bandtkie did not
hesitate to propose combinations of solutions of different origins,
such as in mortgage law fashioned after the Prussian institution with
some French solutions. Therefore, the Napoleonic Code was to him
a universal work, fitting for transplantation onto the Polish territory
without having to adapt it to the specifically Polish conditions, with
the exception of lay marriages, which he thought a Catholic country
was not ready to accept.
IV. SUMMARY
Summing up, both memos were mutually complementary.
Wyczechowski’s remarks focused on showing the reasons for the
uselessness of the Polish legal tradition in drafting codification suitable for the 19th century standards, while, at the same time, both
lawyers explained why the liberal progressiveness of the Napoleonic
Code had its advantage over other codes. Simultaneously,
Wyczechowski attempted to convince the readers of his memo, that
despite the few years that had passed since the introduction of the
Napoleonic Code in 1808, a deep social transformation had already
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occurred, and, in its wake, assimilation of the French civil law. For
all intents and purposes, there was no going back. Bandtkie, in turn,
complemented this argument by pointing to the technical superiority
of the Napoleonic Code over other comparable collections. Subsequently, he tried to prove that the French civil law was unconditionally fit for transplantation onto the Polish territory owing to its universality and objectively high quality. Importantly, to document
these statements, he cited the opinions of German scholars, considering them an authoritative source of evaluation. 90 On the other
hand, Wyczechowski answered the question of why transplantation
was possible by indicating the shared European legal tradition,
rooted—both in the case of Poland and France—in Christianity,
canon law, and Roman law, and adding that although the Napoleonic
Code is indeed imbued with certain revolutionary ideas, it skillfully
reconciled them with the Roman legal heritage common for France
and for Poland.
The described debate was only the beginning of works on replacing the Napoleonic Code with new national codification, which
ultimately were not a success. Works on the national codification
lasted the entire period of existence of the constitutional and relatively autonomous Kingdom of Poland, that is until the uprising of
1830-1831.
The adaptation problem of the transplanted French law, considered in this article in the light of the presented remarks, may also be
regarded in a broader dimension. The analysis of the situation as
done by Wyczechowski and Bandtkie depicted not only the state of
awareness of the erstwhile Polish legal elites, but it also showed
their view of contemporary determinants in Poland of the early 19th
century. The analysis also shed light on the universal nature of problems associated with legal transfers to peripheral countries whenever the transplanted legal system is more advanced than the social

90. Id. at 171-72.
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relations in the recipient country, resistance ensues. 91 The Napoleonic Code, as a modern work serving the implementation of new
ideas, may be held up as a paragon of an instrument which, when
transplanted onto a different cultural substratum, may be viewed differently by the broad society and by the elites. 92 The latter—people
like Bieńkowski, Wyczechowski, and Bandtkie—enjoyed a broader
perspective, and this is precisely what made their evaluation of the
Code incompatible with that of the other part of the society. 93 In the
traditionalistic circles, a foreign instrument, no matter how perfect,
gives rise to resistance, and the greater the number of incidental,
circumstantial adaptation problems, the greater this resistance. Fear
of upturning the social relations and of downgrading the position of
the nobility and the clergy translated into a landslide of criticism
against the transplanted law. The struggle to fossilize social relations
resulted in an idealization of the pre-partition law. 94 In “progressive” circles, on the other hand, such an instrument is enthusiastically welcomed if it may be applied to furthering the desired transformation—of legal and socio-economic modernization. 95 Within
this context, the statement by Juliusz Bardach that transplantation of
91. See Juliusz Bardach, Recepcja w historii państwa i prawa [Reception in
the History of State and Law], in THEMIS A CLIO CZYLI PRAWO A HISTORIA
[THEMIS AND CLIO OR LAW AND HISTORY], 88-89 (Liber 2001); see also concluding remarks of Michał Gałędek, Legal Transfers and National Traditions: Patterns of Modernization of the Public Administration in Polish Territories at the
Turn of the 18th and 19th Century, in CULTURE – IDENTITY – LEGAL
INSTRUMENTALISM (Michał Gałędek & Anna Klimaszewska eds., Brill-Nijhoff,
forthcoming 2019).
92. Bogusław Leśnodorski, U progu nowego stulecia. Księstwo Warszawskie
[On the Brink of a New Century. The Duchy of Warsaw], in HISTORIA I
WSPÓŁCZESNOŚĆ [HISTORY AND CONTEMPORANEITY] 209-211 (Państwowe
Wydawnictwo Naukowe 1967).
93. Bogusław Leśnodorski, Prawnicy – pierwsi profesorowie i studenci
Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego [Lawyers - The First Professors and Students of The
University of Warsaw], in LUDZIE I IDEE [PEOPLE AND IDEAS] 184 (Państwowy
Instytut Wydawniczy 1972).
94. Bardach, supra note 91, at 80-81.
95. Michał Gałędek & Anna Klimaszewska, The Implementation of French
Codes on the Polish Territories as Instruments of Modernization – Identifying
Problems with Selected Examples, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND... / LE DROIT
COMPARÉ ET... 75-84 (Alexis Albarian & Olivier Moréteau eds., Presses Universitaires d’Aix Marseille 2016).
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law constitutes “primarily an effect of specific needs and the desire
to satisfy them” rings true. 96 In this case, the needs of the landed
gentry and clergy were contrary to the needs of other social classes,
particularly of the rising Polish intelligentsia (primary legal elites),
creating a rift in the political elites that represented the society.

96. Bardach, supra note 91, at 96.
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ABSTRACT
Scholars increasingly use expressions such as “regulatory competition” or even “law market” to illustrate the new global legal
system and the rivalry between national laws. This paper scrutinizes
the legitimacy of the application of such economic concepts to legal
systems’ interactions. An economic analysis could allow us to, more
precisely, delimit the factors of convergence (leading to unity) and
divergence (leading to diversity) between national legal systems due
to competitive strategies (namely differentiation and alignment) and
the consequences for the regulation of legal systems’ interactions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To illustrate the effects of globalization on laws and on the law,1
it is common today to refer to “regulatory competition” or even the
“law market.” 2 Therefore, legal experts are led to use economic concepts such as “competition” and “market.” 3 Do such concepts and
the concomitant economic analysis allow for a better understanding
of the contemporary global legal system and in particular the relationships between national legal systems? 4 To what extent can we
expect a better understanding of the trends towards unity or diversity
of the law from an economic analysis of the behaviors related to law
(namely lawmaking and legal mobility for law users)?
The objective of this paper is to assess the legitimacy of applying
these economic concepts to national legal systems. This paper also
aims to demonstrate the fruitfulness of pursing an economic analysis
of the relationships between national legal systems. First, the terms
“competition” and “market” imply that there is some form of rivalry

1. T. Halliday & P. Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 447
(2006); J.-B. AUBY, LA GLOBALISATION, LE DROIT ET L’ÉTAT (Montchrestien
2003); H. P. Glenn, Droit mondial, droit mondialisé ou droit du monde, in DE
TOUS HORIZON—MÉLANGES XAVIER BLANC-JOUVAN 259 (Société de législation
comparée 2005).
2. H. P. GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE
DIVERSITY IN LAW (Oxford U. Press 2010); GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (G.
Teubner ed., Dartmouth 1997).
3. A. MARCIANO & J. M. JOSSELIN, FROM ECONOMIC TO LEGAL
COMPETITION—NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE (Edward Elgar Publ’g 2003); K. M. MEESSEN, ECONOMIC LAW AS AN ECONOMIC
GOOD: ITS RULE FUNCTION AND ITS TOOL FUNCTION IN THE COMPETITION OF
SYSTEMS (Sellier 2009); E. A. O’HARA & L. E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (Oxford U. Press 2009); E. Carbonara & F. Parisi, Choice of Law and Legal Evolution: Rethinking the Market for Legal Rules, 139 PUB. CHOICE 461 (2009); D. C.
Esty & D. Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, 3(2) J. INT’L ECON. L. 235 (2000).
4. A. Ogus, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution
of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law, 48(2) INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 405
(1999); H. TJIONG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: A
DIACHRONIC INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL CHANGE IN AN ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION (VDM Verlag 2009).
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between coexisting legal systems. However, are these notions relevant? Are concepts taken from economic analysis truly applicable,
or is it just a suggestive manner of speaking (i.e., a metaphor)? If so,
we would be facing a case of importation of concepts elaborated in
one discipline (namely economics) into another discipline (law); the
use of the concept being more ideological than scientific. In fact,
one may assume that some concepts are relevant whereas other ones
are not.
Second, careful economic analysis could allow us to delimit
more precisely the factors of convergence and divergence between
national legal systems pertaining to national competitive strategies.
Following an economic approach, the current global trends of law
towards unity or diversity can at least be partially analyzed because
of combined individual strategic behaviors (interactions between
states and law users). Describing the theoretical conditions of the
application of economic analysis to lawmaking and to legal mobility, we will stress that the relevance of this approach depends on the
characteristics of the different legal systems, which comparative law
highlights. Before developing this idea, it is useful to give some preliminary precisions.
Of course, the answer given to the first question depends on the
accepted meaning of a word such as “market.” The word market is
polysemic. Therefore, an expression like law market does not have
only one meaning. It may correspond to the market for legal services
provided by lawyers. In this particular sense, there is undoubtedly a
law market involving law firms, especially large international law
firms that are competing intensively to meet the demand for sophisticated legal advice coming from multinational corporations and
large institutions. 5 In a very different sense, the term “market” can
be used in contrast to other general forms of organization of the
economy, such as centrally managed economy based on state-

5. Y. DEZALAY, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL
JUSTICE (B. Garth ed., Routledge 2013).
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owned enterprises. 6 The market, thus, corresponds to the private
sector and to all economic relations based on autonomous will and
private property. However, the “law market” may also refer to the
competition between the legal orders closely attached to different
jurisdictions. We will show that countries do compete, through their
legal systems, in order to attract players and businesses, but we cannot posit that there is currently a national legal systems market. In
other words, if we consider that the concept of a market is specific
and not identical with that of competition, then there may be competitive situations that are not based on the market mechanism.
This point has key implications for the regulation of global interaction between national legal systems. If a law market does not
exist, it would be unrealistic to hope that such competitive relations
could spontaneously lead to equilibrium. In classical and neoclassical economic theory, the market is described as a mechanism that
has the capacity of allowing a set of actors who do not coordinate
otherwise (by rules, routines, conventions, etc.) to achieve a satisfactory situation in the sense that a deviation from this equilibrium
would be disadvantageous. This theory is conceptually based on
Adam Smith’s idea of the “invisible hand” of the market. Thus, a
real market—in the sense of a specific economic mechanism—is a
spontaneous order since the interactions between the economic actors lead to a balance without external public intervention. However,
if the interaction between the legal systems is not exactly marketbased, it is therefore relevant to consider other ways of regulating
competition between national legal systems to remedy possible perverse effects. Again, an analysis of the nature of economic relations
between national legal orders provides a better understanding of the
dynamics of legal systems. Indeed, to tackle the problem of normative competition, if it does not spontaneously balance itself, one of
the actions lies in the harmonization of rules. In this case, normative

6. F. A. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY—RULES AND ORDER
(U. of Chicago Press 1973).
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competition, which in response calls for a policy of legal harmonization, indirectly feeds the convergence of national laws. Thus, international legal harmonization appears to be a very important remedy to these perverse effects and leads to unification.
II. SPECIFICITY OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
As a preliminary point, it is necessary to situate this analysis
amid the already vast economic analyses of national legal systems.
Indeed, within the last few years, a number of economists have studied, comparatively and with an economic perspective, national legal
systems or major families of legal systems (common law, civil law,
etc. 7), in order to highlight the importance of the legal factor in economic development. We could mention, for instance, the pioneering
work undertaken by R. La Porta, F. Lopes de Silanes, A. Schleifer
and R. Vishny, 8 and continued by the World Bank (Doing Business
reports) along with research on legal origin. 9 There is also a growing
literature on law and development. 10 This type of approach is also
referred to as comparative law and economics. 11
Such economic work focuses on legal systems whereas the analysis that seems to be truly needed would focus on the relationships

7. R. DAVID & C. JAUFFRET-SPINOSI, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT
CONTEMPORAINS (Dalloz 2002); J. Vanderlinden, À propos des familles de droits
en droit civil comparé, in HOMMAGE À RENÉ DEKKERS 359 (Bruylant 1982).
8. R. La Porta, F. Lopes-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, & R. W. Vishny, Legal
Determinants of External Finance, 52(3) J. FIN. 1131 (1997); R. La Porta, F.
Lopes-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer & R. W. Vishny, Law & Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON.
(1998).
9. E. L. Glaeser & A. Shleifer, Legal Origins, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1193 (2002);
R. Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP.
L. 765 (2009); S. Djankov, E. L. Glaeser, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, & A.
Shleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595 (2003).
10. D. Berkowitz, K. Pistor, & J.-F. Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplants Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003).
11. U. MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (U. of Michigan Press
1997) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS]; A. Ogus, Economic
Analysis and Comparative Law, in MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE DENIS TALLON
169 (Société de legislation comparée 2000).
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between legal systems. The abovementioned works are macroeconomic (i.e., they deal with the economic performance of countries). 12 Whereas the understanding of the interactions between legal
systems implies the elaboration of a theory of players and actions
and, therefore, an approach based on microeconomics. 13
If economic comparisons of legal systems are not very helpful
for analyzing the interactions between national legal systems, we
can note that they are not completely irrelevant to the matter of this
study. Indeed, the comparative macro-econometric analysis of legal
systems has contributed to making countries and players aware of
the idea that national legal systems compete and can be ranked according to their economic merits. Moreover, the composing principles of these rankings and the underlying ideology (i.e., the idea of
an economic superiority of common law over systems of civil law,
itself related to the liberal preference for self-regulation or judiciary
regulation over the so-called tendency for the countries of civil tradition to intervene in the economy14) suggest a policy of alignment
of national legal systems with those legal systems presented as the
most efficient from an economic point of view. This is one of the
competitive dynamics that we will come back to.
One may assume that the intrinsic economic efficiency of the
different legal systems is not a well-established theory. 15 A histori-

12. N. Garoupa & T. Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and Comparative Law, in
COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 11, at 58; F. Faust, Comparative
Law and Economic Analysis of Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 837 (M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann eds., Oxford U. Press
2006); G. DE GEEST, ECONOMICS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Edward Elgar Publ’g
2009).
13. H. R. Varian, Microeconomics, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS 461 (Macmillan 1987); H. R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (3d ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 1992).
14. See World Bank, International Finance Corporation, & Oxford University
Press, Doing Business in 2004—Understanding Regulation at XIV (Washington,
D.C. 2004); P. G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek
Might Be Right, 30(2) J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001).
15. This theory has generated critical reactions, both from economists and
lawyers (e.g., J. Klick, B. Deffains, J. Armour, Association Henri Capitant).
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cal overview of the relations between the law and economic development shows that legal systems that are currently viewed as relatively economically inefficient (e.g., France, Italia, or Germany)
compared to common law systems (e.g., England, U.S., Singapore),
have been linked to remarkable periods of economic take-off and
sustained growth. 16 Furthermore, fast-growing economies, such as
that of China, are not based on legal frameworks that are usually
viewed as conducive to economic development. Therefore, the economic attractiveness of laws is not based, or at least not only based,
on the substance of laws, but also on the legal systems’ position in
the market (i.e., on their relative position compared to the other
ones) regardless of content. Also, the choice made by lawmakers to
specifically position their legal systems can be analyzed with the
analytical tools provided by economic theory.
III. THE APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO THE
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
Economic analysis was first established to explain activities that
seemed fundamentally economic in nature, such as the production
or exchange of goods. In this view, law does not seem to be an economic matter. It is a component of the economic environment (i.e.,
a piece of data that economists may take into account), but it is not
the main area of investigation. The general framework of economic
analysis, however, has a broader scope of application (sometimes
described as “economic imperialism” 17). Faced with the challenge
of explaining how economic agents can mobilize limited resources

16. D. C. NORTH & R. P. THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A
NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 1-8, 120-131 (Cambridge U. Press 1973).
17. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (U. of
Chicago Press 1976); D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO
DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS (Princeton U. Press 2000); R. H. Coase,
Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7(2) J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1978).
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to best satisfy their interests, economic analysis has become a general theory of choices under constraint 18 and of rational behavior. 19
If we adopt this abstract conception of economic analysis, it is
possible to apply it to the system composed of the different national
legal systems. 20 The contemporary global legal system can indeed
be modeled as a universe in which different players (countries) produce a particular object (norms and judiciary institutions) that other
players (individuals, businesses, NGOs) choose to use. 21 This theoretical framework was originally provided by Charles Tiebout’s
analysis of jurisdictional competition. 22
The relevance of this model is based on the assumption that law
can be chosen, both by the lawmakers (who design the law) and by
the law users (who choose the governing law or the dispute resolution mechanism). 23 Some long-term evolutions contribute to making
this hypothesis realistic. However, at this stage in the development
of law in the world, the legal malleability and the legal mobility are
only partially true in reality.
As far as the law users’ point of view is concerned, the real possibility of choosing the law has to be verified. There must be concrete mechanisms enabling the choice of one legal system over another; this constitutes the assumption of “legal mobility.” 24 We shall
18. See Robbins’ definition of economics: “Economics is the science which
studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which
have alternative uses,” L. ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND
SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 15 (Macmillan 1932).
19. P. VAN PARIJS, LE MODÈLE ÉCONOMIQUE ET SES RIVAUX (Librairie Droz
1990).
20. Legal systems likely to compete against one another are not limited to
national systems, since supranational legal systems (in particular European Union
Law) and international legal systems (e.g., lex mercatoria) may compete with national legal systems.
21. R. Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2(2) THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 387 (2001).
22. C. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64(5) J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956).
23. J. M. Smith, Legal Engineering in an Age of Globalisation: Is There a
Future for Jurisdictional Competition?, in LEGAL ENGINEERING AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 51 (E. C. Ritaine et al. eds., Schulthess 2008).
24. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra, note 3; L. E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by
Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245 (1993).
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distinguish two main mechanisms that allow economic or social actors to choose a legal system:
The physical mobility that enables them to settle in the territory
of a country whose legal system they want to adopt (assuming that
the criterion of applicability of the law is territorial);
The will that enables them to directly choose the applicable law
for a specific transaction (e.g., a clause of governing law in international contracts) or for an organization (incorporating a business in
a country whose corporate law one wants to apply, regardless of the
location of the actual headquarters, in legal systems that do not apply
the seat-of-administration rule).
Thus, legal mobility is the result of a combination of legal factors (free movement of goods, services, people, and money; free
trade, territoriality of law, national sovereignty, etc.) and non-legal
factors (economic globalization, information and communications
technologies, drastic decrease in transportation costs, the existence
of a global language, etc.). Legal professionals with international
networks and global consulting firms ready to provide services to
global groups play an important role in promoting and implementing
this legal mobility.
On the supply side, we shall insist on an essential point. The
economic model is applicable to the international legal system because the national legal systems may be chosen. This relationship of
choice opens a field of possibilities. There are two implications:
first, law users must have a choice to make from among several legal
systems; second, lawmakers must have the power to change the law.
Conversely, some structures of the global legal system are not
compatible with a choice-based economic analysis. National legal
systems may not be chosen by individuals and businesses for several
reasons, such as the following:
− because laws are not mainly based on territories, in particular
national territories (e.g., laws are clan based, as they used to be
during the early medieval period);
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− because there is only one applicable law to a given matter, without any alternative solution (e.g., the jus commune hypothesis,
which explains for instance why there is no competition between
national canon laws);
− because there is no room left for a choice between coexisting
legal systems (i.e., situation of strictly compartmented national
legal systems. For this reason, we cannot say that North and
South Korean legal systems compete—they are simply foreign
to one another).
The propensity of states to implement competition-seeking strategies based on legal solutions in line with the market depends on the
characteristics of the national legal systems. Laws are actually more
or less likely to be modified in response to governments’ willingness
to adopt strategic positions. There are two reasons for limiting the
malleability of laws. First, the law of a country may not be likely to
be changed by the state because the law is not primarily a product
of the political will (as it is the case for statute law), but rather the
fruit of judges’ wisdom (case law), the practice of lawyers, or social
traditions (customary law). 25 Second, the intensity of the relationship between the national legal system and a nation varies significantly from one country to another. When the law has played a very
important role in the constitution of a state and in the self-consciousness of the people, it is unlikely that the government will be able to
modify easily the law to attract foreign actors.
In a country like France, the Civil Code resembles a civil “constitution” as Jean Carbonnier put it, after Demolombe. 26 It is a fundamental historical landmark (lieu de mémoire 27). Therefore, it is
difficult to imagine that the venerable Civil Code could be replaced
by another system of law regulating private relations without the
25. N. Garoupa & A. Ogus, A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (2006).
26. P. Mazeaud, Le code civil et la conscience collective française, 3
POUVOIRS 152 (2004).
27. J. Carbonnier, Le code civil, in LES LIEUX DE MÉMOIRE III 293 (P. Nora
ed., Gallimard 1986).
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French national identity being profoundly affected. In the same way,
the English people have an extreme attachment to the Common law.
The transformation of the British legal system under the influence
of European law has given rise to considerable reactions of mistrust
and rejection. The nostalgia for a return to English law, free from
any European influence, has recently emerged as an important argument in the public debate on Brexit. Certain legal systems are very
strongly linked to a specific legal tradition and the legal systems of
the same family. 28 For instance, legal systems of countries from the
“new world” are generally very dependent on their seminal laws, as
it is the case for Australian law with respect to English law. The
dependent legal systems can provide some differentiations compared to the seminal law, but they remain limited, except in the case
of mixed legal systems. 29
Examining the conditions for the application of economic analysis to national legal systems is an opportunity for us to emphasize
that the relevance of economic interpretation is not merely theoretical. The validity of the application of microeconomic analysis to legal systems depends on the characteristics of the legal systems as
historical evolutions made them. The more legal systems are based
on written law and contingent regulations, the more the assumption
of legal malleability is relevant. Detailed regulations can be changed
easily by political will. 30 Therefore, states will be more likely to
adopt policies strategically in order to position their law compared
to the other legal systems. Moreover, countries whose legal culture
is mild and where law is not a structuring element of national selfconsciousness can most easily carry out strategic reorientations.

28. K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(Oxford U. Press 1998).
29. K. REID, D. VISSER, & R. ZIMMERMANN, MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PROPERTY AND OBLIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND AND
SOUTH AFRICA (Oxford U. Press 2005).
30. P. Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’, 4(2) MAASTRICHT
J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997).
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The relevance of applying the economic model to national legal
systems is, therefore, dependent upon the level of development of
the global legal system, which needs to be composed of different
national systems that are independent from one another, and relatively substitutable (i.e., largely capable of assuming the same functions, 31 following a classical view in comparative law theory). Competitive oriented lawmaking is, thus, perhaps only one explanatory
factor.
IV. RELEVANT ECONOMIC CONCEPTS: REGULATORY COMPETITION
BUT NO MARKET FOR LEGAL SYSTEMS
After showing that the structure of the contemporary international legal system allows us to apply economic analysis, we need
to determine which economic concept is appropriate for illustrating
the relationships among national legal systems.
On the one hand, the economic notion of competition is relevant. 32 We can state that national legal systems compete because
countries try, through their legal systems, to be attractive for economic actors and businesses, and to acquire international influence.
States provide the legal rules and institutions that best suit actors’
individual preferences. Furthermore, mobile economic actors, particularly businesses, seek to take advantage of the heterogeneity of
the global legal system by choosing laws most profitable for them.
That is why national or state corporate laws are seen as competing
laws. 33 Nonetheless, economic motivations are not the only determiners of behaviors. Profit is not the only motivation in search of
31. E. RABEL, AUFGABE UND NOTWENDIGKEIT DER RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG
(Hueber 1925).
32. U. Mattei & F. Pulitini, A Competitive Model of Legal Rules, in THE
COMPETITIVE STATE: VILLA COLOMBELLA PAPERS ON COMPETITIVE POLITICS
207 (A. L. Breton et al., Kluwer 1991).
33. L. A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); W. L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83(4) YALE
L. J. 663 (1974); R. Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, J. L., ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); R. Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987).
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the most appropriate jurisdiction. They may also be interested in the
fact that certain values are recognized and promoted in some territories rather than in others. For instance, same-sex couples may
leave their country of origin to have access to the possibility of getting married in another country. 34
On the other hand, the notion of a market does not seem applicable to the relationships between national legal systems. The market is a bilateral relation of exchange. 35 In the market, each player
gives and receives something and rationally tries to obtain the best
ratio between the things exchanged. One of the elements of such
exchange is often the payment of a sum of money. The best price
needs to be found—the highest for the seller and the lowest for the
buyer. In the case of relationships between countries and law users,
this bilateral exchange usually does not exist, meaning that contracting parties who choose a particular governing law in their agreement
do not have to pay anything to that country. Sometimes, a fee is required upon completion of a formality in a given legal system (e.g.,
incorporation of a business). However, this represents more the actual price of the formality rather than a payment for access to the
legal system. Note that situations where a tax is directly attached to
the choice of a law are actually quite rare.
Some might object to the concept of the market that we consider
in our reasoning because it is inspired by the market for goods and
services. Some might also believe that there is no reason why this

34. J. G. Brown, Competitive Federalism and Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage in the USA, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 257 (W. W. Bratton, J. McCahery, S. Piciotto,
& C. Scott eds., Clarendon Press 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION]; J. L. Grossman, Resurrecting
Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV.
433 (2005).
35. K. BAIN & P. G. A. HOWELLS, UNDERSTANDING MARKET: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY, INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICE OF MARKETS (Harvester-Wheatsheaf 1988); O. FAVEREAU & E. LAZEGA, CONVENTIONS AND
STRUCTURES IN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: MARKETS, NETWORKS AND
HIERARCHIES (Edward Elgar Publ’g 2002).
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concept should be applicable to the relations between legal systems
because the law is not immediately seen as a good or a service. Nevertheless, many authors who refer to “law market” or to the “market
for legal systems” easily see the law as a good (a set of rules) or as
a service (an institution that allows economic and social actors to
achieve specific objectives). 36 It should also be emphasized that the
market not only applies to goods and services, but it can also be used
to describe the functioning of the “labor market” or the “capital market.” Therefore, the field of application of the concept of “market”
is broader than the field of trade in goods and services. However,
this field of application is not unlimited. The specific criterion of the
market is the possibility of arranging the exchange based on the relationship between the terms exchanged. If the conditions of a bilateral exchange are unquantifiable, are not independent from one another, or if one of the conditions of the bilateral exchange does not
exist, then there is no genuine market.
The idea of the law market is based on the assumption that states
are interested in making their law attractive because they receive
taxes from entities (persons or companies) that choose their law.
This idea should be challenged. If the location of an activity determines the applicable law and taxation at the same time, theoretically
it may be expected that there will be an indirect correlation between
the applicable law and the taxes to be paid to the state. Under this
hypothesis, the state is both the lawmaker and the recipient of tax
revenue, whereas the entity who chooses the law is also the taxpayer.
However, it should be made clear that the actual behavior of people
and firms who play with the diversity of legal and tax systems does
not fit with this theory. Indeed, players who benefit from legal mobility elaborate sophisticated strategies to avoid the linkage between
tax and laws. Multinational groups and even medium-sized companies do not just locate activities where the tax rates are the lowest,

36. See MEESSEN, supra note 3.
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they combine the locations of the different components of their businesses (e.g., intellectual property, headquarters, labor, place of listing, contracts, inputs) to largely avoid taxation. If the measures created by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to combat tax avoidance are successful, some of the
most shocking excesses in tax optimization strategies related to tax
rulings and circumvention of stable establishments should decrease
in the future. The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), an
OECD initiative, aims at preventing the exploitation of gaps and
mismatches in tax rules to shift profits artificially to low or tax-free
locations. However, the idea that actors can take advantage of the
plurality of national legal and tax systems to adopt laws without necessarily being subject to the accompanying taxation structure is not
over.
Economic analysis, therefore, enables us to show that national
legal systems do compete, but that in the absence of compensation
for the offering of laws by countries, there is no such thing as a market for legal systems or a law market.
V. NATIONAL STRATEGIES OF DIFFERENTIATION AND ALIGNMENT
IN REGULATORY COMPETITION
This finding enlightens the understanding of interactions between national legal systems. If we consider the relations between
legal systems from the perspective of competition, we can outline
two economic dynamics that contribute to frame the global legal
system. These forces are, moreover, contradictory. They correspond
to two opposite strategies that countries are likely to pursue rationally in order to oppose (defensive strategy) 37 or take advantage of
(offensive strategy) the competition that exists between legal systems. 38
37. U. Mattei, Legal Change: The Comparative Law and Economics Perspective, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 123 (U. of Michigan Press
1997).
38. Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 25, at 339.
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The first strategy consists of a legal system distinguishing itself
from the existing regulatory or legal offer, including acting as a freerider in a unification process. A country may aim at accentuating the
originality of its legal system to obtain a competitive advantage. For
instance, some countries have historically chosen to adopt strict regulations regarding bank secrecy. Jurisdictions where bankers face
serious criminal charges when they communicate information about
their clients, even when requested by national tax administrations,
gave rise to geographic centers specializing in wealth management
(e.g., Switzerland, Luxembourg, Lebanon, Singapore). 39 Several degrees of bank secrecy correspond to various legal preferences and
economic specializations. Thus, from a broader point of view, the
differentiation strategies stimulate the diversity of law.
This policy is strategic in the sense that the efficiency of choosing to differentiate a legal system depends on the other countries’
reactions. If the other legal systems quickly align themselves with
the position of the innovative lawmaker, the latter must again produce an innovation to retain its advantage over the others, and so on.
Thus, lawmakers’ strategies stimulate the volatility of law and not
only its diversity. Sometimes, there is a persistent premium for the
first mover. For instance, Luxembourg tries to keep its leading position in the market of the administration of investment funds
through a swift transposition of the European directives governing
the different categories of investment funds, e.g., Undertakings for
Collective Investments in Transferable Securities (UCITS) and Alternative Investment Funds (AIF).
The valuable differentiation does not need to be very significant.
There are two types of differences between legal systems. A national law can be distinguished from another national law by different parameters within the same paradigm. For example, one country
may choose that cars must drive on the right, while another may

39. A. P. MORRISS, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY
COMPETITION (AEI Press 2010).
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choose the opposite, but in both cases the structure of the rule is the
same. In the same sense, the lawmakers may decide different maximum numbers of directors, but in any case, boards will oversee the
activities of corporations and the number of seats in the boardroom
will be capped. However, the legal systems can also be distinguished
more deeply according to their general approach to matters. Deep
differences make legal concepts very difficult to translate from one
language to another. For example, the concept of remedies has no
equivalent in the French language. 40
A competitive advantage based on a particular legal tool or set
of rules may be an effect of a micro-differentiation. The legal attractiveness is not correlated with the size of the gap with other legal
systems. This leads to the conclusion that the legal diversity produced by lawmakers’ strategies can be more intense (number of differentiations) than deep (magnitude of the differentiations). In this
regard, the economic and strategic aspect of differentiation contrasts
with the legal diversity that is produced by the historic development
of particular separated legal traditions. The divergence between the
English common law and the French civil law tradition is obviously
not the effect of legal strategies of France and England. 41 In this
case, the legal diversity is probably deeper but slower (the differences are rooted in long-term process).
The second strategy consists of a system aligning itself with an
existing offer. In terms of competition, it can be risky to propose an
original law without losing a lot of influence. It can be preferable to
align with one of the existing dominant legal systems, also called
“origins” by Garoupa and Ogus. 42 In the language that is common
among comparative lawyers, it is a massive legal transplantation

40. R. Sefton-Green, Why are Remedies not a Legal Subject in Civilian Law?,
in LES INTRADUISIBLES EN DROIT CIVIL 1-37 (A. Popovici, L. Smith & R. Tremblay eds., Thémis 2014).
41. P. RICHARD, LE JEU DE LA DIFFÉRENCE—RÉFLEXIONS SUR
L’ÉPISTÉMOLOGIE DU DROIT COMPARÉ (Presse U. de Laval 2007).
42. Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 25, at 339.
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process. 43 English, U.S., French, and German laws are international
standards in terms of legal systems. Alignment with dominant legal
systems gives some advantages. 44 Such aligned national legal systems benefit from the image and the knowledge that international
players already have of them. Regardless of their inherent qualities,
familiarity is an important quality when choosing one legal system
over another. 45 For example, given the number of U.S. and UK investors, international business law tends to favor legal solutions
close to Anglo-American legal practices.
Moroccan law provides a good example of a legal system that
has generally chosen to follow French law. During the colonial period, French law was the basic law (except for family law and personal status) and the legal matrix of modern Moroccan law. Moroccan law could then have emancipated itself from French law or
adopted another legal system as a model. That is not what happened.
Moroccan law has continued to be largely inspired by French law,
under the influence of Moroccan lawyers often trained in French
universities and through cooperation with the French administrations and jurisdictions. Thus, French law inspires new laws (e.g.,
telecommunications regulation), the adaptation of certain laws (e.g.,
company law), and the courts’ interpretations, which often take
French case law as a benchmark. This long-term inspiration has several advantages for Morocco (and for France). It facilitates the international training of Moroccan lawyers in universities in France, Belgium, and Quebec. It also encourages the establishment of foreign
companies on Moroccan territory, in order to take advantage of economic opportunities specific to the country, but also to serve as a
hub for the development of activities in French-speaking Africa.
43. A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (U. Press of Virginia 1974); R. Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39(1) AM. J. COMP. 1 (1991).
44. P. Grajzl & V. Dimitrova-Grajzl, The Choice in the Lawmaking Process:
Legal Transplants vs. Indigenous Law, 5(1) REV. L. & ECON. 615 (2009).
45. J. du Bois de Gaudusson, Le mimétisme postcolonial, et après ?, 129
POUVOIRS 49 (2009).
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Casablanca could not have become one of the main legal and financial hubs in Africa if Morocco had not adopted one of the main international legal standards.
One can hesitate between two explanations for this alignment of
Moroccan law with French law. 46 According to a first theory (which
could be called neocolonial), Morocco remains under the political
influence of France. Its autonomy would remain limited and the former colonial power would have the means to weigh on its choices.
However, it can be observed that the U.S. has also influenced Morocco’s policy in the geopolitical context of the Cold War. However,
Morocco has hardly been tempted to be open to the U.S. legal influence. According to the second theory, it is a rational economic calculation that led Morocco to adhere to French law. In fact, the two
theories are not incompatible. Sharing a common legal culture that
affects both institutions and individuals can result in both political
influences and well-understood economic interests.
Whatever the cause, it seems certain that the policies of alignment with an international legal standard contribute to reducing the
legal diversity and reinforces a “market structure” that tends to take
the form of an oligopoly. Following this dynamic, the world legal
system is structured around three to four major legal traditions, as
showed in the comparative law literature.
Thus, we can see that economic analysis of relations between
legal systems enables us to highlight two original factors of convergence or divergence: competitive strategies of differentiation, and
strategies of alignment with dominant standards.

46. C. SAINT-PROT & F. ROUVILLOIS, L’EXCEPTION MAROCAINE (Ellipses
2013).
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VI. REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
Economic analysis is not only useful to explain the current state
of things, but also to shed light on how things should be, in terms of
relationships between national legal systems. 47 First, the structure of
relations between national legal systems presented earlier contributes to the discussion pertaining to the merits of regulatory competition.48 Regulatory competition is indeed a controversial position of
legal policy. 49 Some scholars stress the expected advantages. Competition between legal systems is supposed to squeeze out the least
efficient processes and regulatory measures that are also the most
expensive for users, as they would stop being used. Regulatory competition is also supposed to make the most appropriate legal solutions available so that the user rapidly prospers. Therefore, it should
lead to a general improvement of law. Another argument consists of
saying that if legal systems compete, countries will be encouraged
to offer a diversity of legal systems expressing political options as
diverse as the expectations and preferences of citizens and businesses, in particular in terms of fiscal and social matters, from
among which economic and social players may choose. 50 This type
of argument is based, implicitly or explicitly, on Adam Smith's theory of the “invisible hand of the market.” Competition is supposed
to lead every player in the system, while pursuing their own individual interests, to contribute to a globally profitable result.

47. INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION, supra
note 34, at 1-538.
48. P. SCHAMMO, EU PROSPECTUS LAW: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
REGULATORY COMPETITION IN SECURITIES MARKETS (Cambridge U. Press 2011).
49. W. E. Oates & R. M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35(3) J. PUB. ECON. 333
(1988).
50. D. D. Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109(6)
MICH. L. REV. 995 (2011).
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The dynamics of competing legal systems would lead to a virtuous equilibrium. 51 However, the major weakness of this argument is
the fact that such a law market does not exist, as we demonstrated
above. Also, said equilibrium, in particular between laws offered by
countries, and compensation obtained by them, cannot exist. It could
be otherwise only if the fiscal resources of each country were strictly
correlated to the adherence of a player or a business to the law of
that country. Yet, as we know, the global legal system offers a huge
variety of legal, fiscal, and social choices for global players. In addition, the rules, legal tools, and regulatory constrains can be combined. A complex policy of localization of assets, employees, company headquarters, and transactions, generates the possibility of dissociating the legal systems that are applicable to a player or a transaction. 52
As the relations between national legal systems correspond to a
competitive relationship that is not a genuine market, it is unrealistic
to hope for self-regulation between national legal systems. Unfair
tax competition, the regulatory race to the bottom, and social dumping 53 are well-known perverse effects of regulatory competition.54
They require corrective measures that can only be external as they
cannot take the form of the immanent, spontaneous, and automatic
corrective action that characterizes the market. Initiatives taken by
countries in the European Union 55 or the OECD against unfair tax
51. J. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN
GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS (Cambridge U. Press 1977); V. Vanberg & W.
Kerber, Institutional Competition Among Jurisdictions: An Evolutionary Approach, 5(2) CONST. POL. ECON. 219 (1994).
52. D. D. MURPHY, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION:
CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Oxford U. Press
2004).
53. R. L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
54. Bebchuk, supra note 33, at 1437.
55. F. H. Easterbrook, Federalism and European Business Law, 14 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 125 (1994); J. M. Sun & J. Pelkmans, Regulatory Competition
in a Single Market, 33(1) J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 67 (1995); R. Van der Bergh,
Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe, 53(4) KYKLOS 435 (2000).
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competition constitute interesting examples of such control of regulatory competition. Certain forms of harmonization such as the establishment of social and economic standards (e.g., minimal wages,
maximum working time) are other ways of overseeing competition
between national systems. 56 In other words, regulatory competition
should be mitigated and circumscribed through state cooperation. 57
Economic analysis provides criteria for deciding when legal harmonization is required due to transboundary externalities for instance. 58
Thus, if we take into account the reaction of states and international organizations to the perverse effects of regulatory competition, we perceive a second force that leads to the convergence between the legal systems. Sometimes, the multiplicity of national legal solutions tends to be abolished and replaced by a single international standard, through cooperatives dynamics. 59 In other cases, a
top-down or consensual position on harmonization will lead to the
limitation of diversity of national legal systems, within the limits
that will be set up.
VII. CONCLUSION
An economic analysis of the relations among international legal
systems shows that laws are in a relationship of competition. Nevertheless, competition does not equate to a real market likely to function without any external regulation. It also highlights the original
forces contributing to a dynamic international legal system. Differentiation strategies feed divergence between legal systems, while

56. P. DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD (Cavendish
Publishing 2013).
57. D. C. ESTY & D. GERADIN, REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Oxford U. Press 2001).
58. Esty & Geradin, supra note 3, at 235-255.
59. E. Carbonara & F. Parisi, The Paradox of Legal Harmonization, 132(3)
PUB. CHOICE 367 (2007); B. Crettez, B. Deffains, & O. Musy, Convergence of
Legal Rules: Comparing Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Processes, 12(1)
REV. L. ECON. 13 (2016); B. Crettez, B. Deffains, & O. Musy, On Legal Cooperation and the Dynamics of Legal Convergence, 156 PUB. CHOICE 345 (2013).
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alignment strategies constitute a vector of convergence between national legal systems. The latter trend is also enhanced by the harmonization promoted as a remedy to the drifts of non-self-regulated
regulatory competition.
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ABSTRACT
Data has become one of the most important resources in postmodern information society. However, European civil law does not
reflect this development adequately. In fact, so far, European civil
law seems to struggle with handling data as a legal entity. Against
this background, the article provides a transnational overview and
a comprehensive analysis of the legal situation in Europe. It discusses why data ownership is widely perceived as a problem on this
side of the Atlantic and how this perception can be overcome by a
fundamental property law approach. Taking into account economic
realities, we argue that European property law provides a sufficient
framework for establishing a theoretical concept of data ownership.
Therefore, we draft the dimensions of a data ownership concept by
proposing potential criteria for assigning ownership and analyzing
both positive access and negative restriction rights.
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I. WHY DATA OWNERSHIP MATTERS
Data is a duplicable virtual entity, i.e., neither tangible nor exclusive by nature. Looking into nowadays digital economy, though,
we quickly realize that data is de facto regarded as if it were a
“thing” that can be owned like goods and chattels. According to the
European Commission, “[d]ata has become an essential resource for
economic growth, job creation, and societal progress.” 1 In the big
data era it is indeed uncontested that data is an asset, if not the asset
of the 21st century. 2 However, legal analysis shows that private law
in Europe does not reflect this reality so far. Scholars and practitioners claim that private laws consistently struggle with handling data
as a legal entity. 3
Against this background and taking into account all major European legal systems, we argue that European property law already
provides sufficient common principles to establish a comprehensive
concept of data ownership.

1. European Commission, Building a European Data Economy, at 2, COM
(2017) 9 final (Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter Building a European Data Economy].
2. E.g., European Consumer Commission, Meglena Kuneva, Personal Data
is the New Oil of the Internet and the New Currency of the Digital World, Keynote
Speech at the Roundtable on Online Data Collection, Targeting and Profiling,
SPEECH/09/156 (Mar. 31, 2009).
3. Wolfgang Kerber, A New (Intellectual) Property Right for Non-Personal
Data?, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND RECHT, INTERNATIONALER TEIL
[GRUR INT.] 989, 990 (2016); Robert Hieke, Big Data, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT ZUM
INNOVATIONS- UND TECHNIKRECHT [INTER] 10, 11 (2017); Artur-Axel Wandtke,
Ökonomischer Wert von Daten, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 6, 6 (2017);
Karl-Heinz Fezer, Theorie des immaterialgüterrechtlichen Eigentums an
verhaltensgenerierten Personendaten der Nutzer als Datenproduzenten, MMR 3,
5 (2017) (claiming the need for a sui generis right).
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For this purpose, we will give a concise summary of the relevant
supranational framework before diving into an analysis of national
laws. By applying a property law approach, we will then take a close
look at whether data can be seen as a tangible good and how ownership rights are acquired and transferred. Subsequently, we will discuss specific problems regarding data ownership and marketability,
particularly data theft, bankruptcy, and lien.
Thereafter, we will draft the dimensions of a data ownership
concept by proposing potential criteria for assigning ownership and
analyzing both positive access and negative restriction rights. Finally, the data ownership concept will be brought into line with conflicting rights such as personal rights, privacy, and freedom of information.
II. EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK
On a European level, there is no concerted approach to the question on data ownership. While there still is a lack of clarity whether
data ownership of any kind is accepted, some of the underlying legal
principles and legal norms might come in handy to develop guidelines to a data ownership.
A. European Primary Law
As for the European primary law, 4 which prevails over other legal sources, the treatment of data is affected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and
the Treaties of the European Union.

4. European Primary law is the supreme law of the European Union and is
at the apex of the European legal order. It mainly consists of the Treaties of the
EU out of which the latest—the Treaty of Lisbon—implemented the current
Treaty on European Union [TEU] and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], see consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 01.
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1. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and
European Convention on Human Rights
Data is an information carrier regarding subjects or circumstances; in case of personal references, the European law provides
specific rights to the data subject. Concerning this matter, article 8
of the Charter 5 lays down that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him (no. 1) and that such data must
be processed fairly for specific purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid
down by law (no. 2). Therefore, the European primary law states
some sort of data sovereignty on behalf of the individual. Even if
personal data is only a small aspect of the overarching concept of
data ownership, this very basic principle has to be kept in mind regarding the acceptance of exclusive rights on data.
Another primary source of EU law is the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR). 6 The ECHR does not provide the protection of personal data in particular, but the protection of privacy
in general. 7 To that effect, informational self-determination is
deeply associated with personal freedom and privacy. Hence, to this
principle, data protection law sets up preconditions for the handling
of data.

5. As can be derived from Art. 6 (1) TEU, the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union [CFR] is part of the European primary law. See
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 23, 2012, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 02.
6. See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS no. 005 (1950). Art. 6 TEU incorporates the
Convention as primary law. If necessary, the Court of Justice may refer to these
principles in order to complement the fundamental rights protected in the CFR.
7. Art. 8 of the ECHR states:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.
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2. Digital Single Market
In contrast to the rather personal approach of data protection, the
EU also stipulates economic interests in its primary law, which are
related to the potential use and marketability of data as an asset. According to article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the
EU shall establish an internal market, i.e., create a harmonized
framework for the free movement of goods, services, and capital.
This facilitates the promotion of competition, jobs, and reduction of
trade barriers. 8 With respect to the proceeding digitalization, a common European framework is needed to provide specific rules for the
marketability of data.
Therefore, the European Commission proposed a “Digital
Agenda for Europe in the year 2020.” Its main objective is to create
a digital single market that covers digital marketing, e-commerce,
and telecommunication. In January 2017, the Commission defined
this agenda by adopting a draft communication on building a European Data Economy. The plan states that free movement of data requires the reduction of unjustified restrictions, like public parameters for the location of data for storage or country-specific law approaches in regard to data and furthermore, the necessity of data access, the facilitation of data sharing, and the acceptance of a data
producer’s right, i.e., the “right to use and authorize the use of nonpersonal data.” 9 As a consequence of this agenda, an exclusive property right of data could be demanded.
3. Fundamental Freedoms
The above-mentioned strategy of the Commission has a strong
relation to the fundamental freedoms of the single market that are
laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

8. Internal Market, EUR-LEX, https://perma.cc/UX99-Z4T6.
9. See Building a European Data Economy, supra note 1, at 13.
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(TFEU). Three of these principles provide valuable starting points
for an approach to data ownership.
The principle of free movement of goods (articles 28–37 TFEU)
appoints the elimination of customs duties or quantitative restrictions as well as the prohibition of measures having an equivalent
effect. 10 Referring to the term “goods,” the European Court of Justice (ECJ) implies products that can be valued in money and that are
subject of commercial transactions. 11 Without prejudice to the
ECJ’s decision, it is commonly agreed that the free movement of
goods requires some sort of tangibility of the product. 12 Nevertheless, one must take into account that even gas, electricity, or software, which is stored on a data carrier, are covered by this principle.
These exceptions exist irrespectively of their concrete physical manifestation, which suggests that data could also be captured. Hereafter, the equal treatment of goods and data demands for the assignment of property to one individual.
Besides the free movement of goods, articles 63–66 TFEU regulate the free movement of capital within the European Union. European legislation does not provide any legal definition of the term
“movement of capital,” which is why one refers to Annex 1 of Directive 88/361 that lists several categories, like loans, liens, or any
other capital movement, 13 but not data. Nevertheless, data are similar to the categories not exhaustively mentioned: if data was seen as
a form of currency, the directive would apply. However, this is
clearly not the case. There are neither data exchange rates, nor a
maximum volume of data in circulation nor inflation rates. Quite the
contrary: the more data is available, and the more analysis options
exist, the more valuable the data becomes. 14 That is why data has a
10. Marius Maciejewski, Free movement of goods, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
(Oct. 2018), https://perma.cc/W2AX-RUDY.
11. Case 7/68, Comm’n v. Italy, 1968 E.C.R. 423.
12. WALTER FRENZ, 1 HANDBUCH EUROPARECHT 93 (2d ed., Springer 2012).
13. Council Directive 88/361, Annex 1, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 8.
14. Dirk Heilmann & Thomas Liegl, Big Data und Datenschutz,
HANDELSBLATT RESEARCH INSTITUTE (2013), https://perma.cc/8DEV-Q6HW.
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unique value for some stakeholders: the business model of social
networks, cloud computing companies, or e-commerce services is
built entirely upon data. Though it is harder to rate and specify data
in the offline world, even there it is used to assess customer behavior
and consequently benefit economically from it. Therefore, it cannot
be denied that data is a modern form of a financial asset, which is
why the underlying idea of protecting the free movement of capital
applies in principle to data as well. Therefore, one might argue that
the principle of free movement of capital can be seen as an appreciable normative landmark.
Furthermore, the TFEU stipulates in articles 56–62 the free
movement of services, which includes only intangible and professional activities (e.g., the provision of digital services like personalized advertisements based on Facebook likes).
Thus, the Fundamental Freedoms of the EU and the primary law
deliver indications for the use and trade of data (services). Insofar,
the acceptance of exclusive rights would strengthen the economic
marketability of data.
B. European Secondary Law
For a comprehensive overview of the European framework, we
also need to take into account European secondary legislation, i.e.,
regulations and directives passed by European institutions such as
the Parliament or the Commission.15 Secondary legislation is a level
down in the normative hierarchy, but provides rather detailed regulations. In search of data-specific legislation, we come across the
recently passed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 16 the
Directive on e-Privacy, and the Directive on e-Commerce.

15. TFEU Art. 288.
16. European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679, Apr. 27, 2016,
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016
O.J. (L119) 1.

2018]

DATA OWNERSHIP & PROPERTY RIGHTS

331

1. Steps Toward “Data Sovereignty” in the GDPR
The GDPR entered into force in May 2018 and replaced the directive on data protection from 1995. 17 As a regulation it is mandatory law and directly applicable in all member states, facilitating a
further harmonization of data protection in the Union. Even though
the GDPR does not provide specific regulations for any form of data
ownership, there are two pertinent developments worth emphasizing.
Firstly, the GDPR stipulates the right to erasure (most commonly labeled as a “right to be forgotten”), which gives the data
subject the right to obtain, from the controller, the erasure of personal data concerning him without undue delay. It particularly applies if the data subject withdraws his consent on which the processing is based. 18 In other words, the individual is granted a power
of exclusive disposition concerning the processing of personal data
that is—to some extent—comparable with the power of the owner
over his property. In terms of property law, this could be understood
as a negative dimension of an exclusive right, i.e., the power to exclude others from using one’s property.
Secondly, the GDPR introduces a fundamentally new right to
data portability. Article 20 gives the data subject the right (a) to receive the personal data concerning him from the controller in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format, and (b) to
transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the
controller to which the personal data have been provided. In this regard, it is an accompanying measure to the right to access. 19 It addresses the so-called lock-in 20 that arises particularly from social
17. European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, Oct. 24, 1995, on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) [GDPR],
1995 O.J. (L281) 31 (EC).
18. GDPR Art. 17 § 1(a).
19. GDPR Art. 15.
20. Jürgen Kühling & Mario Martini, Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung:
Revolution oder Evolution im europäischen und deutschen Datenschutzrecht?,
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networking services (SNS); the underlying reasoning is to enable the
individual to change from one SNS to another with just a single
mouse click. 21 As a matter of fact, it can be seen as a brand new
instrument in exercising the individual’s power over his data. By
granting the data subject the capacity to decide about further processing and access, the right to data portability goes way beyond the
well-established principle of consent. 22 Therefore, it can be seen as
another step towards a (privacy-based) concept of data ownership.
2. Data as a Good in the Directive on e-Privacy
The ePrivacy Directive 23 requires member states to ensure the
free flow of personal data in the Union—a wording that can also be
found in other secondary legislation, e.g., article 1 (1) GDPR. As
such, it serves as a reference to the fundamental freedoms in general
and the free movement of goods in particular. It indicates that data
is considered as a transferrable asset or at least as comparable to
tangible goods that may be subject of a free movement between
member states.
The ePrivacy Directive, however, provides an additional reference point; namely, measures should be taken to prevent unauthorized access to communications including both the contents and any
data related to such communications. 24 The prevention of unauthorized access draws a connection to property rights: the “owner” of
EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 448, 450 (2016); Peter R.
Benson, Data Portability the Antidote to Data “Lock-In,” Electronic Commerce
Code Management Association [ECCMA] White Paper on Data portability (Apr.
1, 2009), https://perma.cc/VG4Q-EFR5.
21. European Commission, Impact Assessment, at 106, SEC (2012) 72 final
(Jan. 25, 2012).
22. Tim Jülicher et al., Das Recht auf Datenübertragbarkeit – Ein
datenschutzrechtliches Novum, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DATENSCHUTZ [ZD] 358, 361
(2016).
23. European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/58, July 12, 2012, concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC) [hereinafter Directive
2002/58] (the directive is about to be reformed by a “ePrivacy” Regulation in
2019).
24. Id. at recital no. 21.
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data is by law entitled to exclude others from accessing his (im)material property—just like the owner of a tangible good.
3. Parallels Between Safekeeping and Hosting Contracts in the
Directive on E-Commerce
Other sources of secondary legislation reveal further similarities
of data and tangible property. Article 14 of the Directive on e-commerce, 25 for instance, regulates the liability of a host provider, i.e.,
someone who provides data storage on a contractual basis. It stipulates that the host provider is not liable for the information stored on
the condition that he does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information. In this regard, hosting contracts are quite similar to safekeeping contracts, since both usually require subjective
elements such as said knowledge to hold the safekeeper or host liable. 26 This implies another parallel reasoning for goods and data.
C. Interim Findings
Even though there is no specific legislation addressing data ownership on a supranational level, we discovered a considerable number of data-related provisions that express two major tendencies:
firstly, recent European legislation strongly reflects the increasing
relevance of data, both economically and societally. Secondly, the
European framework suggests that data and its marketability are
generally comparable to the tangible goods regime. Against this
background, European legislation illustrates not only a common underlying trend but also provides general conditions for determining
a pan-European concept of data ownership. However, European pri-

25. European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31, June 8, 2000, on
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) (EC) 1 (the Commission is about
to initiate the revision of the directive).
26. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896,
RGBL 195, as amended, §§ 688, 694 (Ger.).
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mary law does not allow for a comprehensive supranational regulatory approach as core issues of civil law are exclusively subject to
national legislation. 27
III. NATIONAL LAWS IN EUROPE
As mentioned above, the core issues of civil law lie within the
competence of the member states. Therefore, in this section, we focus on the framework of property law and its core principles on the
national level. This aims to provide the basis for our approach by
identifying commonalities within the member states’ legal systems
and transferring those rules that are applicable to our concept of data
ownership to a European level.
A. Data as Tangible Property
On a national level, the previous findings lead to the question
whether data can be considered a “thing” in terms of property law.
More specifically, whether data can be considered as being corporeal in regards to the right in rem. This is basically the first crux of
the matter.
1. Historical Influences and Preliminary Considerations
Historically, the term “thing” originated from the 1,500-year-old
Roman Corpus Iuris Civilis, one of the first attempts within the history of modern law to unify and codify statutory rights regarding
tangible and intangible property. The basic distinction was based on
the possibility to touch an item. 28 If this was the case, the item was
classified as corporeal; otherwise, it would be incorporeal. In some
European legal frameworks, the legal term “thing” is restricted to

27. According to the principle of conferral, the EU shall act only within the
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the member states, Art. 5 § 1, § 2
TEU—no competence has been given in this matter.
28. ROLF KNÜTEL ET AL., CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS – DIE INSTITUTIONEN 60 (4th
ed., C.F. Müller 2013).

2018]

DATA OWNERSHIP & PROPERTY RIGHTS

335

anything, except for corporeal objects, due to the narrow understanding of von Savigny. His interpretation eliminates all non-tangible assets from property law. 29 A ius naturale point-of-view allows
for a wider comprehension of the term “thing.” Codifications that
have a stronger law of nature background, such as the French 30 and
Austrian 31 examples, consider that property can also include nontangible objects, inter alia obligations and debts. In all European legal systems, the classification of a “thing” as a legal good is essential
in order to establish exclusive rights regarding utilization and the
right to defend valuable assets. 32 The title of ownership, as the highest level of a legal right in property law, is a further common aspect
within all national frameworks. 33
The acknowledgement of corporeality as valuable in terms of
property law is due to a tangible “thing” being marketable and the
option to, therefore, use it as a security interest, for instance, placing
a lien on it. It is even possible to have a usufruct solely on the
grounds of the property asset of a “thing.” 34 This demonstrates that
the approval of an exclusive right through the unwritten laws of an
intangible asset (for instance, energy or heat) must be based on its
aptitude of circulation and its marketability. 35

29. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, DAS SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN
RECHTS 338 (Veit 1840); FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, DAS
OBLIGATIONENRECHT ALS THEIL DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 23 (Veit
1851).
30. FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, DROIT CIVIL—LES BIENS 43 (9th ed., Dalloz 2014),
referring to Art. 1240 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] (Fr.) [hereinafter C.
CIV.].
31. ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jun.
1, 1811, Justizsammlung [JGS] No. 946/ 1816, as amended, §§ 285, 292 (Austria)
[hereinafter ABGB].
32. ELKE HERRMANN, KERNSTRUKTUREN DES SACHENRECHTS 1 (Mohr
Siebeck 2013); CHRISTIAN VON BAR, GEMEINEUROPÄISCHES SACHENRECHT 5, 6
(C.H. Beck 2015).
33. HERRMANN, supra note 32; VON BAR, supra note 32, at 227.
34. VON BAR, supra note 32, at 227.
35. Alexander Peukert, Sonstige Gegenstände im Rechtsverkehr, in
UNKÖRPERLICHE GÜTER IM ZIVILRECHT 5, 95, 99 (Stefan Leible et al. eds., Mohr
Siebeck 2011).
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The same economic specifications apply to data. As a valuable
property asset, data is an elementary subject of modern business relations, which we therefore need to give somehow its rightful place
in property law—whether or not it is corporeal in terms of physics.
A stronger focus on parameters like controllability and manageability may help to develop criteria to subsume data within property law
and to constitute exclusive rights. Yet, through establishing these
subject matters as factors, further problems arise. 36
2. Identifying European Commonalities
The goal is to identify a common ground regarding an original
European comprehension of a “thing” in terms of property law.
Identifying commonalities is a demanding task, since no universal
European property law has been established. 37 Theoretically, we
would need to examine and compare more than twenty-eight different legal frameworks. This would go beyond the scope of this article. We, therefore, narrow this study’s focus down to the major European legal methods defining res incorporales. In the following,
these concepts are summarized and contrasted whilst differences
and similarities will be determined. The simple existence of legal
concepts like personal property and possession themselves may just
be the only mutuality.
The inconsistency of the definition of the term “thing” within
European property law will, therefore, be exemplarily illustrated.
Austria 38 and Scotland, for instance, have some of the most liberal
approaches in Europe. Everything that can be distinguished from a
person and is usable is legally defined as a “thing.” Ownership includes everything that belongs to someone, regardless of whether it

36. VON BAR, supra note 32, at 166.
37. For a comprehensive overview of recent literature on European property
law, see Caroline S. Rupp, What’s New in European Property Law? 6 EUR. PROP.
L. J. 87-110 (2017).
38. ABGB, supra note 31, at § 285.
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is corporeal or not. 39 Within this context, it is understandable to constitute exclusive rights in reference to data. 40 However, a conservative perspective would claim that the legal definition needs to be
restricted to tangible goods.
This problem also arises in Portugal and France. These countries
provide quite broad definitions. The French Civil Code incorporates
tangible and intangible “biens,” i.e., goods. 41 In Portugal, anything
that is an object of legal affairs can be treated as a “thing.” 42 Despite
this indifferent and general terminology, exclusive rights need some
sort of corporality. 43 Concerning this matter, even gas or energy are
materialized and are, therefore, tangible “things” in Portugal. 44 A
comparable approach can be found in Greece. The civil law demands some form of tangibility and controllability, whilst even natural powers, energy, or heat are considered a “thing,” if they are
spatially controllable. 45
Switzerland, which uses similar terminology, recognizes that
natural powers are a legal “thing” in certain constellations. 46 In contrast, Germany assumes a rather narrow definition. The strict requirement of a steady corporeality excludes everything that cannot

39. Id. at § 353.
40. See ELISABETH BERGER, REZEPTION IM LIECHTENSTEINISCHEN
PRIVATRECHT UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DES ABGB 57 (LIT
Verlag Münster 2011).
41. TERRÉ, supra note 30, at 43; GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, HAFTUNGSRECHT:
STRUKTUR, PRINZIPIEN, SCHUTZBEREICH 334 (Springer Science & Business
Media 2006).
42. CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE], Nov. 25, 1966, DL no. 47344/66, as
amended, Art. 202 (Portugal) [hereinafter C.C.].
43. See Art. 544 C. CIV. (Fr.); Art. 1302 C.C.; JOSÉ CARLOS DE MEDEIROS
NÓBREGA, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES PORTUGIESISCHEN SACHENRECHTS 71 (V&R
unipress GmbH 2015); Erwin Beysen, Frankreich, in 4 SACHENRECHT IN EUROPA
177, 230 et seq. (Christian von Bar ed., Rasch 2001) [hereinafter SACHENRECHT
IN EUROPA].
44. DE MEREIROS NÓBREGA, supra note 43, at 71, 72; Maria Margarida
R.A.C. de Seabra & Yanko Marcius de Alencar Xavier, Portugal, in 3
SACHENRECHT IN EUROPA, supra note 43, at 177, 339, 347.
45. ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] Art. 947 (Greece).
46. SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10,
1907, SR 210, RS 210, as amended, Art. 713 (Switz.).
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be sensibly demarcated from other objects, 47 like electricity. 48 Ownership of incorporeal goods is, therefore, not possible. 49 In Dutch
civil law, these legal fundamentals are also indicated. 50 Common
law in the United Kingdom sets no high value on the distinction between tangible and intangible things. 51 Instead, legal rights are usually not at all tied to any physical qualifications. Ownership or property rights may be established on any type of tradeable good. 52
3. Interim Findings
In summary, all European laws use the word “thing” or a comparable expression as a key term. Interpretations, which allow wide
comprehensions of the term, exist in various European legal frameworks. Commonalities on a superordinate level can be found in the
appraisal of the “thing” as a potential property asset and the necessity for controllability. Therefore, distinguishing between tangible
and non-tangible property is not mandatory for an asset, like data, to
be classified within the law of property.
B. Ownership Rights in Europe
Ownership is usually understood as an exclusive right—a right
of domination over a determined thing allowing the owner to possess enjoy fruits and benefits, and to act with as it pleases. The owner

47. BGB § 90.
48. Christina Stresemann, § 90 BGB margin no. 1,5, in MÜNCHENER
KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB (7th ed., Franz-Jürgen Säcker et al. eds., C.H. Beck
2015).
49. BGB § 903.
50. Franz Nieper & Hendrik Plöger, Niederlande, in 3 SACHENRECHT IN
EUROPA, supra note 43, at 149, 162; see BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [CIVIL
CODE] (established in 1992), as amended, Art. 3:2 (Neth.).
51. MICHAEL BRIDGE ET AL., THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 1-11 (Sweet
& Maxwell 2013); Andreas Rahmatian, A Comparison of German Moveable
Property Law and English Personal Property Law, 3 J. COMP. L. 197, 202 (2008).
52. MATTHIAS LEHMANN, FINANZINSTRUMENTE: VOM WERTPAPIER- UND
SACHENRECHT ZUM RECHT DER UNKÖRPERLICHEN VERMÖGENSGEGENSTÄNDE
240, 241 (Mohr Siebeck 2009).
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is also allowed to exclude others from any exposure. 53
1. Transparency: Publicity and Specificity
Since ownership is of exclusive nature, both its original and derivative acquisition requires some element of intersubjective perceptibility. To achieve universal recognition among legal entities it
must be transparent to everybody concerned. 54 Within the civil law
tradition, this principle of publicity usually becomes manifest for
moveable goods in their possession and for real property in its public
registry. 55 It is particularly important not only for the acquisition and
transfer of ownership, but also for obtaining a lien or similar security
interests.
However, there are significantly different publicity requirements
throughout Europe. 56 While in Germany, for instance, chattel mortgage can be agreed upon quite confidentially, neither France nor
England recognize non-possessory security interests without their
explicit registration. 57 The second element of transparency is specificity, i.e., only definable things can be subject to ownership rights. 58
This is a common necessity among the European jurisdictions,
which particularly rules out ownership of unspecifiable and aggregated assets.
53. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 563 (9th ed. 2009); BARRON’S LAW
DICTIONARY 405 (6th ed. 2010).
54. SJEF VAN ERP & BRAM AKKERMANS, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON
PROPERTY LAW 75 (Bloomsbury Publ’g 2012).
55. UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 102–108 (Greenwood Publ’g Group 2000).
56. See Dewi J.Y. Hamwijk, The puzzling concepts of publicity and possession: to the heart of property law, 1 EUR. PROP. L. J. 299–316 (2012) drawing a
line to the Draft Common Frame of References, which attempts to combine basic
rules of the law of obligations which most European legal systems hold in common. See Study Group on a European Civil Code & Research Group on EC Private Law, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law—
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) Book IX (Proprietary security rights
in movable assets) (Outline ed., Sellier 2009) https://perma.cc/DB9D-ML9U.
57. Arts. 2338, 2072 C. CIV. (Fr.); BRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 8–33;
KATALIN LÉGRÁDI, MOBILIARSICHERHEITEN IN EUROPA 328 (Logos Verlag
Berlin GmbH 2012); Rupp, supra note 37, at 95.
58. VAN ERP & AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 76.
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2. Acquisition of Ownership
In general, ownership can be constituted either by derivative or
by original, i.e., legal acquisition.59 Derivative acquisition means
that the title of ownership is derived from a former owner; whereas,
original acquisition implies a primary acquisition, in which case no
previous owner existed. In this case, ownership is constituted by legal statute.
In comparison of European legal systems, both ways imply, in
turn, various modes. First, ownership can be acquired derivatively
by legal transaction, e.g., by contractual arrangement. Secondly, in
certain cases and under strict conditions it may arise from legal acquirement, such as inheritance or specification. Thirdly, there is acquisition by sovereign acts like the award in a compulsory auction. 60
3. Criteria for Allocation in Case of Original Acquisition of
Ownership
Before ownership can be transferred derivatively, firstly, it must
come into existence—the same applies to data ownership. From a
comparative perspective, different criteria for allocation of ownership can be identified. With regard to data ownership, it is crucial to
focus on the prerequisites of acquisition of ownership by specification, as an originator of data is comparable to the creator of a product
in the broad sense.
Specification means a creator produces a new tangible thing out
of one or more components and acquires its ownership. Basically,
the creator is the person who carries out the specification directly. 61
This legal consequence shall take effect no matter who owned the
manufactured components before, provided that the value of the new
59. Id. at 617.
60. See Gesetz über die Zwangsversteigerung und Zwangsverwaltung [ZVG]
[Act on Enforced Auction and Receivership], Mar. 22, 1897, RGBL at 97, § 90
(Ger.).
61. Ernest G. Lorenzen, Specification in the Civil Law, 35 YALE L. J. 29, 38
(1925).

2018]

DATA OWNERSHIP & PROPERTY RIGHTS

341

thing is not less valuable than the components. 62 Therefore, the moment the creator acquires ownership by specification, former rights
expire.
In this context, the term “manufacturer” has to be understood in
a broader sense, though. Its definition can depend on specific circumstances: not only the person who originally performs the transformation can be meant. In German Law, for example, the manufacturer—and as legal consequence the person who acquires ownership
of the new thing—can also be the one in whose interest and in whose
name the production is carried out (i.e., the person who is principal
in the legal sense). 63
This criterion for allocation is one of the older ones in the context of legal allocation of data. The idea of assigning data ownership
to the person who induced the collection, storage, and processing of
data economically and in context of his business, follows an economic approach. A similar approach can be found in the directive of
the European Union on the protection of databases. By this directive,
the maker of a database that shows there has been qualitatively, or
quantitatively a substantial investment is provided an absolute right
under copyright law. 64
4. Transfer of Ownership
In comparison to the aforementioned aspects (i.e., publicity,
specificity, and the acquisition of ownership), the European framework of national property laws shows major discrepancies regarding
the transfer of ownership. Taking this fact into account, it is essential
62. Rahmatian, supra note 51, at 197, 235.
63. Peter Bassenge, § 950 margin no. 6, in BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH:
BGB (76th ed., Otto Palandt ed., Verlag C.H. Beck 2016).
64. European Parliament and Council Directive 96/9, Mar. 11, 1996, on the
legal protection of databeses, Art. 7 § 1, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, 25 (EC) [hereinafter
Directive 96/9]; Commented on by Silke von Lewinski, Database Directive, in
EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY no. 9.7.1 et seq. (Michael M. Walter & Silke von Lewinski eds., Oxford U. Press 2010); see also Estelle Derclaye,
The Database Directive, in EU COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY no. 9.31 et
seq. (Irini Stamatoudi & Paul Torremans eds., Edward Elgar Publ’g 2014).
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to give a brief overview of the various concepts of the transfer of
ownership. On this occasion, we do not aim to outline a full explanation of each member states’ property concept. We rather intend to
explain the distinguishing characteristics with all due brevity, in order not to shift the focus of our topic. This approach should not be
an end in itself. Our idea is to outline a legal framework for a European concept of data ownership. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the potential existing legal barriers and requirements of such
concept in the concrete legal area.
A European concept of data ownership has to be implementable
in the civil law systems of every member state. Thus, the authors
have chosen to develop their proposition based on the principles of
those jurisdictions that demand the strictest prerequisites when it
comes to the original acquisition and transfer of physical property.
The authors make the assumption that a concept compatible with
those demands should work with the concepts of property law in all
less restrictive member states as well.
For starters, it should be pointed out that “ownership is in the
standard repertoire of all codifications in the European Union.” 65 On
this basis, two major tendencies can be identified. 66 Hereinafter, differences and commonalities shall be illustrated in an exemplary
fashion.
a. Necessity of Delivery Combined with Contractual Agreement
and/or Agreement in rem
Legal systems in Germany and Greece require a proprietary
agreement—i.e., an agreement in rem (dingliche Einigung)—and
physical transfer or substitute for physical delivery of the good,
which shall be assigned (traditio). 67 In addition to the obligational

65. VON BAR, supra note 32, at 449.
66. VAN ERP & AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 784; DIETER KRIMPHOVE, DAS
EUROPÄISCHE SACHENRECHT 82 (EUL Verlag 2006) (applying a more sophisticated systematization of six models).
67. KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66 at 88 et seq.
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contractual agreement that contains the minimum content of contractual conditions, e.g., performance and consideration (essentialia
negotii), the parties have to conclude a bargain of disposition. With
this agreement, normally fixed at the same time as the contractual
agreement, the parties correspond in the transfer of property. A peculiar feature of German law is that both agreements, contractual,
and in rem become effective and exist independently of one another
(principle of separation). The invalidity of one contract does not affect the other (principle of abstract real conveyance). The publicity
principle requires external recognizability of the change in the ownership structure, e.g., by transferring the direct possession of the determined thing. Thus, the fulfillment of the transfer of ownership
should be apparent for third parties. With the necessity of delivery,
this concept follows the tradition principle.
Compared with the rest of Europe, the German system of transfer of ownership is especially the one that raises very high barriers
with regards to data ownership. The fact that both agreements exist
independently complicates legal classification of possible ownership structures of data by enlarging the connecting factors. This is
one reason why the discussion about data ownership is not in the
least a German discussion. 68 From this knowledge, the following
hypothesis is taken as a basis: if it is possible to establish a concept
of data ownership that is compatible with those legal systems having
demands concerning their legal principles that are difficult to combine with the nature of data, this concept, as well, might be adoptable to legal systems with less barriers in this regard.
In countries such as Austria, Hungary, Poland, or Switzerland,
the transfer of ownership requires a proprietary agreement and the
delivery of the assigned good as well, but it is based on the principle

68. See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on the
Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, at 23
n.108, COM (2017) 9 final (Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter Commission Staff Working
Document on the Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the European Data
Economy].
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of causa. 69 The principle of causa implies an inevitable link between
the contractual agreement and the proprietary agreement. Notwithstanding the principle of separation, there is no effectiveness of the
two agreements without one another. If for any reason the contractual agreement is ineffective, ownership is retransferred automatically.
Some countries—e.g., Spain and the Netherlands—do not require any proprietary agreement at all. 70 In this case, transfer of
ownership is executed by the conclusion of a treaty (obligational
agreement) and the delivery of the thing. Therefore, the transfer of
ownership primarily depends on the question whether the obligational agreement is effective or not. 71
b. Principle of Consensus
In France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, Portugal, and Bulgaria
there is a completely different approach to the transfer of ownership,
as it is not based on any delivery but the principle of consensus. It
only requires an effective understanding of the legal transaction. 72
Neither a further proprietary agreement nor the delivery of the sold
good is necessary. 73 In case of an ineffective contract, the ownership
is retransferred automatically to the former owner. It is noteworthy,
that there is basically no element of public disclosure. Few exceptions only exist in the case of obligations to purchase of fungible

69. KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66, at 88 et seq.; for Austrian law, see VAN ERP
& AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 798.
70. KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66, at 103 et seq.; for Dutch law, see VAN ERP &
AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 795.
71. KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66, at 102.
72. Erwin Beysen, Frankreich, in 4 SACHENRECHT IN EUROPA, supra note 43,
at 239; KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66, at 109.
73. Jakob Fortunat Stagl, Der Eigentumsübergang beim Kauf von
beweglichen Sachen - Gedanken über die Methode der Rechtsvereinheitlichung
am Beispiel der Study Group on a European Civil Code, in JAHRBUCH JUNGER
ZIVILRECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLER 2004 at 369 (Andrea Tietze et al. eds., Richard
Boorberg Verlag 2005); see Arts. 1583, 1138, 711 C. CIV. (Fr.).
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goods, elective obligation or goods to be manufactured. Those exceptions require a further agreement appropriating the goods to the
contract.
In contrast to this “pure principle of consensus” 74 or “solo consensus rule,” 75 the legal systems of Great Britain, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania combine both elements of the tradition principle
and the principle of consensus. 76 In detail, the concrete procedure of
selling tangible goods depends on the underlying legal transaction.
All purchase agreements, as well as manufacturing agreements, fall
under the Sale of Goods Act and the Consumer Rights Act. The only
and sufficient condition for the transfer of ownership is the contractual agreement. According to ss. 17 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act
“the property . . . is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties
to the contract intend it to be transferred.” In this regard, the British
system is comparable to the aforementioned model. However, it varies in the parties’ possibility of determining the date of the transfer
of ownership. Thereby, it enables temporal division of the conclusion of the contract and the acquisition of ownership. Outside the
scope of the Sale of Goods Act—for example in case of donation,
loan, or barter contracts—the general law of contract is applicable
and the transfer of ownership additionally requires the delivery of
the thing.
c. Non-Regulation in Scandinavia
There are a few European jurisdictions—particularly in Scandinavia 77—that do not provide a uniform system for transferring ownership rights. In countries like Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland,
and Iceland, only certain aspects are covered by existing law of

74. KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66, at 109 et seq.
75. VAN ERP & AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 788.
76. KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66, at 120 et seq. (“differentiating principle of
consensus”).
77. Id. at 132 et seq. (“principle of consensus of successive single effect”).
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property. Those aspects indicate a similarity to the principle of consensus. However, by not regulating the system of transfer of ownership extensively, the legal systems are able to handle new developments more flexibly than other systems by adapting the law of property in one particular case.
5. Interim Findings
The analysis of European national property laws shows some
major differences on the whole, but, nonetheless, commonalities
within some crucial dogmatic legal issues. European law of property
is, therefore, in principle, receptive to a joint approach regarding the
question of data ownership.
IV. DATA-SPECIFIC ISSUES
So far, we have outlined the foundations of European property
law and demonstrated that there is little legislation that particularly
addresses data as an intangible asset. However, we have not paid
close attention to the practical implications of this shortcoming,
even though in praxis, the lack of data-specific regulation certainly
raises quite a number of problems. We have picked some examples
to draw further conclusions (i.e., data theft, bankruptcy, and whether
data can be subject to a lien).
A. Data Theft
Whereas many national legal systems provide special sections
for data theft, 78 the question whether the theft of data can be also
classified as “usual” theft is of higher interest for the development

78. See, e.g., STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 202a, May 15,
1871, RGBL at 127, as amended (Ger.).
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of a data ownership. Since most European member states’ legislations determine that only a physical thing 79 can be stolen, it is extremely relevant whether or not the definition of things can also contain non-tangible assets.
Luxembourg’s highest court in civil and criminal matters, the
Cour de cassation, rendered an important decision in 2014 on the
matter. 80 In the criminal case, the employee of a bank had downloaded and photocopied confidential documents that belonged to the
bank. Later, he presented these documents before an employment
tribunal as evidence for gross misconduct of his former employer.
In response, the bank filed a criminal complaint inter alia for theft.
In the prior instance, the court of appeal 81 had differentiated between the downloading of electronic data and the photocopying of
paper documents. For the aim of this article the violation of the
bank’s copyrights by the latter act are secondary, as well as the violation of professional secrecy. 82 As far as the downloading was concerned, the court held that the defendant did not commit the crime
of theft, because an object of theft could only be an item of moveable
corporeal property. According to the court of appeal, data could not
be seen as a physical subject and, therefore, it could not be stolen.
Basically, the Cour de cassation followed the court of appeal’s
distinction but partly overruled its decision. It made use of a wider
interpretation of the definition of theft: “[E]lectronic data stored on
the bank’s server and which is legally its exclusive property constitute incorporeal property which can be apprehended by way of
downloading.” Furthermore, according to the court, sec. 461 Luxembourg Criminal Code would not make a distinction between corporeal or incorporeal objects of theft.
79. In French, a thing is “chose” and in German, it is “Sache.”
80. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Apr. 3, 2014, 6458/10/CD
(Lux.).
81. Cour d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal], Luxembourg City, July 10, 2013,
395/13 X (Lux.).
82. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, according to the Cour de cassation, the photocopying qualifies as theft.
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This means that electronic data stored on a server qualifies as a
thing that can be stolen. By this decision, Luxemburg’s Cour de cassation broke with the court of appeal’s case law. 83
B. Bankruptcy
As more and more data services shift from local or on-premises
solutions to cloud-based setups, private individuals and corporate
enterprises start to ask themselves, what would happen to “their”
data if a cloud service provider went bankrupt? Once a cloud service
provider shuts down its servers due to financial problems, customers
can neither access nor recover their data. Despite the disastrous consequences, only few jurisdictions pay attention to this urgent problem so far. Again, the underlying problem seems to be that storage
devices are easily sizeable as a “thing;” whereas, the data itself may
be scattered across innumerous physical resources and, therefore,
not tangible.
Usually, contracting parties have a right to claim for separation
and recovery of assets not belonging to the bankrupt estate. However, this right of separation is closely linked to the above-mentioned principle of transparency, which requires an asset to be determinable. This means that customer data must be capable of being
separated from other objects in order to be (re-)vindicated. In digital
environments this obviously poses a problem. But thanks to virtualization, data clusters can actually be separated depending on the customers to whom they are assigned.
Against this background, most bankruptcy laws allow for a right
to claim back. Unfortunately, some jurisdictions limit (re-)vindication to tangible goods, as does Switzerland for example. 84

83. CA, Luxembourg City, May 11, 2004, 154/04 V (Lux.).
84. Bundesgesetz über Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs [SchKG], Apr. 11,
1889, Art. 242.
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Luxemburg, on the contrary, leads a different path. Just recently,
it introduced a specific right to claim back intangible and non-fungible movable assets—i.e., data from bankrupt companies. For this
purpose, article 567 of the Code of Commerce requires:
− that the bankrupt company must not be the legal owner of
the data but only hold it,
− that the claimant must have entrusted the data to the bankrupt
company or be the legal owner of it and
− that the data must be separable from the other assets of the
company at the time of the opening of bankruptcy proceedings. 85
Clearly, such a precise provision comes along with a great deal
of legal certainty. Notwithstanding this advantage, most jurisdictions see no need for specific regulation as they allow for (re-)vindication of intangible assets under general provisions. In fact, this
laissez-faire approach carries a certain risk, since it lacks data-specific prerequisites for claims.
C. Data and (Common Law) Lien
Closely related to the issue of how data is dealt with legally in
case of bankruptcy is the question whether data can be subject to a
lien. By extension, both subject areas discuss data as a possible economic security.
Within the boundaries of the Common Law, the English Court
of Appeal assessed this exact question in a recent case in 2014. 86 For
85. Nonofficial translation by Vincent Wellens, Patrice Vanderbeeken & Tycho de Graaf, Proposal for a Right to Claim Back Data from Bankrupt Cloud
Computing Providers, LEXOLOGY, https://perma.cc/PEH7-KDKD; for further
commentary on the provision, see Sjef van Erp, Ownership of Digital Assets?, 5
EUR. PROP. L. J. 73–76 (2016).
86. Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media Ltd. [2014] EWCA
(Civ) 281 [2014], 3 WLR 887 (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media Ltd.]; commented on by van Erp, supra
note 85, at 73–76; see also Thomas Hoeren, Big Data and the Ownership in Data:
Recent Developments in Europe, 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. [EIPR] 751–754
(2014).
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companies working with digital assets like customer data, the sudden loss of access to their data is likely to cause catastrophic results.
Therefore, it is quite surprising that the legal matter has only just
been decided by the courts. Current law in Britain states that a person who has possession of another person’s property with the purpose of altering or improving the property can claim a possessory
lien over that property in case of an unpaid debt. A well-known example is a car mechanic or a dry cleaner retaining possession of the
client’s goods. Incidentally, this legal mechanism applies to nearly
every European legal framework.
In concreto, the legal matter in Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam
Business Media Ltd. 87 questioned if it were possible to assert a common law possessory lien over a publisher of magazines’ database
containing subscriber’s information now withheld by Datateam. The
data was updated regularly; up to hundreds of alterations were made
daily.
The Court of Appeal overruled the lower court and held that
within the common law, a lien was only possible over tangible property; information stored in an electronic database could not be considered property that one can possess. Therefore, the court ruled that
Datateam was not entitled to retain the data until outstanding invoices were paid.
Potent arguments by Datateam stressing the urgent need to extend the scope of lien were overruled. Judge Floyd emphasized the
distinction between information itself, the physical medium, like a
server for instance, and the rights to which the information gives
rise, like intellectual property rights. One of the most relevant decisions the court based its verdict on is OBG Ltd. v. Allan. 88 This case
rose, for the first time, the legal issue whether existing law should
be applied to intangible objects. The trial court accepted an analogy
87. See Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media Ltd., supra note 86,
at recital no. 83.
88. OBG Ltd. v. Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, [2007] 2 WLR 920
(appeal taken from Eng.).
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based on the presumption that the essence of possession is physical
control combined with the intention to exclude others.
The Court of Appeal’s decision highlights the fact that contractual status does not guarantee an appropriate degree of legal certainty in the long run. Further judicial or legislative action is still
needed. Lord Justice Moore-Bick stated that it was a matter for Parliament to resolve. Contrarily, Lord Justice Davis argued that the
court should resist the attraction to leave the common law lien stuck
in its outdated origins, but to change it to suit a 21st century application, due to the unintended consequences that would follow such
a verdict: for instance, changes within the law of theft. Interestingly,
the court even states the rights and duties that arise in relation to data
in a digitized business world.
Still, the judgement effectively limits modern data service companies, who are providing IT maintenance, to collect outstanding
debt. They are then left in a remarkably less favorable position than
traditional service providers like the aforementioned car manufacturer or dry cleaner. Therefore, the verdict not only obstructs startup innovation, but also data-driven businesses. The court fails to
provide sufficient argument for why putting IT service companies
in a worse position is justified.
However, the nature of intellectual property itself needs to be
taken in perspective also. Database rights follow the European database directive from 1996, which clearly states what rights are to be
given to a database owner. A right of lien or any other similar right
is not included.
V. DIMENSIONS OF DATA OWNERSHIP
As established above, we discovered a striking discrepancy between the economic and legal status quo in handling data as an asset.
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As legal issues of data are increasingly considered in economic contexts, its value comes to the forefront. 89 Thus, considering that data
is a de facto trade good, the lack of data-specific regulation is truly
unsatisfactory. Against this background, we argue that the law
should follow the economic reality and, therefore, address legal uncertainty.
In the following, we will further specify our property law approach by pointing out criteria for the assignment of data ownership
and contouring dimensions of such an exclusive right in rem. As the
debate on whether there is a fundamental need for data ownership is
intensifying, 90 our approach takes up recent European impulses and
attempts to contribute to a critical discussion by taking economic
considerations as a basis.
A. European Scope
Before we proceed to substantiate the dimensions of a comprehensive data ownership concept, it is necessary to emphasize the
crux of the problem of creating such a property right on a European
scale. As outlined above, the member states have widely different
models for acquisition, transfer, and scope of ownership rights.
At the lower end of the scale, we have the principle of consensus,
which is applied in the legal systems of states such as France, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal, for example. This principle solely requires
a contractual agreement that covers the details of data ownership and
creates a sufficient legal framework. Thus, all performances are laid

89. This thesis is confirmed by the fact that, in the last years, the European
Court of Justice had to judge data law issues in context of commercial or competition law increasingly often, see, e.g., Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co.
OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039; Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601; Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH, 2015 ECLI:
EU:C:2015:477.
90. For an overview of the current academic debate, see Commission Staff
Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 33 et seq.
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down in one contract. The change of ownership, rights of use, access, and exploitation rights as well as defensive rights can be substantiated precisely. For that reason, according to the principle of
consensus, the question of data ownership does not pose a major
problem.
At the top end of the scale, we find the principle of abstract real
conveyance combined with the principle of separation. It particularly applies to Germany and Greece. With the necessity of both an
obligational contractual and proprietary agreement, these principles
provide the highest level of requirements for assigning ownership
rights. For this reason, the academic and governmental debate is
much livelier in Germany than in other EU member states where the
law of property follows the principle of consensus. 91
Those are the systemic differences we already discussed. However, our analysis shall not be limited to identifying obstacles in
drafting a European approach to data ownership. Instead, the aim is
to find common ground. For this purpose, i.e., establishing a transnational data ownership right, one would consider a European regulation or directive as the obvious solution. The problem is that this
is an unfeasible option because—according to the principle of conferred powers, one of the key EU principles 92—the law of property
is an exclusive matter of the member states. 93 Therefore, a purely
theoretical concept requires finding the lowest common denominator within the various models of ownership in Europe. Hence, we
91. This thesis is substantiated by the recently published Commission Staff
Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 22 et seq., which reveals the current discussion about data ownership within the EU boundaries. Compared with the rest
of Europe, data ownership issues have been discussed variously in academia and
in government as well. No concrete regulatory initiatives have been launched so
far.
92. According to the principle of conferral, the EU shall act only within the
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the member states.
93. For a constitutional perspective on property law in the internal market,
see Bram Akkermans, European Union Constitutional Property Law: Searching
for Foundations for the Allocation of Regulatory Competences, in WHO DOES
WHAT? ON THE ALLOCATION OF REGULATORY COMPETENCES IN EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW 177–210 (Bram Akkermans et al. eds., Intersentia 2015).
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opt for the following methodology: if we developed an approach that
meets all requirements of the German and Greek legal system, a fortiori it would also work in all of the other legal systems. Against this
background we hold on to the strictest, top-end requirements (as outlined above).
B. Potential Criteria for Assigning Data Ownership Rights
1. Open Data Concepts
One approach to deal with the legal classification of data is the
use of open data concepts. Strictly speaking, open data does not facilitate the particular allocation of data to a legal subject, but rather
has the opposite effect, by “setting data free.” 94 Nonetheless, open
data models are becoming increasingly popular amongst European
governments and must, therefore, be taken into account.
France just recently passed specific open data regulations 95: it is
one of only a few European member states to have regulated on this
issue. The idea is to “enhance the circulation of data and
knowledge.” 96 This places France in an improved competitive position, as it is facing the challenges presented by the advancing digital
economy. 97 Under specific conditions, the new legislation requires
commercial companies to provide access to data for purposes of reutilization. This particularly concerns data acquired in the procurement process, commercial data for the creation of official statistics,
data generated in the energy production and distribution process

94. Matt West, Open Data: 3 Principles for Setting Data Free, TREEHOUSE
BLOG (Aug. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/V3MC-YL7E; for visions of open data,
see BRIDGETTE WESSELS ET AL., OPEN DATA AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 45
et seq. (Amsterdam U. Press 2017).
95. Loi 2016-1321 du 7 oct. 2016 pour une République numérique [Law
2016-1321 of Oct. 7, 2016 on a Digital Republic], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 8, 2016, no. 0235.
96. Id.
97. See the proposal of the law, Projet de loi pour une République mumérique, Assemblée nationale, no. 3318, Dec. 9, 2015, https://perma.cc/HEJ3BDK9.
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and, finally, data relating to changes in real estate ownership. 98 The
Estonian government has gone even further by introducing the idea
that the free movement of knowledge and data should be established
as a fifth freedom, next to the four pre-existing internal market freedoms of the European Union. 99 Also, Finland has just recently commenced an open data initiative: the new Transport Code proposes
that essential data—particularly passenger data—from all transport
services shall be made open. 100
Although open data concepts have beneficial effects, 101 due to
the continued use of data within secondary economic business models, it complicates the explicit legal allocation of data or may even
prevent it.
2. Data and Data Carriers
Another approach would be to focus on the medium storing the
data, assuming that the data carrier itself constitutes data ownership.
This assumption acknowledges the technological fact that digital
data cannot be accessed without the physical medium. 102 Thus, a
concept that understands data and its carrier as an entity is anything

98. Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 22 et seq.
99. The ideas were presented by the Estonian President Mr. Ilves, see Debates, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Feb. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/BR27-4KTT.
100. Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications Press Release,
Transport Code Progresses, a Solution Found (Sept. 21, 2016), https://perma
.cc/UZH2-U4YC.
101. For further discussion, see OECD, Data-Driven Innovation—Big Data
for Growth and Well-Being at 186 (2015), https://perma.cc/G6CV-BEVL; Gerrit
Hornung & Thilo Goeble, “Data Ownership” im vernetzten Automobil, 31(4)
COMPUTER UND RECHT [CR] 265, 272 (2015) (Ger.); see also the “free flow of
data initiative” planned by the European Commission in the Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy
for Europe, at 4.1, COM (2015) 192 final (May 16, 2015).
102. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jul. 10, 2015,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
[NJW]
317,
2016
(Ger.);
Landesarbeitsgericht Chemnitz [LAG] [Higher Labour Court] Jan. 17, 2007,
MMR 426 (2008) (Ger.).
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but far-fetched. This approach facilitates the objectification of digital data and provides a tangible starting point for a right in rem. Legal reification of data can, therefore, be derived by using the data
carrier as a point of reference for the legal allocation of data. At first
glance, this approach would constitute a transparent and comprehensible solution. However, the economic value of data is not necessarily represented by the ownership of the data carrier. Eventually,
regarding the current use of industrial data, the originator of data and
the proprietor of the data carrier are rarely the same legal subject. 103
3. Originator of Data
Perhaps the most significant approach regarding the discussion
of data ownership as an asset focuses on the originator of data
(scriptor). 104 In this context, the scriptor would be the person who
directly initiates the data processing and is, therefore, closest to the
matter.
In fact, this concept is one of the earliest and most sophisticated
approaches. Its dogmatic rationale can be found within the German
Criminal Law, for example. Sections 202a and 303a of the German
Criminal Code protect the authority to dispose of data as a legal asset. 105 Therefore, we may draw the conclusion through analogy that

103. E.g., cloud service providers such as Amazon Web Services provide data
storage to customers. However, it is the customers who generate and process data.
104. Jürgen Welp, Datenveränderung (§ 303a StGB) Teil 1, INFORMATIK UND
RECHT [IUR] 443, 447 (1988); Thomas Hoeren, Dateneigentum – Versuch einer
Anwendung von § 303a StGB im Zivilrecht, MMR 486, 486 et seq. (2013); see
Oberlandesgericht Nuremberg [OLG Nuremberg] [Higher Regional Court of
Nuremberg], Jan. 23, 2013, 2013 ZD 282 (Ger).
105. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: Drucksachen und Protokolle [BT] 16/3656, 9
(11) (Ger.); DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: Drucksachen und Protokolle [BT] 10/5058,
28 et seq. (Ger.); THEODOR LENCKNER, STGB-KOMMENTAR § 202a no. 1 (29th
ed., Adolf Schönke & Horst Schröder eds. 2014); JÜRGEN-PETER GRAF,
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM STGB § 202a no. 3 (3th ed., Wolfgang Joecks ed.
2017); Jan Eichelberger, Sasser, Blaster, Phatbot & Co. - alles halb so schlimm?
- Ein Überblick über die strafrechtliche Bewertung von Computerschädlingen,
MMR 594, 594 (2004); Monika Frommel, Das Zweite Gesetz zur Bekämpfung
der Wirtschaftskriminalität, JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG [JUS] 667, 668 (1987).
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data may also be subject to the power of disposition as a right in
rem. 106
At first instance, this train of thought allows for a comprehensible constitution of data ownership, due to the fact that this methodology is based upon objective criteria. Yet, such a rigorous approach
shows one substantial weakness: it disregards the importance of the
economical initiator of any modern data acquisition and data generating process. The initiator—as a rule—is not necessarily restricted
to the originator of data.
Additionally, it is arguable whether an approach that—in essence—draws upon copyright law assumptions can be expedient
with regard to modern data processing. We should question whether
one can speak of a personal connection between the originator and
his data—like the connection between an author and his work.
4. Economic Rationale
As stated above, the acceptance of data ownership is closely related to—if not fully dependent on—economic interests. 107 Huge investments are often necessary, to create, manage, and store data for
operating purposes. 108 For example, sensors supervise the function
of industrial plants and generate millions of data assets for fault diagnosis, maintenance, and automatic purposes. 109 It is by no means
106. See Herbert Zech, “Industrie 4.0” – Rechtsrahmen für eine
Datenwirtschaft im Digitalen Binnenmarkt, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND
URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 1151, 1159 (2015); Herbert Zech, Information as a
tradable commodity, in EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE
MARKET 51, 51–79 (Alberto de Franceschi ed., 2016) [hereinafter EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET]; Karl-Heinz Fezer,
Dateneigentum, MMR 3, 4 (2017).
107. See Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 34–35.
108. See Cindy LaChapelle, The Cost of Data Storage and Management:
Where is it Headed in 2016?, DATA CENTER JOURNAL (March 10, 2016),
https://perma.cc/LL5W-6C7X.
109. This trend is also known as Industry 4.0, see Cornelius Baur & Dominik
Wee, Manufacturing’s Next Act, MCKINSEY&COMPANY (June 2015),
https://perma.cc/SN6A-JFKM. For a legal discussion on industrial data, see Andreas Wiebe, A Protection of Industrial Data – A New Property Right for the Digital Economy?, 65 GRUR INT. 877 (2016).
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a matter of fact that the owner of the data carrier or the machine is
necessarily identical with the subject who has original informational
and economic interests. 110 Within the scope of contracting, data processing, leasing models or cloud computing, the client must be
granted the predominant and legitimate interests in the exclusive access and use of data. 111 Third parties—including the contractor—
shall be excluded from the opportunity to take note of the stored and
processed data or the acceptance of property rights. Therefore, data
ownership must take the contractual agreements and informational
interests referring to the process of collection, recording, and organization into account.
Hereafter, a data ownership concept must be tied to the legal
subject who primarily initiates the process of data recording and processing by economical, technical, and informational means. 112
One potential criterion could also be allocated in the resources
invested in the creation of the relevant data. This means taking factors like manpower or capital expenditure into account. In economic
life, investments of this sort are mostly done by two different players. Firstly, the producer of the sensor-equipped device or tool that
actually generates the data and, secondly, the economic operator that
utilizes the device and has already funded the purchase price. His
economic objective is the amortization of his investment. 113 Admittedly, this split situation does raise conceptual issues regarding the
110. Herbert Zech, Information as a Tradable Commodity, in EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET, supra note 106, at 51, 75;
Maximilian Becker, Schutzrechte an Maschinendaten und die Schnittstelle zum
Personendatenschutz, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL-HEINZ FEZER ZUM 70.
GEBURTSTAG 815, 825 (Wolfgang Büscher et al. eds. 2016).
111. See Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 16 et seq.
112. For an overview referring general legal protection of data, see Todd Vare
& Michael Mattioli, Big Business, Big Government and Big Legal Questions, 243
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 46 (2014).
113. With this comprehensible explanation: Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 33 et seq.; with a reference to Herbert Zech, Information
as a Tradable Commodity, in EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW AND THE DIGITAL
SINGLE, supra note 106, at 51, 75; Becker, supra note 110, at 815, 825.
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identification of a specific data owner and is, therefore, too difficult
to apply. 114
5. Interim Findings
It is worth specifying at this point that the legal allocation of data
to an owner in terms of property law has to be considered a work in
progress. Still, several promising, coherent, and comprehensible approaches do exist already. Whichever is adopted, it must put informational, technological, and especially economical means at the
center of any further consideration.
C. Rights of Use and Defensive Rights
Following a property law approach, we need to distinguish between two dimensions. As Section 903 of the German Civil Code
states: “The owner of a thing may, to the extent that a statute or thirdparty rights do not conflict with this, deal with the thing at his discretion and exclude others from every influence.” Similarly, article
5:1 of the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek specifies:
(1) Ownership is the most extensive right, which a person
can have in a corporeal object.
(2) To the exclusion of everybody else, the owner is free to
use the object provided that this use does not violate the
rights of others and that it respects the limitations based
upon statutory rules and rules of unwritten law. 115
On the one hand, the owner of a thing is entitled to deal with his
property at his discretion (positive rights of use). On the other hand,
he may exclude others from any kind of interference (negative rights
of defense). These two competences find their limits in the rights of
third parties.

114. European Commission, High Level Conference on Building a Data Economy: Summary of the Discussion, at 3 (Oct. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc
/JSB8-SEXV.
115. Translation by VAN ERP & AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 382.
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Against this systematic background, we need to assess what kind
of rights a data ownership could and/or should encompass. In order
to assess this question, we will discuss both positive rights (i.e., data
usage) and negative competences regarding secondary claims such
as damages or restitution. In the following, we will illustrate potential outlines for such competences from a proprietary point of view.
1. Access Rights
First, we need to clarify whether or not data property is tied to
exclusive or non-exclusive access rights. Exclusive data access
would grant the data owner the right to exclude third parties from
the opportunity to take notice of the stored information. In contrast
to that, non-exclusive access would be required to balance the conflicting interests of the owner and third parties on a case-by-case
basis. Such a need to balance interests on an individual basis cannot
be considered a feasible solution regarding the practical significance
of data-driven business models, particularly when taking into account the need for legal certainty. Therefore, ownership as a concept
within the law of property necessitates that the data owner be
granted the right of exclusive access. 116 However, this argument
shall only apply insofar as legal provisions do not state otherwise,
for instance if data protection law is applicable and third parties are
not explicitly authorized to generate and access the personal data. 117
Thus, a data owner generally has an exclusive right to access his
data regardless of whether third parties process it on his informational, technological or economical behalf. 118 The owner’s access
right comes along with the third party’s duty to tolerate and facilitate
116. Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 33 et seq.
117. Regarding the right of access within intellectual property law, see Dan
Wielsch, The Differentiation of Property, 5 EUR. PROP. L. J. 77, 96 et seq. (2016).
118. See for instance in data protection law, GDPR Art. 15 § 1, which states
that the data subject shall have the right to obtain, among further information,
access to the personal data being processed. It is also provided by GDPR Art. 20
§ 1, which gives the data subject the right to receive the personal data concerning
him or her in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format.
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the enforcement of access claims. The access right shall be accompanied by the right to reproduce, i.e., copy identical datasets to ensure the access to data, considered as its informational basis.
2. Use and Exploitation
Secondly, we need to define the contours of a data owner’s right
to use and exploit data. From an economic perspective, it is fair to
state that these competences are considered the most relevant since
many business models are based on an extensive exploitation of
data. After all, due to the lowering of switching costs, promotion of
competition between data services, 119 and the exchange of economic
goods, a great need for data portability (i.e., the movement, copying,
or transfer) 120 can be concluded.
From a legal perspective, a specific portability right has already
been established within data protection law. Article 20 of the GDPR
states that one “shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning him, which he has provided to a controller, in a structured,
commonly used and machine-readable format and have the right to
transmit those data to another controller.” 121 In this context, it is important to consider that the term “provide” covers a broad scope of
applications 122 and nearly all kinds of data. This concept increases
legal certainty substantially and indicates the general demand for
data portability to be initiated on behalf of a data holder in case of a
lack of comprehensive and fair contractual agreement. 123

119. Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely
Reduces Consumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique, 72 MD. L. REV. 335,
338 (2013).
120. Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 46.
121. GDPR Art. 20 § 7.
122. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the right to data
portability, adopted on 13 December 2016, 41(3) DATENSCHUTZ UND
DATENSICHERHEIT [DuD] 136, 136 (2017).
123. Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 47.
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Economic exploitation of data raises yet another question: the
fruits of the data—in another words, its economic benefit—need to
be allocated to someone in a legal sense. Originally, the data owner
should be entitled to profit from the outcome of processed information. For example, he should have the right of further analysis
and processing. This dogmatic assumption is supported by existing
national law in Europe 124 according to which fruits of a thing or
rights are assigned to the respective owner and entitled legal persona. 125 Consequently, the owner of a smart car would be assigned
the data and informational value he generates, unless statutory or
contractual provisions state different assignations.
Finally, a data ownership should provide the legal option to
transfer single competences to others. 126 If the owner withholds the
original dataset but transmits identical copies to contract partners,
particular exploitation rights might be granted. This means that single ownership rights can be licensed, 127 like the copying of data or
transfer of informational and economic benefit. An exclusive property right on data, supplemented with licensing models, would facilitate the dealing with original and copied datasets and, therefore,
strengthens data-driven business models as well as legal certainty in
general.
3. Defensive Rights
The concept of data ownership furthermore grants a set of defensive rights to protect the right holder against impairment by third

124. E.g., BGB §§ 953, 99.
125. Lambert Grosskopf, Rechte an privat erhobenen Geo- und
Telemetriedaten, IP-RECHTSBERATER [IPRB] 259, 261 (2011).
126. BENEDIKT BUCHNER, INFORMATIONELLE SELBSTBESTIMMUNG IM
PRIVATRECHT 276 et seq. (Mohr Siebeck 2006).
127. Parallels to this concept can be found in the Copyright Law, see Gesetz
über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urhebergesetz] [UrhG] [Act on
Copyright and Related Rights], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL 1273, as amended, §§ 29, 31
[hereinafter Act on Copyright and Related Rights].
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parties. 128 On a first level, a data ownership as a right in rem gives
the data originator the right of disposal. The data owner, therefore,
serves as legal point of reference regarding the integrity of data in
terms of property law. This basically means that he is entitled to deal
with the relevant data however he pleases as a right in rem. 129 Therefore, he shall be entitled to access and exploit or even delete the relevant data as explained above. On a second level, the integrity of
data has to be proprietary against third parties. Eventually, the data
originator needs protection against impairment and, therefore, entitlement to enforce legal action against unauthorized access and exploitation of his data. Thus, utilization of data by any outside party
is prevented erga omnes, independent of contractual agreements.
Modification or destruction as an expression of compromising
data integrity could be legally prohibited inter alia through tort law
as a fully recognized right in rem. 130 Still, such protection would not
include copying or the mere use of data, since such activity would
lead to an unintended monopolization of data. 131
Specifically, legal protection could be integrated within civil
procedural law as, for instance, the right to seek injunctions in order
to prevent further exploitation, the right to have products built and
128. Herbert Zech, Information as a Tradable Commodity, in EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE, supra note 106, at 51, 51–79; Becker,
supra note 110, at 815; Kerber, supra note 3, at 989, 989 et seq.
129. See on the “most comprehensive” nature of the right of ownership, VAN
ERP & AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 219 et seq.; for further German Commentary on § 903 BGB, see OTHMAR JAUERNIG, KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB §903 no. 2
et seq. (16th ed., Othmar Jauernig ed. 2015); BETTINA BRÜCKNER, MÜNCHENER
KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB § 903 no. 22 et seq. (7th ed., Franz Jürgen Säcker et al.
eds. 2015); HANS SCHULTE-NÖLKE, BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH: BGB § 903 no.
1 et seq. (8th ed., Reiner Schulze et al. eds. 2014).
130. Wolfgang Kerber, Governance of Data: Exclusive Property vs. Access,
47(7) INT’L. REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. [IIC] 759, 760 (2016); Wiebe,
supra note 109, at 877, 880 et seq. In German tort law such a legal classification
is already recognised on a broad scale, see Michael Bartsch, Daten als Rechtsgut
nach § 823 Absatz 1 BGB, in RECHT DER DATEN UND DATENBANKEN IM
UNTERNEHMEN 297, 300 (Isabell Conrad et al. eds., Dr. Otto Schmidt 2014); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 2, 1996, 133 BGHZ 15
(Ger.).
131. See Wiebe, supra note 109, at 877, 880 (pointing out further problems in
U.S. law).
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services offered on basis of misused data excluded from commercialization, and the right to claim compensation for damages for unauthorized use of data. 132
At this juncture, we already need to point out the potential for
conflict regarding personal data, as the protection of personal data
is secured by article 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental
Rights and, therefore, subject to legislative and judicial control.
Additionally, data protection law foresees claims for damages
itself if data is misused. 133 Yet, these can only be asserted as far as
personal data is concerned. The distinction between personal and
non-personal data is unclear though, since in the era of big data,
anonymous data can often be de-anonymized easily. Admittedly,
potential economic risks arise in terms of a data ownership concept
regarding claims for damages of the data subject that may hinder the
usability and marketability of the respective data.
However, it is very unclear how the amount of damage should
be calculated. A reference point can be derived from the GDPR that
contains rules on sanctions and damages. While the latter does not
give any hint on the actual amount of damages, the first foresees up
to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover or 20 million Euros.
One has to keep in mind though that these numbers serve as a reference point in case privacy is violated, but cannot be used as far as
industrial data is concerned—since data protection law protects
other legal assets than mere economic interests. In this respect, one
might refer to the calculation of damages in copyright law, where
the amount of damage can be calculated on the basis of what should
have been paid if the permission would have been lawfully requested. 134
132. For further information, see Commission Staff Working Document on the
Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra
note 68, at 33.
133. E.g., GDPR Art. 82.
134. See Act on Copyright and Related Rights, supra note 127, at § 97 sec. 2;
explained by PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT—PRINCIPALES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 325 et seq. (Oxford Press U.
2013); see also Thomas Dreier, Damages for Copyright Infringement in Germany,
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In contrast to a data ownership consisting of positive and negative competences, another approach proposes that the data originator
could be given purely defensive rights, 135 therefore promoting a
“data possession” instead of a “data ownership.” 136 Nonetheless,
granting the data originator defensive rights in terms of property law
should be limited to a certain extent, in order to prevent data monopolies.
It can be summarized, that defensive rights are an indispensable
part of a data ownership. This argument is supported by legal considerations derived from moral rights within copyright law, which
give the author inter alia the right to prohibit the distortion or any
other derogatory treatment of his work, which is capable of prejudicing his legitimate intellectual or personal interest in the work. In
this context, the work is already seen as being distorted when its
independent character changes negatively. 137 This is due to the author’s special relation to his work. Transferring this legal provision
to the question at hand, one could argue that the data owner should
be able to prohibit any distortion of the integrity of his data by third
parties—since this data might hold information about him that he
does not want to be distorted. Taking into account that our data ownership approach is based upon assumptions drawn from property
law, issues regarding the scope of application of moral rights within
in INTELLECTUAL PROPOERTY AND INFORMATION LAW—ESSAY IN HONOUR OF
HERMAN COHEN JEHORAM 129, 131 (Gerald Mom ed., Kluwer Law Int’l 1998).
135. Kerber, supra note 3, at 989, 991.
136. Herbert Zech, Information as a Tradable Commodity, in EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE, supra note 106, at 51, 63; for more
details, see Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 33 et seq.
137. Emphasised for several national European copyright laws by GOLDSTEIN
& HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 134, at 19 et seq.; for further German commentary,
see GERNOT SCHULZE, URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ: URHG § 14 no. 5 et seq. (5th ed.,
Thomas Dreier & Gernot Schulze eds. 2015); ANDREAS WIEBE, RECHT DER
ELEKTRONISCHEN MEDIEN § 14 no. 4 et seq. (3d ed., Gerald Spindler & Fabian
Schuster eds., Beck 2015); WINFRIED BULINGER, PRAXISKOMMENTAR ZUM
URHEBERRECHT: URHR § 14 no. 4 et seq. (4th ed., Artur-Axel Wandtke & Winfried Bullinger eds., Beck 2014); see for a conceptual expansion of property regarding intellectual property law, Wielsch, supra note 117, at 77, 87 et seq.
137. GDPR Art. 2 § 1, Art. 6 § 1.
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European copyright law are not addressed at this point, but may raise
further questions in the future. As can be seen, the specific embedment of defensive rights regarding data ownership as a legal concept
within civil law is still a work in progress.
D. Conflicting Rights
The acceptance of exclusive rights regarding data potentially
conflicts with rights of third parties or the law system itself. Personal
data, which is information about an individual, is deeply knotted to
the data subject. In Europe, the accessibility to and use of these data
assets is tied to the explicit consent or an exceptional authorization
by law, if they are generated automatically or either-way intended
to form part of a filing system. 138 Therefore, an ownership of personal data is usually determined by the data protection framework. 139 Data processing has to be compatible with a legitimate purpose of the controller, for instance the performance of a contract. 140
The processing of special categories of personal data—e.g., racial or
ethnic origin—is moreover generally prohibited, until particular interests of third parties come up. 141 In addition, the individual has
extensive rights, which limit the processing of the collected information, such as the possibility to withdraw the recent consent, right
to access, rectification, erasure, and restriction. 142 In this regard,
data ownership can certainly be allocated to the data subject. 143 On
the contrary, the controller has only limited exclusive rights in terms
of the collection, use and transmission of personal data. In order to

138. Id.
139. However, the GDPR does not apply to the processing of personal data by
a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity, see
GDPR Art. 2 § 2.
140. GDPR Art. 5 § 1(b), Art. 6 § 1(a).
141. GDPR Art. 9.
142. GDPR Art. 7 § 3, Arts. 15–18.
143. Nadezhda Purtova, The Illusion of Personal Data as no One’s Property,
7 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 83 (2015); see also Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data:
Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 36 AM. J. L. & MED. 586, 593 (2010).
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ensure legal certainty, the controller should obtain the clear and extensive consent of the subject for data processing. To avoid these
strict provisions of the European GDPR, one can introduce procedures to anonymize data assets; for example by removing personal
identifiers. 144
Another question that arises concerning property rights on data
is the potential conflict with the ownership of the data carrier. Since
data can easily be copied, modified, and transferred to other storages, the entitlement to use and access the storage and data may diverge. A contractual agreement with a cloud operator usually does
not mean that the operator receives legal ownership on the stored
data assets. Instead, the user merely intends temporary retention and
requests for exclusive access to the information. In this context, the
agreement of the parties has to be cultivated.
Furthermore, confidentiality interests limit the use and disclosure of data. If third parties have overriding socio-economic motives
regarding the secrecy of data, the exploitation and transmission of
these assets can be characterized as lacking good faith and are possibly punishable. 145
Beyond that, competition and antitrust law provide boundaries
for the compilation of big data and data itself. Dominant positions
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it is prohibited
according to article 102 TFEU. It is reasonable to question whether
or not companies like Facebook, which massively collect personal
data, exploit their dominant positions and, therefore, should be restricted. 146

144. GDPR Art. 2 § 1. For further information on the GDPR and the former
European Data Protecion Directive, see Arlette Noujaim, The Stimulus for Data
Protection Law Around the World: The Development and Anticipated Effect of
the European Union’s New Data Rules, 20 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 99, 102–113
(2015–2016).
145. See Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [UWG] [Act against Unfair
Competition], July 3, 2004, BGBL I 233, as amended, § 17.
146. Sebastian Telle, Big Data und Kartellrecht, 3 INTER 3, 5 (2017); see Autorité de la concurrence & Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law and Data (May
10, 2016), https://perma.cc/D9LY-UPR9.
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Finally, European databases are protected “by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents . . . [if] they constitute the author’s own intellectual creation.” 147 Furthermore, a sui generis right
determines the protection “for the maker of a database, which shows
that there has been qualitatively, and/or quantitatively a substantial
investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the
contents.” 148 These matters have to be respected in regard to the acceptance and limit of data ownership. 149

147. Directive 96/9, supra note 64, at Art. 3 § 1.
148. Id. at Art. 7 § 1.
149. For an overview of how intellectual property law influences the disclosure of data, see Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535,
549–556 (2014-2015).
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VI. FINAL CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis shows that the European framework of supranational and national laws provides a sufficient basis for a property
law approach to data ownership. By taking the variety of European
legal systems and their different models for acquiring and transferring ownership rights into account, our course of action proposes an
argumentum a fortiori and follows a three-step approach. In the first
place, it is crucial to specify how data as an asset can be allocated to
a legal subject. We argue that potential criteria must consider informational, technological, and economical means. Secondly, we need
to outline the contours of an exclusive data ownership right. From a
property law angle, it grants both positive competences (rights of
access, use, and licensing) and negative rights of defense (claims for
damages and restitution). However, it is essential to stress that a data
ownership cannot exist without limitations—despite its absolute nature. Hence, and thirdly, those restrictions necessitate balancing data
ownership with conflicting rights and interests such as intellectual
property, confidentiality, or personal freedoms. These limitations facilitate an adequate level of protection for specific categories of data
requiring protection from unlimited exploitation: privacy and data
protection in particular.
Our property law approach attempts to contribute to the debate
on data ownership by pointing out that the economic reality—i.e.,
data being traded as an asset—can hardly be denied. However, this
approach poses more of basic considerations than an actual concept
since property laws are subject to national legislation. Still, in the
light of national fragmentation, it became obvious that European jurisdictions need a strong commitment to seek common ground in
order to ensure legal certainty and economic prosperity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Italy, the Gelli-Bianco Law (referred to as the 2017 Law in
this article) 1 deals with the issue of medical malpractice, liability of
the healthcare provider and, from a broader perspective, defensive
medicine. 2 The previous law (commonly referred to as the Balduzzi
∗ Assistant Professor, University of Bologna School of Law; LL.M., Louisiana State University; Doctorate in Comparative Law, University of Milan.
1. Legge Mar. 8, 2017, n. 24, G.U. Mar. 17, 2017, n. 64. It is commonly
referred to as the Gelli-Bianco Law due to the name of the two members of the
Parliament who submitted the relevant text.
2. Defensive medicine occurs when physicians order unnecessary treatments and excessively rely on tests and procedures (i.e., positive defensive medicine), or when they refuse to treat patients that present a high degree of risk, in an
effort to avoid malpractice suits rather than because they consider the treatment
medically appropriate (i.e., negative defensive medicine). See U.S. Congress, Office of Technological Assessment, Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice
3, OTA-H--602 (1994), quoted by Sira Grosso, What Is Reasonable and What
Can Be Proved as Reasonable: Reflections on the Role of Evidence-Based Medicine and Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Negligence Claims, 27 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 74, 76 n. 13 (2018); see also Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law,
Medicine and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 268 (2001).
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Law 3) was enacted in 2012 and represented the first legislative attempt to put a limit to professional liability grounded on medical
malpractice in light of the settled judicial orientation of the previous
case law. 4 Indeed, until 2012, without a specific legal framework for
medical malpractice, Italian judges and Italian doctrine addressed
the issue. 5
3. Decreto Legge Sept. 13, 2012, n. 158, G.U. Sept. 13, 2012, n. 214 converted with amendments in Legge Nov. 8, 2012, n. 189, G.U. Nov. 10, 2012, n.
263 (“Urgent provisions to foster the development of the Country through a higher
level of health’s protection”).
4. See generally Giulio Ponzanelli, La responsabilità medica: dal primato
della giurisprudenza alla disciplina legislativa, 8-9 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ
819 (2016).
5. Pursuant to the Italian case-law, medical malpractice used to be encompassed within the range of application of art. 2043 of the Italian Civil Code
(“C.c.”). Art. 2043 C.c. (Compensation for unlawful acts) provides the general
norm for tort liability. However, starting from 1999, the Italian Supreme Court
(with ruling n. 589/1999), through the recourse to the fictio iuris of the so called
contatto sociale between the physician and the patient, deemed such liability as a
contractual one, thus applying the relevant legal regime, more favorable to the
patient. On behalf of the healthcare provider, it used to be invoked the application
of art. 2236 C.c., limiting the liability of the practitioner to the event of her malice
or gross negligence, but only for cases requiring the solution of technical issues
of particular difficulty. See, ex multis, Guido Alpa, Ars interpretandi e
responsabilità sanitaria a seguito della nuova legge Bianco-Gelli, 3 CONTRATO
E IMPRESA 728, 732 (2017) [hereinafter Alpa, Ars interpretandi]. Besides the liability of the physician, it used to be affirmed that the contractual liability of the
healthcare institution (public and/or private) due to the atypical contract (i.e., contratto di spedalità), expressly or implicitly entered into force between the patient
and the institution. In light of its peculiarities, the medical malpractice used to be
deemed by some commentators and tribunals as a sub-system of civil liability.
See, ex multis, Carlo Granelli, Il fenomeno della medicina difensiva e la legge di
riforma della responsabilità sanitaria, 2 RESP. CIV. PREV. 410, nn.120-131
(2018); RAFFAELLA DE MATTEIS, LA RESPONSABILITÀ MEDICA: UN
SOTTOSISTEMA DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE (CEDAM Padova, 1995);
Vincenzo Roppo, La responsabilità civile dell’impresa nel settore dei servizi
innovativi, CONTRATO E IMPRESA 891, 894 (1993). According to other scholars,
though speaking of “system” would raise conceptual issues, medical malpractice
should nevertheless be intended as a special regime comparable to that of tort
liability; see Guido Alpa, From the Physician to the Team, to the Healthcare Setting, to the System, in LAW AND MEDICINE—CURRENT TOPICS IN A GERMAN AND
ITALIAN PERSPECTIVE 13, 14 (Consiglia Botta & Christian Armbrüster eds.,
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2017). The 2017 Law has introduced specific provisions dealing with the proper qualification of medical malpractice: see infra, §
III. For interesting remarks about individual liability and the evolution of the law
of torts, see Olivier Moréteau, Individual Liability in a Vulnerable Environment:
Revisiting the Ethical Foundations of Tort Law, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAAP
SPIER 239-257 (Helmut Koziol & Ulrich Magnus eds., Jan Sramek Verlag 2016).
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The legislative intervention reveals the constant interest for the
subject matter as well as the difficulties to cope with its related issues. Like the previous legislation, the 2017 Law addresses the topic
from a wide perspective, insofar as it does not focus only on medical
malpractice, but rather on liability of healthcare providers in general, and it outlines a comprehensive system aimed at achieving the
safety of healthcare through different interventions. Furthermore, it
approaches medical malpractice encompassing new criteria. In particular, the law tries to allocate the liability regime from a legal and
economic perspective, though charging the economic consequences
of an adverse event on the entity better able to bear it (i.e., the public
or private healthcare institution).
Last but not least, in the original intention of the legislature, the
2017 Law was to reduce defensive medicine, 6 thus benefiting patients. In particular, the 2017 Law intended to address the topics of
medical malpractice, defensive medicine and safety of patients introducing a more favorable regime of professional liability for the
healthcare providers, both from the civil law and the criminal law
perspective, focused on a new and more detailed role for Clinical
Practice Guidelines (CPGs). 7
In its original intention, it should have redressed some gaps and
limits of the Balduzzi Law on the one hand, and, it should have decreased defensive medicine and healthcare liability on the other
hand, by providing judges with clearer and more favorable rules and
standard of behavior for healthcare professionals. In spite of several
positive aspects, the 2017 Law did not reach its ambitious goal, in
particular because of the limits of the new regime for criminal liability. 8 The legislative choice to give CPGs a determinant role in the
6. See generally Carlo Granelli, La medicina difensiva in Italia, 1 RESP. CIV.
PREV. 22 (2016); ADELMO MANNA, MEDICINA DIFENSIVA E DIRITTO PENALE. TRA
LEGALITÀ E DIRITTO ALLA SALUTE (Pisa U. Press 2014); ALESSANDRO ROIATI,
MEDICINA DIFENSIVA E COLPA PROFESSIONALE MEDICA IN DIRITTO PENALE. TRA
TEORIA E PRASSI GIURISPRUDENZIALE (Giuffrè 2012).
7. See Alpa, Ars interpretandi, supra note 5, at 729-731.
8. See infra, § V.
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professional liability of healthcare providers’ cases seems to follow
the U.S. legal system, where the topic of Evidence-Based Medicine 9
and that of CPGs originated and have gained primary importance
even for purposes of legislative reforms.
CPGs are commonly associated to Evidence Based Medicine
(EBM). However, many commentators stress the conceptual difference between them, highlighting that EBM involves much more
than CPGs. Yet the latter, when really evidence-based, can facilitate
the practice of EBM by serving as codifications of the best evidence
available. Thus, CPGs are useful, if not essential components of
EBM. 10
In the U.S., the legal system for medical liability is based on the
negligence standard. 11 Currently, neither law nor jurisprudence
9. The first to use the term Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) has been Gordon Guyatt, Evidence-Based Medicine, 114 ACP J. CLUB A16 (1991) (pointing
out the trend towards the best use of scientific literature and biomedical development in medical decision-making). See also David Sackett, Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71 (1996) (defining EBM
as “the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients”); Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical
Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373 (2002); Roger Sur & Philip Dahm, History of
Evidence-Based Medicine, 27 INDIAN J. UROL. 487 (2011).
10. For the features of the tort of negligence and the relevance of the requirement of the duty of care, see Carter L. Williams, Evidence-Based Medicine in the
Law Beyond Clinical Practice Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the
Standard of Care?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479, 486-487 (2004) [hereinafter
Williams, Evidence-Based Medicine]. CPGs used to be defined by the Institute of
Medicine as “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient decision about the appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances,” see Committee on Clinical Practice Guidelines, Institute of Medicine,
Guidelines for Medical Practice 2 (Marylin J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds.
1992). Currently, their revised definition reads: “statements that include recommendations intended to optimize patient care that are informed by a systematic
review of evidence and in assessment of the benefits and harms of alternative care
options.” See Institute of Medicine (U.S.) Committee on Standards for Developing Trustworthy Clinical Practice Guidelines, Clinical Practice Guidelines We
Can Trust (Robin Graham, Michelle Mancher, Dianne Miller Wolman, Sheldon
Greenfield, & Earl Steinberg eds., National Academies Press 2011) [hereinafter
Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust]. As it can be inferred by a comparison
between the two definitions, the latest puts more emphasis on the methodology in
the process of CPGs’ selection.
11. See Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 (Scot.); Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); and MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)).
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clearly and uniformly define the standard of care for claims of medical malpractice. Traditionally, the so called “customary standard”
(i.e., what is usually done in a specific field) used to be adopted.
However, with development of EBM, nowadays there has been a
shift towards a more objective and scientifically grounded standard. 12 Many commentators struggled with the role of CPGs, in particular whether they might be intended as a legal standard of care to
be applied by courts in medical malpractice suits, or whether they
might be used as evidence of the standard of care. In spite of the
increasing role gained by CPGs, a review of the literature about their
legal effects reveals how they so far cannot be intended as a binding
standard of care in light of many criticalities surrounding the CPGs’
phenomenon (e.g., the issue of conflict of interests among different
stakeholders, the issue of reliability, trustworthiness, and accountability of CPGs, the gap between the theoretical perspective of CPGs
and the peculiarities of each patient, the difficulty to cope with patients affected by several diseases, and the risks of the so called
“cookbook medicine”). Accordingly, the topic of EBM and CPGs,
as related to that of medical malpractice and defensive medicine, has
been extensively investigated and argued in U.S. doctrine. 13
12. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), setting forth a standard according to which an expert’s theory is reliable if it meets
four requirements: 1) it is possible to test the theory; 2) it was submitted to peer
review and publication; 3) it points out the potential rate of error; 4) it is generally
accepted by the scientific community.
13. Among the manifold contributions, see Grosso, supra note 2 (focusing on
the issues related to EBM, CPGs and the standard of care within medical practice,
contending that the postulated link between an uncertain legal standard and defensive medicine may be overstated, and that promoting a cultural shift in the
doctor-patient relationship would be more effective in reducing the defensive
medicine trend); Ronen Avraham, Overlooked and Underused: Clinical Practice
Guidelines and Malpractice Liability for Independent Physicians, 20 CONN. INS.
L. J. 273 (2013-2014) (deeming that the use of CPGs may improve the quality of
healthcare in the U.S., analyzing three accountability models—public, private and
semi-public—for CPGs, and arguing in favor of a private competitive regime for
CPGs); Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 543
(2011) (arguing in favor of a private regulation regime (PRR) under which private
firms would develop and update CPGs and they would compete to license their
own CPGs to medical providers, being liable for putting forth sub-optimal guidelines); Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in
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the U.S. Health Care System, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 7 (2011); Maxwell J. Mehlman,
Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1165
(2012) (outlining the historical evolution of medical practice and its legal implications, with particular regard to the standard of care, and reporting the most important legislative attempts to introduce legal defenses on behalf of practitioners,
such as that of Maine, Vermont, Florida and Minnesota); Maxwell J. Mehlman,
Medical Malpractice Guidelines as Malpractice Safe Harbors: Illusion or Deceit?, 40 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 286 (2012); Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical
Practice Guidelines in Healthcare Reform: An Update, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 21
(2012) (pointing out that EBM is an essential part of the nation's healthcare reform
strategy and the role of CPGs to implement it; highlighting some key developments and issues in the CPGs movement, and focusing on the activity of the IOM
(Institute of Medicine) to develop trustworthy and reliable CPGs); John Tucker,
A Novel Approach to Determine Best Medical Practices: Looking at the Evidence,
10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 147 (2009); Michelle H. Lewis et al., The Locality Rule and the Physician’s Dilemma: Local medical Practices and the National
Standard of Care, 297 JAMA 2633 (2007) (pointing out that the applicable standard of care in medical malpractice lawsuits varies among jurisdictions in the U. S.
and arguing that the locality rule is difficult to justify, as medical education has
become more standardized and modern technology provides rural physicians with
the same access to information for patient care as urban ones); James F. Blumstein, Medical Malpractice Standard-Setting: Developing Malpractice “Safe Harbors” as a New Role for Q10s?, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1017 (2006) (focusing on determination of liability for medical malpractice purposes through the modification
of the standard adopted in targeted areas); Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer
Review Standards and Due Process: Moving From Tort Doctrine Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
1179 (2006) (describing the doctrines applicable to medical malpractice and focusing on the role of CPGs); James Ducharme, Clinical Guidelines and Policies:
Can They Improve Emergency Department Pain Management?, 33 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 783 (2005) (reporting the definitions of relevant tools for medical practice, such as protocols, practice guidelines, clinical pathways, etc.); Williams, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 10 (emphasizing how some courts affirmed
the physician’s “duty to stay abreast” with the latest medical science, stressing the
difference between EBM and CPGs, and contending to bifurcate the standard of
care for medical practice in substantial and procedural one); Michelle M. Mello,
Using Statistical Evidence to Prove the Malpractice Standard of Care: Bridging
Legal, Clinical and Statistical Thinking, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 821 (2002)
(arguing that attempting to integrate clinical practice guidelines into malpractice
litigation suggests that practical and conceptual problems involved in merging the
cultures of medicine, science, and law should not be underestimated); Michelle
M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645 (2001) [hereinafter
Mello, Of Swords and Shields] (developing a seminal analysis about the role of
CPGs, the main features of medical malpractice litigation, the legislative attempts
to provide healthcare professionals with a shield to defend themselves from alleged professional liability, and contending that CPGs cannot be deemed as a legal
standard of care); Elise C. Becher & Mark Chassin, Improving the Quality of
Health Care: Who Will Lead?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 164 (2001) (defining quality
problems of CPGs as underuse, overuse and misuse); Arnold J Rosoff, EvidenceBased Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines,
26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L., 327 (2001); Arnold J Rosoff, The Role of Clinical
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The approach adopted by the Italian lawmaker also follows the
path devised by the European institutions. According to the EU approach, although this area of law pertains to the competence of the
Member States, 14 it is important to set an EU common level of health
protection through, among other means, the development of the recourse to CPGs. 15
The new system depicted by the 2017 Law has, thus, been enriched with further provisions dealing with different aspects of the
healthcare field, aimed at pursuing the same target. For example, the
law sets thresholds for the amount of damage to be compensated by
the physician on behalf of public hospitals or other public healthcare
entities in the event of liability of the hospital due to the gross negligence of the physician (art. 9). 16 Article 12 also requires that
Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 369 (1995) (proposing a system that would grant the Federal Government the task not to develop
guidelines, but rather to certify privately developed CPGs); Angela Campbell &
Kathleen Cranley Grass, The Legal Status of Clinical and Ethics Policies, Codes,
and Guidelines in Medical Practice and Research, 46 MCGILL L. J. 473 (2001)
(arguing about the role of professional norm and/or legal norm of CPGs); Michael
Cabana et al., Why Don’t Physicians Follow Clinical Practice Guidelines?
Framework for Improvement, 282 JAMA 1458 (1999); Barry R. Furrow, Broadcasting Clinical Guidelines on the Internet: Will Physicians Tune In?, 25 AM. J.
L. & MED. 403 (1999) (arguing on behalf of CPGs and providing an overview of
the main on-line (at that time) available CPGs’ databases); William R. Trail &
Brad A. Allen, Government Created Medical Practice Guidelines: The Opening
of Pandora’s Box, 10 J. L. & HEALTH 231 (1995-1996) (analyzing four basic types
of government created medical practice guidelines and arguing that the first
type—i.e., State created affirmative defense—would be the optimal practice
guidelines program); Daniel Jutras, Clinical Practice Guidelines as Legal Norms,
148 CANAD. MED. J. ASSOC. 905 (1993) (focusing on the potential liability resulting from the drafting and implementation of CPGs); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBL. 87 (1991); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The Policy Rationale, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 777 (1990).
14. For an overview of the different national legal systems within the European Union, see EWOUD HONDIUS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL LIABILITY
(Ewoud Hondius ed., Cambridge U. Press 2010); MEDICAL LIABILITY IN EUROPE:
A COMPARISON OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS (Bernard A. Koch ed., De Gruyter
2011).
15. See, e.g., Athanasios Panagiotou, Professional Standards, Clinical
Guidelines and Medical Liability: A Chance for Significant Improvement in Determining the Standard of Care?, 25 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 157 (2018).
16. See generally Giulio Ponzanelli, Medical Malpractice: La Legge Bianco
Gelli. Una Premessa, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 268 (2017).
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healthcare institutions 17 have mandatory insurance-coverage; thus,
trying to limit the practice, common in recent years, of self-insured
retention (S.I.R.). Furthermore, art. 10, § 6 of the law allows victims
of alleged medical malpractice to directly sue the insurance company of the healthcare institution and/or the healthcare provider implementing a special fund for damages arising from medical malpractice. 18 Additionally, art. 8 of the 2017 Law imposes a mediation
proceeding as a mandatory pre-requirement to file a malpractice
suit. 19
This contribution will specifically focus on the new regime of
the healthcare provider’s liability and on the key role played by
CPGs. In particular, section II will briefly explain the previous legal
regime and the relevant judicial orientation based on settled case
law; section III will address the main features of the 2017 Law; section IV will deal with the case law developed after the enactment of
the 2017 Law; and section V will focus on the topic of the patient’s
informed consent. Then, final remarks will be expressed.
II. THE BALDUZZI LAW
The Balduzzi Law was the first legislative attempt to provide for
medical malpractice in order to limit the phenomenon of defensive
medicine, with specific provisions in terms of both civil and
criminal liability to be applied to healthcare professionals in general.
In spite of its laconic and incomplete text,20 the Balduzzi Law was

17. See, e.g., Leonardo Bugiolacchi, Le strutture sanitarie e l’assicurazione
per la R.C. verso terzi: natura e funzione dell’assicurazione obbligatoria nella
legge n. 24/2017 (Legge “Gelli/Bianco”), 3 RESP. CIV. PREV. 133 (2017).
18. See Maurizio Hazan, L’azione diretta nell’assicurazione obbligatoria
della RC sanitaria (e il regime delle eccezioni), 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 317
(2017).
19. See generally Rosanna Breda, La responsabilità civile delle strutture
sanitarie e del medico tra conferme e novità, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 283,
286 (2017).
20. Terms adopted by the Supreme Court of Cassation, see Cass., sez. IV
penale, Apr. 9, 2013, n. 16237, § 4 [hereinafter Cantore].
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significant under two different aspects. 21 For the first time, it
introduced the distinction between slight and gross negligence 22 for
the affirmation or exclusion of criminal liability. Secondly, the
Balduzzi Law also enhanced the role of CPGs. In addition, it
represented the outcome of a debate arisen from a heterogeneous
context: the defensive needs of healthcare providers, victim
expectations, the issues of properly allocating healthcare costs, the
balance between therapeutic necessities, and the limits of public
financial resources.
The keystone of the law was its art. 3:
The healthcare provider who, in the execution of her performance complies with clinical guidelines and good clinical
customs accredited by the scientific community, is not criminally liable for slight negligence. 23 In these cases, the obligation arising from art. 2043 C.c. [Civil Code] is maintained.
In determining the compensation of the damage, the judge
shall duly consider the behavior set forth in the first paragraph.
The text has raised many issues about its meaning and range of application. A concern dealt also with the alleged unconstitutionality

21. See, e.g., Ombretta Di Giovine, In Difesa del c.d. Decreto Balduzzi
(Ovvero: Perché Non È Possibile Ragionare di Medicina Come Se Fosse Diritto
e di Diritto Come Se Fosse Matematica)?, 1 ARCH. PEN. 3 (2014).
22. For an interesting comparative analysis about fault liability and for the
relevant terminology, see Gert Brüggemeier, Fault Liability Today. A Critical
View of the Cathedral, 1 OPINIO JURIS COMPARATIONE 1 (2014), available at
https://perma.cc/CWF6-X9HA.
23. Pursuant to the Italian Penal Code (“C.p.”), art. 43—Mental Element of
the Offenses—a crime shall be 1) intentional, i.e., according to intention, when
the harmful or dangerous event, which is the result of the act or omission, and on
which the existence of the crime depends, is foreseen and desired by the actor as
a consequence of his own act or omission; shall be 2) preterintentional, i.e., in
excess of intention, when the act or omission is followed by a harmful or dangerous event more serious than that desired by the actor; shall be 3) negligent, i.e.,
contrary to intention, when the event, even though foreseen, is not desired by the
actor and occurs because of carelessness, imprudence, unskillfulness or failure to
observe laws, regulations, orders or protocols. As for negligence, the first kind
(i.e., carelessness, imprudence, unskillfulness) is named “generic negligence,”
while the second (failure to observe laws, regulations, orders or protocols) is
named “specific negligence.”
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of this provision in light of art. 3 of the Italian Constitution (affirming the principle of equality24) due to the more favorable regime for
healthcare providers in comparison with other socially relevant professions, equally complex and potentially risky. 25
Most notably, for the first time, the Balduzzi Law introduced the
distinction between slight and gross criminal negligence. Until then,
art. 133 of the Criminal Code was used, among other criteria, to determine quam in concreto the extent of the criminal sanction.
Through the Balduzzi Law, criteria are used to affirm or deny the
criminal liability of the healthcare provider. Therefore, under this
regime, the distinction became the “turning point” between liability
and no liability.
The first obstacle arose from the fact that the Balduzzi Law did
not explain the difference between the two categories of negligence.
Thus, the courts were left with the task to conceptually identify and
distinguish between them, in particular in the borderline cases. 26
Therefore, it has been up to judicial interpretation to clarify the
range of application of the Balduzzi Law provisions. In particular,
the Supreme Court stressed that the judicial history of medical malpractice is the topos for the study of professional negligence, especially when dealing with gross negligence. 27
24. Art. 3, para. 1 Costituzione: “All citizens have equal social dignity and
are equal in front of the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion,
political opinion, personal and social conditions.”
25. See Trib. Milano, sez. IX penale, ordinanza Mar. 21, 2013 and comment
by Marco Scoletta, Rispetto delle linee guida e non punibilità della colpa lieve
dell’operatore sanitario: la “norma penale di favore” al giudizio della Corte
costituzionale, ibidem, DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO, Mar. 29, 2013,
available at https://perma.cc/8U68-Y3SU. However, the recourse has been rejected by the Constitutional Court, holding that the ordinance a quo did not
properly described the issue and lacked an adequate reasoning supporting the importance of the request. Corte Cost., ord. Dec. 6, 2013, n. 295, available at
https://perma.cc/MRL6-5ZX2.
26. See, e.g., Domenico Pulitanò, Responsabilità medica: letture e valutazioni divergenti del novum legislativo, 4 DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO 73
(2013) (proposing the distinction between imperfect performances (subject to
punishment only in cases of gross negligence) and perfect non-performances, occurring in case of clear non-compliance with the CPGs and subject to punishment).
27. See Cantore, supra note 20, § 5.

2018]

ITALY

381

In this regard, the evolution can be divided into three different
periods. During the first period, from the enactment of the Civil
Code until the 1980s, the courts tended to adopt a very favorable
approach for the physicians, and their liability used to be affirmed
only in very outrageous cases due to the “macroscopic” violation of
the most elementary rules of the ars medica. Pursuant to this view,
the exclusion of liability used to be the rule, whereas its affirmation
used to be the exception. The normative ground of this approach is
identified in art. 2236 C.c., 28 which was interpreted as requiring the
affirmation of liability only in very strict cases of macroscopic mistake. In particular, the application of art. 2236 C.c. to the criminal
area used to be justified on the basis of the inner consistency of the
legal system as a whole. However, it must be noted that, under this
perspective, it is up to the physician to prove the occurrence of peculiar technical difficulties and the release from liability applies
only to cases of unskillfulness, not to carelessness or imprudence. 29
The concern about the constitutional compliance of this approach with the principle of equality set forth in art. 3 of the Italian
Constitution was addressed by the Constitutional Court in 1973. 30
The Court found that the interpretation above complies with the Italian Constitution since arts. 589, 42, 43 C.p. and art. 2236 C.c. give
rise to a peculiar legal regime for intellectual professionals (like
physicians, lawyers, engineers, etc.) aimed at facing two opposite
purposes: on one side, not to mortify the initiative of the professional
with the fear of unfair retaliation in the event of her failure and, on
the other, not to indulge on behalf of the inconsiderate decision or

28. Art. 2236 C.c., Liability of the performer of a work: “If the performance
implies the solution of technical issues of particular difficulty, the performer is
not liable for damages unless in the event of her malice or gross negligence.”
29. See Cantore, supra note 20, § 5. See ALBERTO CRESPI, LA
RESPONSABILITÀ PENALE NEL TRATTAMENTO MEDICO-CHIRURGICO CON ESITO
INFAUSTO (Priulla 1955); Alberto Crespi, I recenti orientamenti giurisprudenziali
nell’accertamento della colpa professionale del medico chirurgo: evoluzione o
involuzione?, 4 RIV. IT. MED. LEG. 785, 789 (1992).
30. Corte Cost., sentenza Nov. 28, 1973, n. 166, available at https://perma
.cc/MRL6-5ZX2.
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reprehensible omissions of the professional. However, this regime
shall apply only in cases of particular technical difficulties and only
when unskillfulness is at stake. 31
During the second period, from the 1980s to 2007, a new approach was favored, based on the relational nature of the patientprofessional link: the uniform judicial orientation was aimed at protecting the patient’s health, thus increasing the range of liability of
the physician. Consequently, the special regime of art. 2236 C.c.
was neglected for the purposes of criminal law, on the assumption
that civil law and criminal law are different domains. 32
Finally, as of the third period, starting from 2007, 33 it has been
deemed that, although art. 2236 C.c. cannot be directly applied to
criminal law, its ratio can operate as rule of experience to be taken
into account by the judge when assessing the behavior of the professional in event of emergencies, or when the case implies the solution
of particularly complex issues. Consequently, art. 2236 C.c. stands
for the codification of an inner logical and empirical rule, underlying
the whole legal system. 34
As above mentioned, through the Balduzzi Law, the Italian lawmaker intended to outline a legal framework to provide for a topic
so far exclusively governed by judicial precedents: in particular, the
Balduzzi Law clarifies the nature of (and the requirements for) professional liability of the healthcare providers in general, and fosters
the role of CPGs to guide the professional’s behavior. 35

31. Id.
32. See Cantore, supra note 20, § 6. See Fabio Basile, Un itinerario
giurisprudenziale sulla responsabilità medica colposa tra art. 2236 Cod. Civ. e
Legge Balduzzi (aspettando la riforma della riforma), 2 DIRITTO PENALE
CONTEMPORANEO 159 (2017).
33. Cass. Sez. IV penale June 21, 2007, n. 39592.
34. See, e.g., Cass., sez. IV penale, Apr. 5, 2011, n. 16328 (“Montalto”); see
also Cass., sez. IV penale, Nov. 22, 2011, n. 4391 (“Di Lella”).
35. For interesting remarks about the relationship between CPGs and the
healthcare professional’s behavior, see ANDREA R. DI LANDRO, DALLE LINEE
GUIDA E DAI PROTOCOLLI ALL’INDIVIDUALIZZAZIONE DELLA COLPA PENALE NEL
SETTORE SANITARIO. MISURA OGGETTIVA E SOGGETTIVA DELLA “MALPRACTICE”
(Giappichelli 2012).

2018]

ITALY

383

However, despite the determinant role granted to CPGs and
good clinical practices, it failed to properly define and identify them,
thus leaving room to practical uncertainties and allowing strategic
defenses like the reference to the so-called posthumous (search for)
guidelines. This phenomenon occurs when a physician charged with
a malpractice claim points out, on an ex-post basis, a guideline as a
justification of her previous behavior. 36 The generic reference of art.
3 to improperly qualified guidelines allowed the professional to
avoid liability by referring to guidelines not necessarily known, or
not specifically taken into account, by her at the moment of the decision-making process and that of performance.
The Balduzzi Law also failed to provide a criterion to select,
among the manifold available guidelines, those grounded on scientific evidence and therefore reliable, making only a generic reference to guidelines “accredited by the scientific community.” 37 An
additional concern dealt with the proper identification of the range
of application of the waiver of criminal liability set forth by art. 3. 38
In particular, it was controversial whether this rule ought to be applied to all types of negligence (i.e., carelessness, imprudence, and
unskillfulness) or to the sole cases of unskillful behavior. 39 Indeed,
in spite of some diverging opinions, the Supreme Court has eventually excluded the criminal liability of the healthcare provider in all
cases of slight criminal negligence, regardless of the nature of negligence (thus, either in cases of carelessness, imprudence, or unskill-

36. Paolo Piras, Il discreto invito della giurisprudenza a fare noi la riforma
della colpa medica, DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO, July 4, 2017, § 7,
available at https://perma.cc/52N8-CGTQ.
37. The same concern about reliability and trustworthiness of CPGs has been
expressed and extensively investigated within the U.S. scenario, see Mello, Of
Swords and Shields, supra note 13, at 650-652. Eventually, the IOM has particularly focused its attention on such issue as can be inferred by the latest definition
of CPGs, see Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust supra note 10.
38. See art. 3 of Balduzzi Law cited in text above note 23.
39. See Brüggemeier, supra note 22.
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ful behavior) and, in so doing, has resolved the controversial conceptual issue to distinguish among the three types of fault, while at
the same time preserving equal treatment among professionals. 40
In brief, on one side, thanks to the dialogue between the legislative and judicial formants, 41 the conceptual achievements in malpractice, except for some unsolved issues, were quite noteworthy. 42
However, on the other side, the phenomenon of defensive medicine
had increased. 43 One of the main unsolved issues dealt with the nature of medical liability. Indeed, in spite of the clear and straightforward legislative provision regarding the nature of medical liability
(i.e., tort liability), Italian courts used to affirm constantly its contractual nature, with all the legal consequences this entails regarding
the burden of proof and prescription or the statute of limitation. 44
This, inter alia, has been pointed out among the factors determining
the increase of the phenomenon of defensive medicine.
The aim of the 2017 Law, at least in the beginning, was to clear
up those critical elements, for example the role of CPGs and their
proper identification. However, the final outcome seems so far to

40. Cass., sez. IV penale, June 6, 2016, n. 23283 [hereinafter Denegri]; Cass.,
sez. IV penale, July 1, 2015, n. 45527 (“Cerracchio”); Cass., sez. IV penale, Oct.
9, 2014, n. 47289 (“Stefanetti”).
41. From the comparative-law perspective, “legal formants” are those elements concurring to characterize a particular legal system and which must be
taken into account to have a proper knowledge of it: paradigmatic examples of
legal formants are, in addition to legislative provisions, court rulings, academic
writing, professional and administrative practice developed in a particular context.
See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law,
39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 and 343 (1991).
42. See Cantore, supra note 20 and Denegri, supra note 40.
43. See Carlo Brusco, Informazioni statistiche sulla giurisprudenza penale di
legittimità in tema di responsabilità medica, DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO,
July 14, 2016, available at https://perma.cc/H7QA-KVAX; Nicola Enrichens, Le
linee guida tra medici, pazienti e diritto: alcune osservazioni, RIV. RESP. MEDICA,
Mar. 13, 2018, available at https://perma.cc/Y9BW-H6S8. For further statistical
data, see also Federico Valentini, Il nuovo assetto della responsabilità sanitaria
dopo la riforma Gelli-Bianco, 4 RIV. IT. MED. LEG. 1395 (2017).
44. A further distinction between the two regimes, in transnational cases,
deals with the criteria to identify the governing law (i.e., pursuant to EU Rome I
Regulation for contractual obligations and EU Rome II Regulation for non-contractual obligations) and the forum (i.e., EU Brussels I bis Regulation).
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have missed the point and, while the 2017 Law has certainly provided a contribution to the proper identification of relevant CPGs, it
seems to have moved backward in comparison to the Balduzzi Law,
at least from the criminal liability perspective.
III. THE 2017 LAW
The 2017 Law, entitled “Disposizioni in materia di sicurezza
delle cure e della persona assistita, nonché in materia di responsabilità professionale degli esercenti le professioni sanitarie”
[Provisions on safety of the healthcare and of the patient, as well as
on professional liability of the healthcare providers], addresses, as
the heading reveals, different aspects of the healthcare world, encompassing provisions of different nature. In particular, it adopts a
broad approach to the above-mentioned topic, 45 providing that:
− The safety of healthcare is an essential part of the constitutional
right of health 46 and it is pursued on behalf of the individual and
of the community (art. 1, § 1);
45. For a general introduction to the 2017 Law, see GUIDO ALPA, LA
L. 8 MARZO 2017, N. 24 (Pacini
2017).
46. Art. 32, para. 1 Costituzione: “The Republic safeguards health as a fundamental right of the individual and as a collective interest, and guarantees free
medical care to the indigent.” This article depicts the general framework of the
right to health as a fundamental right of the human being, and as interest of the
community, combined with the guarantee of gratuitous treatment for needy people. The term “illness” has been used in a wide significance, encompassing both
general diseases and professional ones. A second feature of such right is the adequacy of the healthcare treatment pursuant to several initiatives at the international
level, like for example those carried out by the World Health Organization, the
principles enclosed in the Ottawa Chart of 1986 aiming at equity in health. See
Fernando Bocchini, Salute e sanità tra solidarietà e responsabilità, 1 CONTR.
IMPR. 126 (2018) (arguing that protection of the human health is a significant experience of rebuilding the effectiveness of a legal system in order to erase the gap
between theoretical declarations and the incongruity of real life, and stressing that
the current interpretation of art. 32 Cost. tends to grants constitutional value to
statutory provisions. As well, the regulations of the Consumer Code—i.e., Decreto Legge, Sept. 6, 2005, n. 206—art. 2 (2) (a), points out among the fundamental rights granted to consumers and users “the right to health’s protection,” and
that, pursuant to such provision, contractual terms aimed at limiting or excluding
the liability of the professional party in the event of death or personal injury suffered by the consumer as a consequence of an action or omission of the former
are held unfair).
RESPONSABILITÀ SANITARIA. COMMENTO ALLA
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− The safety of healthcare is achieved also through the complex of
all the activities aiming at the prevention and risk management
connected to the issuance of healthcare services and the appropriate use of the structural, technological, and organizational resources (art. 1, § 2). 47 For this purpose, in every region of Italy,
a center has been established for risk management and patient’s
safety aimed at collecting from private and public healthcare institutions the data related to adverse events and malpractice litigation.
− Article 3 establishes a National Observatory of the good customs
on safety in the healthcare system (Observatory) under the National Agency for Regional Healthcare Services (AGENAS).
The Observatory has the task:
• to collect, from the regional centers above, the data related to risks and adverse events, as well as to causes,
extent, frequency, and financial burden of the controversies;
• to draw up guidelines with the support of qualified scientific associations; and
• to identify appropriate measures in order to prevent and
manage health-risk with the aim of monitoring the good
customs, as well as for purposes of professional training,
and continuing education of the healthcare providers.
With reference to the professional activity of healthcare providers
and their liability, art. 5 sets forth specific rules according to which
47. In this regard, see Matteo Caputo, La responsabilità penale dell’esercente
la professione sanitaria dopo la L. n. 24 del 2017… “quo vadit”? Primi dubbi,
prime risposte, secondi dubbi, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 293, 297 (2017) (arguing that the emphasis on healthcare’s safety rather than on the right to health in
itself, is aimed at stressing the absence of a duty upon the professional to ensure
the patient’s healing. The former would therefore be obliged to apply the required
professional diligence but could not be held liable for not having achieved the
patient’s recovery). See also Adolfo di Majo, Il giudizio di responsabilità civile
del medico dopo la legge Gelli e cioè la perizia “guidata,” 4 GIUR. IT. 841 (2018)
(arguing about the legal effects of the criminal provisions of the 2017 Law within
the civil law’s field, and stressing the nature of obbligazione di mezzi (obligation
of means) charged upon the healthcare provider).
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healthcare providers executing health services for prevention, diagnostic, therapeutic, palliative, rehabilitation, and forensic medicine
purposes comply with the recommendations of the guidelines drawn
up by qualified selected scientific institutions and published pursuant to the procedure set forth in the same article, except for the peculiarities of the single case. In case of absence of the above-mentioned guidelines, health care professionals abide by good clinical
care practices. However, such behavioral duty must be tailored to
the specific case. If the peculiar circumstances of the case require a
different approach and/or behavior, the healthcare professional
shall, on a justified basis, depart from the above-mentioned recommendations. 48 Consequently, exceptions to the general rule can be
allowed with reference to the peculiarities of the single case.
In particular, the institutions referred to in art. 5 are included in
a list compiled and updated by the Ministry of Health. The guidelines and updates are integrated within the sistema nazionale per le
linee guida. 49 A further public entity operating under the Ministry
of Health, namely the Istituto superiore di sanità (ISS) is involved.
Indeed, the ISS, before publishing such guidelines on its websites,
shall previously verify (i) the compliance of the adopted methodology with a specified public standard, as well as (ii) the relevance of
scientific evidences declared in support of the recommendations.
Accordingly, the framework outlined by the 2017 Law is quite complex and involves different stakeholders, both private and public,
called to actively cooperate to the development of the national system of guidelines. Furthermore, the entities operating under the supervision of the Ministry of Health and its related agencies play a
fundamental role in selecting and verifying which guidelines should
be included in the system and must be complied with by healthcare
professionals.
48. Therefore, the approach adopted is that of “comply or explain.” See
Caputo, supra note 47, at 295.
49. SNLG, DELL’ISTITUTO SUPERIORE DI SANITÀ, https://perma.cc/48MH4T9Y.
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In addition, unlike the Balduzzi Law, the 2017 Law introduces
a hierarchical distinction between CPGs and good clinical practices.
In particular, the CPGs provided with the preeminent role granted
by such provision, are only those officially accredited and published
pursuant to the 2017 Law. The good clinical practices will come at
stake only when the first lacks, and they might also encompass
CPGs issued by (reliable) entities, but not (yet) accredited in the official system depicted by the 2017 Law. 50
Article 6 specifically deals with criminal liability of healthcare
providers, introducing a new provision in the Italian Criminal Code:
art. 590-sexies (fault liability for death or personal injuries in the
healthcare field). According to this article, if death or personal injuries occur within the exercise of healthcare professional activity, the
healthcare providers will be punished pursuant to arts. 589 and 590
C.p., 51 except for situations specified in art. 590-sexies, para. 2 C.p.
In fact, pursuant to the second paragraph of this provision, should
death or personal injury occur because of unskillfulness, punishment 52 is excluded when the recommendations set forth by the officially published CPGs—or, absent such guidelines, the good clinical
50. For critical remarks about the role of good clinical practices within malpractice trials (in particular when invoked by the defendant in a criminal judgment), see Francesco D’Alessandro, La responsabilità penale del sanitario alla
luce della riforma “Gelli-Bianco,” 5 DIR. PEN. PROC. 572, 578 (2017).
51. The articles respectively provide for manslaughter and personal injury.
52. The literal expression adopted by art. 6 of the 2017 Law related to art.
590-sexies C.p. is punibilità. Pursuant to the Italian Criminal Code and from a
strictly technical perspective, the “cause di estinzione della punibilità” are circumstances excluding the liability of the defendant although all the constitutive
elements of the crime have been met. FERRANDO MANTOVANI, I DIRITTO PENALE,
PARTE GENERALE 786 et seq. (9th ed., CEDAM 2015). However, the expression
has been used even in different meanings and its theoretical conceptualization has
not been properly built. Id. at 798. Yet, as constantly highlighted by Italian judges
(lastly by the Tarabori holding, Cass., sez. IV penale, Apr. 20, 2017-June 7, 2017,
n. 28187 [hereinafter Tarabori]—and authoritatively by the Supreme Court in the
Mariotti case, Cass., sez. Unite Penali, Dec. 21, 2017-Feb. 22, 2018, n. 8770
[hereinafter Mariotti] see infra, § IV, the Italian lawmaker in recent times adopted
the term punibilità in several, non-technical, and improper meanings, to express
different concepts; for example, criminal liability in general, or other circumstances able to exclude, even from a subjective point of view, the penalty. Accordingly, reference to exclusion of punibilità ought not to necessarily be intended
as implying a proper condition for the exclusion of the punishment. Pursuant to
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practices—have been complied with, as long as the recommendations above proved to be adequate to the peculiarities of the case.
Article 7 deals with civil liability of both the healthcare institution and the healthcare providers. In particular, solving problems of
proper qualification of the nature of the liabilities above, it draws a
distinction between the institution, on the one side, and the
healthcare professional, on the other. 53 Indeed, the institution that,
in order to perform its obligation, avails itself of the activity of
healthcare providers, is contractually liable because of the intentional or negligent behavior of these professionals according to arts.
1218 and 1228 C.c. The liability of the structure has a contractual
nature and it is legally grounded on the direct liability of the institution towards the patient combined with elements of its vicarious liability. 54
The healthcare provider is liable under art. 2043 C.c., unless she
has performed in execution of a contractual relationship with the patient. This being the exception, the general rule is that the healthcare
provider is liable towards the patient under tort law. The distinction
above affects, in particular, the procedural burden of proof, heavier
for the patient in case of tortious liability pursuant to art. 2043 C.c., 55

the Tarabori Court, the term at stake shall therefore be intended as non-technical
reference to the process of assessing the liability of the defendant in light of the
degree of the fault (see Tarabori, supra note 52, § 10.1). Since there is no consensus among courts and among scholars about the proper qualification of the term
punibilità within art. 590-sexies C.p., in the present essay it has been translated
into “punishment,” thereby referring to the element of the sanction pursuant to the
concept of punibilità encompassed within the Criminal Code, although being
aware of the possible non-technical meaning of such expression.
53. See, e.g,, Roberto Pardolesi, Chi (vince e chi) perde nella riforma della
responsabilità sanitaria, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 261, 264 (2017) (arguing
that the 2017 Law has introduced a “dual-track” system of remedies); Giuseppe
Pavich, La responsabilità penale dell’esercente la professione sanitaria: cosa
cambia con la legge Gelli-Bianco, 7-8 CASS. PEN. 2961 (2017) (expressing critical
remarks about the distinction between different kinds of liability).
54. Alpa, Ars interpretandi, supra note 5, at 728-729; Massimo Franzoni,
Colpa e linee guida nella nuova legge, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 271, 273
l(2017).
55. Generally, in case of tortious liability, the patient or, more broadly, the
victim shall prove (i) the damage; (ii) the intentional or negligent behavior of the
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and liberative prescription, which amounts to 5 years in case of tortious liability, and 10 years in case of contractual liability.
In particular, art. 7 of the 2017 Law refers to three different situations: (1) the patient chooses a private practice physician, (2) the
patient refers to a public or private hospital and is treated by a physician employed there; and (3) the patient avails herself of the professional activity of her general practitioner or of a physician employed by a public or private institution, but allowed to practice privately within the institution itself. 56 In the first and in the third case,
the relationship between the physician and the patient is governed
by the law of contracts. 57 The second case used to qualify as contractual too on the basis of the doctrine of contatto sociale (i.e., a de

alleged tortfeasor; (iii) the element of causation between (i) and (ii); (iv) the unlawful nature of the damage (i.e., the harm to a legally protected interest, see
Brüggemeier, supra note 22, at 4, 7-8). On the contrary, under a contractual liability regime, the victim shall prove (i) the existence of a contractual relationship
with the other party; (ii) the breach of the contractual obligation by the other party;
and (iii) the damage; consequently, it will be up to the alleged breaching party to
demonstrate that nonfeasance or improper performance is not due to her fault.
However, such general rules have been affected by the judicial interpretation and
evolution.
56. See, e.g., Ubaldo Perfetti, La responsabilità civile del medico tra legge
cd. Gelli e nuova disciplina del consenso informato, 2 GIUST. CIV. 359 (2018).
57. With regard to the first and third case, the new rules do not change the
previous judicial achievements, particularly with reference to the burden of proof.
Such rule indeed shall be tailored with the case when the obligation undertaken
by the professional is an obbligazione di risultato (obligation of result) whereby
the professional guarantees a specific result or, on the contrary, whether it is an
obbligazione di mezzi (obligation of means) whereby the same guarantees to apply
her best care, though not ensuring any results. Such distinction affects the relevant
burden of proof. Pursuant to art. 1218 C.c., in the first case it is up to the debtor
to prove that the nonfeasance is due to force majeure, whilst in the second case it
is up to the creditor to prove the negligence and the breach of the duty of care by
the debtor. Traditionally, the obligation of the physician used to be an obligation
of means. See, e.g., Gaetano E. Napoli, La responsabilità sanitaria nel sistema
civilistico. Punti fermi e nuove linee di riforma, 1 RESP. CIV. PREV. 103, 112-113
(2017). However, such qualification has been criticized by many authors arguing
that the distinction above has only descriptive value and lacks any prescriptive
force, and it has been subject to a progressive judicial evolution, culminating with
the holding of the Supreme Court, July 28, 2005, n. 15781 arguing that every
obligation requires at the same time the coexistence of the debtor’s behavior together with a result, although in variable proportion, and thus affirming that the
evidentiary mechanism is the same in any case of alleged breach of contractual
obligation. A further judicial attack to the relevance of the distinction above has
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facto relationship between the physician and the patient giving rise
to legal obligations according to art. 1173 C.c.). However, due to the
2017 Law, it is now governed by the law of torts. 58
been carried out with the recognition of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, distinguishing between routine and non-routine interventions. In particular, the ease of the
intervention and/or its routine-nature imply the reversal of the burden of proof up
to the professional charged with the demonstration that the unsuccessful result is
not due to her fault. See Giovanni Pascuzzi, Malpractice: la colpa del medico è
presunta se l’intervento è di “facile esecuzione,” in 1 LEX AQUILIA - LA
RESPONSABILITÀ MEDICA 16 (Giovanni Pascuzzi ed., Zanichelli 2005). Subsequently, such distinction has been abandoned on the assumption that the risk-allocation cannot be linked to the difficulty of the intervention and the tribunals
used to require by the professionals the proof of an event beyond their control and
not reasonably predictable and/or avoidable. See, e.g., Claudio Scognamiglio,
Regole di condotta, modelli di responsabilità e risarcimento del danno nella
nuova legge sulla responsabilità sanitaria, 6 CORR. GIUR. 740, 741-744 (2017).
Furthermore, Italian courts used to apply the rule of the so called “proximity of
the evidence” whereby the relevant burden shall be charged to the breaching party
because this party possesses the elements to paralyze the creditor’s claim, see Supreme Court, Joint Civil Division, Oct. 20, 2001, n. 13533. As for the specific
area of medical malpractice, the rule of proximity of the evidence is interpreted
in the sense that the patient alleging the professional’s nonfeasance shall demonstrate the existence of the contract with the hospital or the healthcare institution
together with the source of the contatto sociale with the physician, and then it is
up to the defendant to prove the absence of any fault in the contractual performance. Such shift in the burden of proof has been identified among the factors
increasing medical malpractice claims, on one side, and the practice of defensive
medicine on the other, even after the enactment of the Balduzzi Law. Indeed, as
above mentioned, despite the express characterization in such Law of the
healthcare professional’s liability as tortious, Italian courts carried on in affirming
its contractual nature thus applying such evidentiary rules. For critical remarks,
see Giovanna Visintini, La colpa medica nella responsabilità civile, 3 CONTR.
IMPR. 530 (2015). On the contrary, the 2017 Law straightforwardly affirms the
tortious nature of the physician if employed by a public or private healthcare institution, and not involved in a pre-existing contractual relationship with the patient; and vice versa, should a contractual relationship occur between the patient
and the healthcare provider, the latter would be judged on the basis of the abovementioned contractual rules.
58. The characterization of the healthcare professional’s liability as tortious
implies, on one side, the compensation of even not predictable damages pursuant
to art. 2056 C.c., and, on the other, the application of the regime provided for by
art. 2050 C.c. if the relevant requirements are met. Such a norm deals with liability
due to the exercise of dangerous activities (art 2050 C.c.—Liability arising from
the exercise of dangerous activities: “Whoever causes injury to another in the performance of an activity dangerous by its nature or by reason of the instrumentalities employed, is liable in damages, unless she proves to have taken all suitable
measures to avoid the injury”). The range of application of this article has been
investigated by the doctrine and the Italian courts under two different aspects. The
first issue dealt with the nature of such liability: currently, the majority view describes it as strict liability whilst, according to a minority opinion, the norm would
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Furthermore, non-pecuniary damage suffered by the patient
shall be compensated referring to thresholds and parameters set
forth in the charts outlined by arts. 138 and 139 of the Code of Private Insurance. 59 Finally, art. 7 clarifies that the provisions above
are mandatory.
The Balduzzi law affirmed the tortious nature of medical liability, leaving the burden of proof on the plaintiff. However, as previously indicated, 60 this clear legislative choice did not prevent Italian
courts to carry on adjudicating that the professional had a contractual relationship with the patient, in particular if employed by a
healthcare institution: liability ended up being contractual and the
burden of proof was consequently reallocated. Therefore, in light of
the clash between the Balduzzi qualification of professional liability
as tortious, and the judicial interpretation of this liability as contractual, the emphasis of art. 7 in clarifying the mandatory nature of the

give rise to a mere rebuttable presumption of liability upon the party exercising a
dangerous activity. As known, the strict liability characterization affects the relevant burden of proof in favor of the victim. The second issue dealt with the possibility to include the healthcare activities within the category of “dangerous activities” encompassed by such article. The answer given by the judicial formant
is affirmative because, besides the list of dangerous activities filled in by specific
Laws or other normative provisions, Italian courts admit the possibility to include
other atypical activities on a quam in concreto basis, to be therefore assessed case
by case. Such extensive orientation is also upheld by authoritative statutory precedents, in particular art. 15 of the Privacy Code according to which “whoever
causes a damage as effect of the personal data processing shall compensate such
damage pursuant to art. 2050 C.c.” Consequently, for the purposes of Italian law,
the personal data processing is deemed a dangerous activity. See Perfetti, supra
note 56, § 10.
59. See Decreto Legislativo Sept. 7, 2005, n. 209. With regard to the compensation of damage, the express reference to the thresholds set forth in the Code
of Private Insurance has been interpreted in a double sense: on one side, in light
of the legislative will to put a cap on damages and, on the other, in light of the
need to personalize and tailor the assessment of damages, as commonly applied
in the insurance field, but with a peculiar feature. In the case of the insurance, the
criteria to personalize the damage even increasing it up to the triple, are exclusively focused on the victim; on the contrary, in the healthcare field what matters
for the purposes of decreasing or increasing the amount of damages is the professional behaviour of the healthcare provider and her level of compliance with the
accredited CPGs or the good clinical practices. See Alpa, Ars Interpretandi, supra
note 5, at 731.
60. See supra, § II.
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provisions at stake seems aimed at definitively solving this hermeneutical issue and avoiding any further different interpretations.
The 2017 Law has been implemented by means of two Ministry
of Health’s decrees addressing essential elements. In particular, the
first decree points out the list of accredited scientific associations
and technical-scientific associations of the healthcare professions, 61
while the second establishes the above-mentioned Observatory of
the good clinical practices on healthcare safety. 62
Since the task of elaborating the relevant guidelines, pursuant to
the scheme drawn up by the 2017 Law, pertains to public and private
entities, as well as to scientific and technical-scientific associations
of the healthcare professions purposely included in a public list, the
first decree points out the criteria to be included in the list of selected
entities. The list will be updated on a two-year basis. In order to be
included in such list, associations shall demonstrate to have:
− national relevance, namely to have a direct or indirect branch or
subsidiary within at least 12 Regions;
− representativeness of at least 30% of professionals (who are not
retired) of the specific field of expertise;
− proved independence from entrepreneurial activities and lack of
profit-making purposes;
− compliance with the duty to publish the scientific activity of the
association on its website, to be constantly updated;
− absence of wage for the company’s officer positions;
− among the entity’s purposes, lack of the aim to provide laborunion assistance to its members and absence of any direct or indirect labor-union activity; and
− broadest participation of the members to the activities and decisions of the association.

61. Decreto Aug. 2, 2017, G.U. n. 186.
62. Decreto Sept. 29, 2017, G.U. n. 248.
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The requirements above are, therefore, quite strict 63 and should
the association subsequently lose one or more of them, it might be
first suspended and then erased from the list.
The second decree establishes the Observatory within the
AGENAS. As previously mentioned, the Observatory is called to
carry out, in accordance to the directions of healthcare planning as
defined by the Ministry of Health, very important tasks, in particular
dealing with the collection of statistical data, drawing up of CPGs,
and risk-management activities. Both decrees play an important role
with reference to the criminal liability of the healthcare provider. In
particular, the first decree concurs to select and outline the sources
of reference for the behavior of the healthcare professionals (and,
from a different perspective, concurs to select and outline the standard of behavior to be adopted by judges when assessing their liability). Worthy of attention is the fact that healthcare professionals
shall comply with the sole recommendations set forth by the guidelines published in accordance with the 2017 Law and drafted by the
accredited institutions.
The 2017 Law has apparently deprived first the physicians and
then the courts of the power to evaluate the reliability and credibility
of the guidelines. 64 This, in the majority of the opinions, has represented a worthy effort to avoid uncertainties arising from the large
number of available guidelines, not all of the same value, 65 and to
interrupt the recourse to “posthumous” identification of guidelines.

63. On Oct. 23, 2017, the Ministry of Health issued an official circular in
order to clarify the doubts arisen about the proper interpretation of the requirements above and their range of application.
64. Cristiano Cupelli, L’eterointegrazione della legge Gelli-Bianco:
aggiornamenti in tema di linee guida “certificate” e responsabilità penale in
ambito sanitario, 10 DIR. PEN. CONT. 266, 268 (2017).
65. See, ex multis, Carlo Scorretti, Le linee guida nella medicina moderna e
nella recente normativa italiana, in RESPONSABILITÀ E LINEE GUIDA 103-114
(Gian Marco Caletti et al. eds., EPG Udine 2018). See also Justin Kung et al.,
Failure of Clinical Practice Guidelines to Meet Institute of Medicine Standards,
172 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1628 (2012) (focusing on the problem of conflict of interests among the members of the entities called to issue CPGs and
providing statistical data about such phenomenon).
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This used to be a strategy developed under the dominion of the previous legal regime (i.e., the Balduzzi Law). 66 The express duty to
abide by existing, published, and clearly identified CPGs, puts an
end to this strategy. Furthermore, the ex-ante perspective is important because it takes into account all potential recipients and beneficiaries, and not just the injured parties or the parties involved in a
trial. As highlighted, art. 5 of the 2017 Law introduces a general rule
requiring the compliance with the accredited guidelines working
both in the area of civil (and, for certain purposes, criminal) liability
as a criterion to assess the skillfulness of the physician and for the
quantification of damages.
A further aim of the new law is to avoid uncertainties due to the
reliability of the scientific association involved as well as conflicts
among different and inconsistent recommendations. The process of
controlled selection of guidelines to be included in the national official database immediately carries out a distinction between reliable
and not-reliable guidelines (at least for the purposes of the 2017
Law). Finally, the new system should solve the issue of conflict of
interests among stakeholders and guidelines’ issuers affecting the
reliability of clinical guidelines as well.
IV. JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY
To summarize, the 2017 Law, by introducing a rebuttable presumption of lack of punishment, not only opened new and significant issues in respect to the previous legislative regulation, but it
seems to have failed the task of ensuring the certainty of lack of
liability in cases of compliance with the officially accredited CPGs.
Indeed, the 2017 Law, according to the majority of commentators
and to a significant judicial orientation, appears less favorable to
healthcare providers than the Balduzzi Law. 67
66. See supra, § II.
67. See Tarabori and Mariotti rulings, supra note 52, and relevant comments.
See also Cristiano Cupelli, L’art. 590-sexies C.p. nelle motivazioni delle sezioni
unite: un’interpretazione costituzionalmente conforme dell’imperizia medica
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The first opportunity for the Supreme Court to deal with the
2017 Law was the Tarabori case. 68 In this case, the Fourth Criminal
Division of the Supreme Court highlights the functions of art. 5,
which “entails a real foundation of the ways to exercise of healthcare
professions.” 69 Within such a system, the guidelines are intended as
“general directives that shall face the peculiarities of each case, and
shall adapt themselves to it.” 70 In particular, the Tarabori holding
points out “the clear legislative intention to build up an institutional
public system aimed at regulating the healthcare activities, able to
ensure their development in a uniform and appropriate manner, in
compliance with controlled scientific evidences” in order to “overrule uncertainties that occurred after the enactment of the Balduzzi
Law with reference to the criteria to properly identify the scientifically qualified directives,” 71 as well as to avoid the dangers of degenerations due to guidelines affected by conflict of interest or not
scientifically grounded. This is done “[i]n order to foster the uniform
application of accredited and virtuous directives.” 72
As noted by the Supreme Court, the legislative choice not only
guarantees “to the healthcare institution, the governance of the medical profession,” but it also “has a significant impact on the professional who must comply with the recommendations although with
the adaptations required by each case” and is “legitimately entitled
(ancora) punibile, DIR. PEN. CONT. Mar. 1, 2018 (arguing that the 2017 Law has
failed its alleged purposes); Pier Francesco Poli, Il D.D.L. Gelli-Bianco: verso
un’ennesima occasione persa di adeguamento della responsabilità penale del
medico ai principi costituzionali?, 2 DIR. PEN. CONT. 67 (2017) (expressing
several critical remarks to the 2017 Law). But see also Gian Marco Caletti &
Matteo Leonida Mattheudakis, Una prima lettura della legge “Gelli-Bianco”
nella prospettiva del diritto penale, 2 DIR. PEN. CONT. 84 (2017) (pointing out
some positive elements of the 2017 Law).
68. See Tarabori, supra note 52.
69. See id. § 7.5 (analyzing the effects of the 2017 Law from a wider perspective, encompassing both the domain of criminal liability and that of civil liability,
see also § 7.4, as linked by the overall approach adopted by such Law).
70. Id. § 7.5.
71. The Court expressly argues that, under the Balduzzi Law, the CPGs
counted as scientific directives for the healthcare provider and their compliance
amounted to a “protective shield” against unjustified claims. Id. § 6.
72. Id. § 7.5.
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to rely on the fact that her behavior shall be assessed pursuant to the
same recommendations she must abide by.” 73 In light of such remarks, the Supreme Court infers that the system introduced by the
2017 Law “provides an unprecedented regulatory framework, focused on the modalities of execution of the healthcare profession
and of the assessment of negligence,” which offers to the judge “precise directions in order to evaluate the liability of the provider.” 74
In particular, the holding points out the paradoxical consequences of a literal interpretation of the norm, according to which a
physician (or any other healthcare professional) could escape liability even though she caused harm to the patient if it is demonstrated
that the physician acted in compliance with qualified directives. 75
The Fourth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court has, thus,
deemed that the text of art. 590-sexies C.p., as introduced within the
Penal Code by art. 6 of the 2017 Law, is affected by “obvious” traits
and by a “logical incompatibility” with the overall rationale of the
provision itself, as well as with the general principles of the Italian
legal system.
In brief, according to the Court, a literal interpretation of the article would make it unconstitutional. The paradigmatic example offered by the Court is the case of a surgeon planning and executing,
in compliance with the relevant clinical guidelines, an operation for
the removal of an abdominal neoplasm, who, in the executive moment, due to a huge and tragic mistake, severs an artery rather than
the peduncle of the neoplasm, thus causing the death of the patient.
In the opinion of the Court, following the literal interpretation of the
provision at stake would lead to exclude the surgeon’s liability. Accordingly, since the outcome would be unfair and unlawful because
it would amount to a breach of the right to health set forth in art. 32
of the Italian Constitution, and would negatively affect civil claims
of medical malpractice and the related compensation of damage, as
73. Id. § 8.2.
74. Id. § 7.5.
75. Id. § 7.4.
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well as the constitutional principle of equality set forth in art. 3 (because the legal regime applied to healthcare professionals would be
“irrationally” different than that applied to other equally risky and
difficult professions), this interpretation was rejected by the Court. 76
In light of the above reasoning, the sole interpretation allowed by
the “unhappy” lexical phrasing of the 2017 Law is that, when it is a
matter of unskillful behavior, the healthcare provider 77 shall not be
held liable if she complied with the officially accredited guidelines
and there were no reasons to depart from them.
Consequently, the Tarabori Court, emphasizing the purposes of
the 2017 Law and particularly the new system of accredited guidelines, holds that the physician complying with the accredited guidelines, save the peculiarities of each case, is entitled to expect that her
behavior will be judged pursuant to the same clinical guidelines. 78
Therefore, for the purposes of the new art. 590-sexies C.p., the assessment of liability shall be carried out taking into account the involved clinical guidelines, which must be pertinent and whose reliability and adequacy to the specific case shall be previously investigated by the judge, called to focus this assessment upon the moment
of implementation of the guidelines by the healthcare professional.
Within the described range of application, the healthcare provider is
consequently entitled to be judged pursuant to the standard set by
the same guidelines she shall comply with.
Accordingly, the role of CPGs as drawn up by both art. 5. and
art. 6 of the 2017 Law ends up to be neglected because any “automatic” waiver of liability (or any “protective shield”) generated by
the compliance with the officially accredited guidelines, is denied.

76. Id.
77. The 2017 Law, as pointed out, deals with the liability of the healthcare
provider in general. However, all the three holdings of the Supreme Court address
the case of medical malpractice and liability of the physician, thus referring their
reasoning to the latter category. Nevertheless, except for the peculiarities of each
healthcare profession, the interpretation provided by the Court applies to
healthcare providers in general.
78. See Tarabori, supra note 52, § 8.2.
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A confirmation of such effect can be found in the fact that, in comparing the Balduzzi regime with that of the 2017 Law for inter-temporary purposes related to the principle of non-retroactivity of the
criminal provision, the Tarabori Court found the Balduzzi Law more
favorable to healthcare providers than the 2017 Law.
Four months after the Tarabori ruling, the Fourth Criminal Division (with a different composition) dealt again with the 2017 Law
and, in particular, with art. 590-sexies C.p. However, the Court embraced a completely different interpretation and never mentioned the
earlier ruling. 79 The Cavazza holding points out that the specific
field of application of art. 590-sexies, para. 2 C.p. is that of the unskilled execution of proper and adequate clinical guidelines. 80 Consequently, the so-called imperitia in executivis would shield the
healthcare provider from criminal liability, while the imperitia in
eligendo, namely the incorrect selection of the guideline or the adoption of a non-adequate guideline, would lead to affirm her criminal
liability. 81 This is the rule set forth by the holding at stake, which is
reached through an articulated ratio decidendi.
First of all, the Fourth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court,
sitting with different judges than those of the Tarabori holding, highlights what the elements of certainty introduced by the 2017 Law
are: first, the specific abrogation of art. 3 of the Balduzzi Law, together with the consequent overtaking of the issue of the degree of
fault; second, the clear legislative choice to apply the waiver of liability set forth in the second paragraph of art. 590-sexies C.p. only
to the event of unskillfulness (thus, excluding from its range of application cases of negligence and carelessness). 82
On the contrary, among the controversial elements of the 2017
Law, the Court stresses the role of CPGs as outlined by the
lawmaker. It points to the operational difficulties in distinguishing
79.
80.
81.
82.

Cass., sez. IV penale, Oct. 19-31, 2017, n. 50078 [hereinafter Cavazza].
Id. § 7.
Id.
Id. § 6.
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between unskillfulness, negligence, and carelessness, since these
concepts are adjoining and often overlapping. It insists that in a case
of gross fault, it would be extremely difficult to find that the
circumstances to release the physician from liability, as set forth by
the art. 590-sexies C.p., are fulfilled. 83
Consequently, in order to avoid the highlighted issues—and to
save the rationale of the 2017 Law—the Cavazza Court provides an
interpretation aimed at enhancing as much as possible the letter and
the purposes of this law. In particular, in the opinion of the Court,
the clear intent of the 2017 Law is to avoid any differences in the
degree of fault in the event of harm due to unskillfulness of the
healthcare provider. Consequently, when the requirements of art.
590-sexies, para 2 C.p. are fulfilled, even the gross fault shall be
excused. 84 In addition, pursuant to this interpretation, the intent of
the 2017 Law is to specifically favor the position of the physician
by decreasing the possibility of a criminal liability, without prejudice to civil liability, thereby ensuring to patients the compensation
of the suffered damages. 85
The keystone of the new regime are the accredited CPGs and the
mandatory requirement for healthcare professionals to comply with
them or, in the absence thereof, with the good clinical customs, provided that both prove to be adequate to the circumstances of the specific case. Accordingly, the “causa di non punibilità,” as outlined
by the Court, loses any subjective connotations to assume an objective feature:
[T]he surrender to sanction the physician is justified in light
of the lawmaker’s choice not to mortify the initiative of the
professional because of the fear of unfair retaliations, thus
discharging the physician from punishment in reason of a
mere judgment of criminal policy’s opportunity in order to

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 7.
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restore the operational serenity of the physician and thereby
preventing the phenomenon of defensive medicine. 86
Therefore, in the sole case of unskillfulness, criminal liability
will hinge on the adequacy of the accredited guidelines: should these
guidelines be held adequate, the physician would not incur criminal
liability even in cases of gross unskillfulness. On the contrary,
should the guidelines be held not appropriate to the circumstances
of the case, the physician will be found liable even in cases of slight
unskillfulness. However, it has been also stressed by the Court that
the physician’s unskilled behavior will be excused only if the mistake occurred in the execution of the appropriate guideline. On the
contrary, should the mistake occur ab initio in the selection of the
guideline, liability will be maintained. Finally, pointing out the positive effects of the new provisions, the Cavazza Court did not seem
to doubt the constitutionality of the 2017 Law.
The two holdings differ from each other, adopting opposite interpretations of the 2017 Law. The Cavazza Court highlighted the
purpose of this law in light of the announced intent of the lawmaker
to provide a “safe harbor” to healthcare providers vis-a-vis the malpractice claims in cases of unskillful behavior. In order to reach such
aim, the Court emphasized the letter of the 2017 Law and, in particular, of art. 590-sexies C.p. deeming that both cases of slight and
gross unskillfulness (in the execution of proper guidelines) shall discharge the healthcare provider from criminal liability, although
without prejudice to the civil liability. Accordingly, the Court has
stressed the determinant role played by CPGs to release from liability the professionals who abide by them, insofar as they prove to be
adequate to the specific case.
However, the Cavazza interpretation raises issues as to the compatibility of the new provisions with, in particular, the principle of
equality and the fundamental right to health, as respectively set forth
in arts. 3 and 32 of the Italian Constitution. To avoid a possible clash
86. Id.
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with constitutional norms, the Tarabori Court provided an interpretation so strict as to deprive the 2017 Law of its (alleged) innovative
potential. Pursuant to this ruling, the liability waiver regime
grounded upon the system of accredited CPGs tended to be disregarded. Therefore, the interpretation adopted by the Tarabori Court
has been qualified as interpretatio abrogans. 87
In addition, from the perspective of the Tarabori holding, the
Balduzzi Law is more favorable than the 2017 Law. On the contrary,
according to the Cavazza holding, the result of the comparison is
exactly the opposite: this clash would lead to antithetical outcomes
in cases involving inter-temporary matters in light of the principles
of non-retroactivity of the criminal law, and retroactivity of the more
favorable provisions derived from art. 2 C.p. and art. 25 of the Italian
Constitution.
The crucial importance of the issue, and the clear conflict of interpretations about the letter of the 2017 Law arisen within the
Fourth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court, urged the intervention of the Joint Criminal Division in order to clarify the meaning
and the range of application of this law and aimed at providing the
lower courts, the Italian society, and the whole public of stakeholders with an authentic interpretation of the 2017 Law (namely of the
art. 590-sexies C.p. as introduced by art. 6 of the 2017 Law).
In the Mariotti holding, 88 the Joint Criminal Division of the Supreme Court offered a third and different interpretation of the provisions. In the opinion of the Court: (i) the Tarabori Court upholds
an interpretatio abrogans of the 2017 Law clashing with the clear
intent of the law and with the previous judicial achievements; (ii)
the Cavazza Court grants a too broad range of application to the
waiver of liability system set forth by the 2017 Law, therefore raising constitutional issues of the law in light of the principles of equality among professionals (art. 3) and protection of the patient’s health

87. See Mariotti supra, note 52.
88. Id.
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(art. 32). The Joint Division in the Mariotti ruling affirms that the
release of the healthcare professional from liability occurs when the
harmful event is caused by the slight unskillfulness of the professional during the execution of the adequate accredited guidelines. 89
On the contrary, gross unskillfulness will not discharge from liability, in order to avoid any discrimination with the liability regime of
other professionals and to avoid any charge of unconstitutionality of
the 2017 Law. 90 The milestone of the present ruling is, therefore, the
concept of “slight unskillfulness.” 91 However, it is noteworthy that
the 2017 Law does not mention at all the term slight and does not
make any references to the degree of the unskilled behavior.
Pursuant to the Court, the degree of fault in the form of the unskillfulness is justified in light of three main reasons. First, because
of art. 2236 C.c. that specifically distinguishes between slight and

89. In the opinion of the Court, CPGs are not a shield against any kind of
liability, since their value and legal effects depend upon their proved suitability to
the peculiar circumstances of the specific case. Pursuant to the Court, then, such
freedom of assessment granted to the healthcare provider, is aimed at preserving
the professional’s autonomy, thus avoiding any “bureaucratic flattering out.”
Therefore, the formalization of the leges artis would amount to a cultural change
occurred in a new socio-professional context where the complex of expertise and
know-how of the individual becomes a shared asset of the whole scientific community. See Mariotti, supra note 52, § 3.
90. The principle expressed by the Mariotti Court is:
The healthcare provider is liable on the basis of fault for the manslaughter or personal injuries deriving from the performance of a medical-surgical activity:
a) if the event occurred as a consequence of negligence (even ‘slight’)
due to carelessness or imprudence;
b) if the event occurred as a consequence of negligence (even ‘slight’)
due to the unskillful behavior when the specific case is not governed by
the recommendations of the CPGs or of the good clinical practices;
c) if the event occurred as a consequence of negligence (even ‘slight’)
due to the unskillful behavior in the selection and choice of CPGs or
good clinical practices which are not adequate to the peculiar circumstances of the case;
d) if the event occurred as a consequence of gross negligence due to the
unskillful behavior in implementing the recommendations of adequate
CPGs or good clinical practices, taking into account both the level of risk
to manage and the specific technical difficulties of the medical act.
See Mariotti, supra note 52, § 11.
91. Id. §§ 9, 10, 10.3 & 11.
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gross negligence and that, although not directly applicable to criminal liability, yet underlies a general principle operating in the criminal area as well, as held by the Italian Constitutional Court. 92 Second, because of art. 3 of the Balduzzi Law that explicitly defined a
spectrum of criminal fault. 93 Third, because the preliminary drafts
of the 2017 Law used to specifically distinguish between slight and
gross unskillfulness. Therefore, the lack of the distinction in the official draft of the 2017 Law ought to be ascribed to an unintentional
omission of the lawmaker. 94
The second and the third reasons have been criticized because
art. 3 of the Balduzzi Law has been expressly abrogated by art. 6 of
the 2017 Law. Consequently, it seems difficult to argue that the criteria of art. 3 of the Balduzzi Law should still influence a regime
that has clearly superseded this provision. 95 These arguments have
also been criticized because it is difficult to argue that the text of the
2017 Law, currently in force, did not intend to exclude the degree of
fault although such distinction lacks in its binding and official version. 96
From a practical point of view, a further criticism to this interpretation is the widely acknowledged difficulty in distinguishing between carelessness, negligence, and unskillfulness. Consequently,
these uncertainties might foster charges grounded on carelessness
and negligence, thus bypassing the application of art. 590-sexies
C.c. and its exegetical concerns: this would lead to an “escape” in
the concepts of carelessness and negligence. 97
92. Id. §§ 9.2 & 10.1.
93. Id. §§ 8.2, 9.2 & 10.2.
94. Id. § 10.3.
95. See, e.g., Rocco Blaiotta, Niente resurrezioni, per favore. A proposito di
S.U. Mariotti in tema di responsabilità medica, DIR. PEN. CONT. May 28, 2018,
available at https://perma.cc/36LB-NKH5; Paolo Piras, Un distillato di
nomofilachia: l’imperizia lieve intrinseca quale causa di non punibilità del
medico, DIR. PEN. CONT. April, 20 2018, available at https://perma.cc
/WUD7-6QU5 [hereinafter Piras, Un distillato di nomofilachia].
96. See Piras, Un distillato di nomofilachia, supra note 95.
97. Cristiano Cupelli, La legge Gelli-Bianco e il primo vaglio della
Cassazione: linee guida sì, ma con giudizio, 6 DIR. PEN. CONT. 280, 284 (2017).
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Consequently, rather than referring the issue to the Constitutional Court, as requested by the Attorney General in his conclusive
remarks as well as by many commentators, the Joint Criminal Division of the Supreme Court rewrote the text of the law by adding the
term “slight.” According to some commentators, the text of the 2017
Law was rewritten in malam partem because the interpretation rules
that the gross unskillfulness is out of the range of application of art.
590-sexies, para. 2 C.p., thus enlarging cases of liability. 98
In addition, the interpretation provided by the Mariotti holding
does not eliminate the logical incompatibility, highlighted by the
Tarabori Court, between compliance with the accredited guidelines
and unskillful behavior. Consequently, as well summarized by a
commentator, “unskillfulness in executivis:
− pursuant to the Tarabori Court, non excusat: interpretatio abrogans;
− pursuant to the Cavazza Court, semper excusat: interpretatio latissima;
− pursuant to the Mariotti Court, excusat si levis: interpretatio stricta.” 99
Furthermore, according to the Mariotti holding, which upholds
the Tarabori’s remarks regarding this issue, the Balduzzi Law is
more favorable than the 2017 Law. Thus, the Balduzzi Law shall be
applied in cases involving matters of inter-temporary law. 100 Should
the Mariotti ruling be the final word regarding the 2017 Law, the
Italian lawmaker would have missed the opportunity to reduce the
area of criminal liability of the healthcare provider and decrease the
practice of defensive medicine. 101
98. Piras, supra note 95, at 10.
99. Id. at 4.
100. See Mariotti, supra note 52, § 12.
101. For further comments to the Mariotti ruling, see, e.g., Gian Marco Caletti
& Matteo Leonida Mattheudakis, La fisionomia dell’art. 590-sexies C.p. dopo le
Sezioni Unite tra nuovi spazi di graduazione dell’imperizia e “antiche” incertezze,
4 DIR. PEN. CONT. 25 (2018); Roberto Bartoli, Riforma Gelli-Bianco e Sezioni
Unite non placano il tormento: una proposta per limitare la colpa medica, 5 DIR.
PEN. CONT. 233 (2018); Bartolomeo Romano, La responsabilità penale
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It has been noted 102 that, following the Mariotti holding, the
Fourth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court might either decide
to submit again the issue at stake at the Joint Division pursuant to
art. 618 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure or to refer the
issue of the unconstitutionality of the art. 590-sexies C.p. to the Constitutional Court. Alternatively, Italian judges might decide to adhere to the Mariotti’s perspective, thus enhancing the role of art.
2236 C.c. as an expression of a general principle operating even
within the criminal matter. 103
In a subsequent case, 104 the Fourth Criminal Division seems to
have followed the third option. The case involved a neurologist
charged with the death of a patient: a young woman died due to a
syncope provoked by a severe arrhythmogenic heart disease. The
neurologist was held liable for using the Tilt test in lieu of a 12-lead
electrocardiogram (ECG). The latter exam would have allowed the
doctor to properly identify the disease suffered by the patient,
whereas the former was not adequate for this purpose. The absence
of a prompt diagnosis prevented the appropriate treatment.
The case provides the Fourth Division with the opportunity to
recap the achievements about medical malpractice in light of the
2017 Law and of the Joint Division’s judgment. First, the therapeutic relationship between the physician and the patient implies the
duty for the former to protect the life and the health of the latter.
Second, ongoing medical science developments decrease the room
for the individual dimension of the medical practice in favor of the
standardized, multitasking, and multidisciplinary one. However,

dell’esercente la professione sanitaria tra antichi dubbi e nuovi problemi, DIR.
Nov. 16, 2018, available at https://perma.cc/ZRW4-ZMR8.
102. Piras, supra note 95, at 11.
103. See, e.g., Carlo Brusco, Responsabilità medica penale: le Sezioni Unite
applicano le regole sulla responsabilità civile del prestatore d’opera, 5 DIR. PEN.
PROC. 646 (2018).
104. Cass., sez. IV penale, Jan. 12-Apr. 5, 2018, n. 15718 [hereinafter Tessitore].
PEN. CONT.
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this assumption must be adapted to the principle of personal criminal
liability. 105
Finally, the Court focuses on the role of clinical guidelines and
their suitability to act as legal standard for the assessment of professional liability. In particular, moving from the previous holdings, the
Court bestows such guidelines, and their proper selection and application by the healthcare provider, with a determinant role, although
excluding their binding nature as a legal standard. 106 However, the
element worth mentioning is the fact that the neurologist was held
liable not on the ground of his unskillful behavior, but rather on the
charge of negligence. Accordingly, the potential application of art.
590-sexies C.p. has been ab origine excluded since unskillfulness
was not involved.
In light of this approach, the holding has been subject to critical
remarks, first, because of the difficulty in distinguishing between
“unskillful behavior” and “negligence” (and the fact that in this case
the two concepts tended to overlap) and, second, because the risk of
the (alleged) escape in the two different types of fault. 107
V. THE ISSUE OF INFORMED CONSENT
Although aimed at addressing from a broad perspective the patient-provider relationship as well as the topic of the professional’s
liability, the 2017 Law does not specifically deal with the issue of

105. Id. §§ 4.1-7.
106. Id. §§ 4.2-4.3-6. See also Lucia Risicato, Il nuovo statuto penale della
colpa medica: un discutibile progresso nella valutazione della responsabilità del
personale sanitario, LEGISLAZ. PEN. June 5, 2017, 1, 9 (expressing three critical
remarks about the new legislative focus on accredited CPGs: first, because of the
risks of a “medicine of State”; second, because of the inner limits of CPGs on one
side and the peculiarities of the medical profession on the other; third, because the
primary aim of the 2017 Law is the implementation of risk-management systems
in order to decrease the expenditure of public resources: consequently, the relevant CPGs for the purposes of the 2017 Law are not those exclusively aimed at
the patient’s benefit, but those combining elements of cost-reduction too).
107. See Laura Anna Terrizzi, Linee guida e saperi scientifici “interferenti”:
la Cassazione continua a non applicare la legge Gelli-Bianco, 7 DIR. PEN. CONT.
93 (2018).
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informed consent. 108 However, both topics are strictly intertwined
since the lack of adequate and complete information for the patient
may give rise to a form of healthcare professional liability.
This gap has been filled by a subsequent legal provision, Law
219/2017. Its first article is indeed headed with “Informed Consent.” 109 This provision expresses the aim of the law, which is to
recognize and protect fundamental rights—in compliance with both
the Italian Constitution (in particular, arts. 2, 13, 32) and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (arts. 1, 2, 3)—such as
the right to life, health, dignity, and the right of self-determination,
in particular mandating that no healthcare treatment should be carried out without the free and informed consent of the involved person.
Before the enactment of this statutory recognition, the right to
informed consent lacked a specific legal framework, but Italian
judges used to ground it on the above-mentioned constitutional provisions. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court had highlighted the
function of informed consent as a synthesis of both the right to selfdetermination and the constitutional right to health, since both imply
the right to complete and adequate information. 110
The task to outline the content and boundaries of this right has
therefore been assigned to the Italian judges, who have developed a
remarkable case law. Their role is still important since the recent law
does not specifically address compensation of harm and does not
clarify other related issues. A recent Italian Supreme Court ruling, 111
108. A point of convergence between the 2017 Law and the topic of informed
consent, has been identified in the duty of the physician, willing to adopt a different approach to treat the patient than that recommended by the CPGs, to specifically reporting the reasons of her choice. Such decision, has been noted, shall be
explained to (and agreed upon with) the patient, both in order for the consent of
the latter being really effective and, at the same time, for ex ante, exculpatory
purposes, having in mind the potential adverse effect of such decision in a judicial
context. See Granelli, supra note 5, at nn. 54-56.
109. Legge Dec. 22, 2017, n. 219, in force since Jan. 31, 2018.
110. Corte Cost., sentenza Nov. 18, 2008, n. 438, available at https://perma
.cc/XN4A-WB2Z.
111. Cass., sez. III Civile, Dec. 22, 2017, n. 7248 [hereinafter Cass. n. 7248].
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issued the day of publication of the Law 219/2017, is worth mentioning. The Court expressly adhered to the settled judicial orientation according to which the absence of the informed consent of the
patient has autonomous dignity for purposes of damage-compensation. Consequently, the breach by the physician of the duty to secure
the informed consent of the patient might cause different kinds of
damage. Firstly, a damage to the patient’s health whenever she is
able to demonstrate that had she been duly informed, she would have
never undergone the surgery, thus avoiding its harmful consequences. Secondly, damage for breach of the right to self-determination, which occurs when, due to the lack of information, the patient suffers a pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage (in this case provided that the harm is substantially serious 112).
Indeed, in the opinion of the Court, thanks to adequate and complete information, the patient has:
− the right to choose among different options of medical
treatment;
− the power to require further and different medical
opinions;
− the power to choose a different institution and/or specialist;
− the right to refuse the surgery or the therapy and/or the
right to consciously interrupt it;
− the power to consciously prepare herself to the negative consequences of the surgeon wherever they result
particularly burdensome and painful, even because
completely unexpected for the patient due to the lack
of relevant information. 113
The scenery of the harmful events is thus quite articulated. In
particular, there might be:
(1) absent or unsatisfactory information about a surgery that has

112. Id. § 3. Ex plurimis Cass., sez. III Civile, July 5, 2017, n. 16503; Cass.,
sez. III Civile, Oct. 13, 2017, n. 24074; Cass., sez. III Civile, Nov. 27, 2015, n.
24220; and Cass., sez. III Civile, Feb. 13, 2015, n. 2854.
113. Cass. n. 7248, supra note 111, § 3. The same reasoning has been adopted
by the Supreme Court in a subsequent decision, Cass., sez. III Civile, ordinanza
Dec. 4, 2018, n. 31234.
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caused damage to the health of the patient due to the fault of the
physician in cases where the patient would have anyway undergone
the surgery: in these circumstances, the compensation will cover
only the damage to the health (pursuant to Supreme Court
901/2018);
(2) absent or unsatisfactory information about a surgery that has
caused damage to the health of the patient due to the fault of the
physician in a situation where, if duly informed, the patient would
have never undergone the surgery: in this case, the damage to be
compensated will be the damage to the health of the patient as well
as that due to the breach of the patient’s self-determination right;
(3) lack of information about a surgery that has caused damage to
the health of the patient not due to the fault of the physician, in cases
where the patient would have anyway undergone the surgery: in this
situation, the damage will cover the infringement to the patient’s
right to self-determination, while the harm to the patient’s health
shall be assessed on a case by case basis; and
(4) lack of information about a surgery duly performed and not causing any damages to the patient’s health: in this scenario, the infringement of the patient’s right to self-determination shall be compensated only if the patient has suffered the unexpected consequences
resulting from the surgery without the necessary consciousness and
being totally unprepared to them.
For compensation of the damage to the right of self-determination, the damage should meet or exceed the legal threshold of seriousness of the harm, as set forth by Supreme Court: Civil Joint Division no. 26972/2008 and 26975/2008. 114 Again, the ongoing dialogue between the legislative, judicial, doctrinal formants has made
it possible to ensure an appropriate legal framework to efficiently
protect selected and deserving interest.

114. These two cases are commonly known as “S. Martin’s twin-rulings” and
are dealing with the requirements and the criteria to compensate the non-pecuniary damage.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The topic of medical malpractice (rectius, healthcare liability) is
very complex and interesting, and it is a field where the “law in action” plays a fundamental role, even in light of the manifold, heterogeneous, and sometimes conflicting interests of different stakeholders. Within the Italian legal system, the relevant legal framework has been developed thanks to a constant and articulated dialogue among different formants. In a first period, such dialogue occurred in particular between the Italian Judges and the opinion of
jurists. Recently, the statutory formant has also been directly and
actively involved.
The analysis of the last six years reveals that this phenomenon
is still a work in progress that needs to be adjusted and better tailored
to the field. However, due to the peculiarities of medicine and
healthcare protection and their transnational nature, the dialogue
should occur not only among formants of the same legal system, but
also looking at the experiences of other legal systems, and applying
a critical comparative approach. Referring to the U.S. scenario, it
proves evident that many issues raised by the Italian legislative
choices have been analyzed there and investigated for some time,
both in their positive and negative aspects. In this regard, the paradigmatic example can be found in the debate surrounding the role
and the function of CPGs, which are the undeniable protagonists of
the attempt to cope with the new concept of medicine that seeks
more standardization and links to scientific evidence (although there
is no unanimous consensus at all about medicine being a science).
In addition, the U.S. debate has highlighted the need to cope with
the necessity to decrease healthcare costs, to enhance patients benefit, and with the struggle to find suitable legal rules.
However, a peculiar feature of the Italian legal system within
this area of law is that the judicial formant has constantly been very
active in developing and settling the legal framework, and in paying
specific attention to claim its autonomy in interpreting and applying
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the relevant norms, even when not properly in compliance with (or
clearly departing from) the legislative choices.
With specific reference to the topic of CPGs, the occurrence of
clear “solos” by the Italian judges in such musical score is undeniable. On the opposite side of the great theoretical emphasis placed by
the 2017 Law on the exculpatory role of CPGs, there is indeed the
systematic and constant distinction affirmed by the Italian judges
about the unsuitability of CPGs to act as a shield or as an automatic
waiver of liability on behalf of healthcare providers. 115
More generally, while the measures introduced by the 2017 Law
seem to have achieved positive results regarding civil litigation, the
same cannot be said about criminal litigation. This might provoke
adverse effects in light of the high level of uncertainty and unpredictability of medical malpractice claims, 116 thus discouraging the

115. See Mariotti, supra note 52, § 3: “guidelines are an abridgement of the
scientific, technological and methodological achievements concerning the specific operative fields, qualified in such way after an accurate selection and installation of different contributions, without any presumption of immobilism and
lacking any suitability to stand as binding rules.” About the role of CPGs, see also
the ruling of the Cass., sez. III Civile, ordinanza Nov. 30, 2018, n. 30998, affirming the absence of liability of both the physicians and the hospital for having administered to a patient with a hemorrhagic risk a lower dose (i.e., the half) of
heparin than the recommended one, in order to balance such risk with that of venous thrombosis. The departure from the recommendations set by the relevant
CPGs is justified, in the opinion of the Court, by the need to reach a compromise
between the two concurring risks. With specific regard to CPGs the court holds:
CPGs (i.e., the leges artis sufficiently shared at least by a distinguished
part of the scientific community in a given time) are not an insurmountable Procrustes’ bed . . . . They are only a parameter to assess the physician’s behavior: generally, a behavior in compliance with the CPGs will
be diligent, whilst a behavior not in compliance with the CPGs will be
negligent or imprudent. However, this does not mean that a behavior not
in compliance with the CPGs might not be deemed diligent if the specific
circumstances of the case dictate not to abide by such CPGs ( for example, when the CPGs require a particular medicine but the patient is allergic and thus the physician does not prescribe it); for the same reason even
a behavior in compliance with the CPGs might be deemed negligent on
the basis of the circumstances of the case (for example, when the CPGs
recommend a surgery and the physician abides by them although the patient’s previous conditions do not allow her to tolerate a total anesthesia).
116. See, e.g., D’Alessandro, supra note 50, at 277; Caputo, supra note 47, at
295; Alessandro De Santis, La colpa medica alla luce della legge Gelli-Bianco,
7-8 STUD. IUR. 790, 796-798 (2017); (all arguing about the risks of liability of the
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healthcare providers and negatively affecting the patients’ benefit.
This uncertainty is further enhanced by the judicial clash about the
proper interpretation of the 2017 Law, which the intervention of the
Criminal Joint Division of the Supreme Court did not unravel. In
this scenario the doctrinal formant seems called to find a balance
between the (sometimes problematic) text of the law and the judicial
interpretation. The conversation has just begun.

Italian State for breach of art. 7 of the ECHR due to a legislative framework not
suitable to guarantee the certain and predictable outcome of criminal trials).
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One does not typically expect civil code interferences in public
affairs. However, the case of McGraw v. City of New Orleans 1 illustrates how the classification of property and the civilian doctrine of
negotiorum gestio interact with local governance.
I. BACKGROUND
In the United States, monuments, statues, and other markers that
depict controversial Confederate figures are being removed from
public areas. 2 In this case, Mitchell Landrieu, the Mayor of New
Orleans, signed a city ordinance, enacted on December 18, 2015,
that provided for the removal of three monuments that memorialized

* J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May 2020) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. The author would like to give special thanks to Professor
Olivier Moréteau for his guidance throughout the writing of this case note.
1. McGraw v. City of New Orleans, 16-446 (La. App. 4 Cir. 03/29/17); 215
So. 3d 319.
2. Jess Bidgood et al., Confederate Monuments Are Coming Down Across
the United States. Here’s a List, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc
/3YPA-TAED.
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former leaders of the Confederate States of America. 3 Landrieu,
whose father was the mayor of New Orleans during desegregation
in the 1970s, faced tremendous pushback. He ultimately went
through with his plan to remove the monuments because, as he put
it, “[a] house divided against itself cannot stand, but to heal our divisions we must be able hear one another, see one another, understand one another and feel one another.” 4 Since the conclusion of
the lawsuit, all three monuments were removed as of May 20, 2017. 5
Pierre McGraw was the president of a group who opposed removal of these Confederate monuments. Mr. McGraw had previously invested his own time and money into the maintenance and
upkeep of the monuments.
The removal by the Mayor and the city council was authorized
by article VII, Chapter 146 of the city’s codified ordinance. The ordinance allows for removal of public monuments, plaques, or other
works of art when certain requirements are met. First, the structure
must constitute a nuisance such that it praises ideologies in conflict
with the equal protection of citizens. Second, the site of the structure
must have been, or may become, an area of violent demonstration.
Finally, the structure’s maintenance or security costs must be
weighed against any historic or architectural significance it might
have. If all requirements are met, the monument will be removed
from public and placed in an indoor facility such as a museum,
stored, or otherwise disposed. 6
The first monument at issue enshrined P.G.T. Beauregard, a general in the Confederate army who was born on the outskirts of New
Orleans. Beauregard was depicted wearing his Confederate uniform
atop a horse, and the monument was located in an entrance to a city
3. The city ordinance sought to remove four monuments, however only
three of the four are the subject of this suit.
4. MITCH LANDRIEU, IN THE SHADOW OF STATUES: A WHITE SOUTHERNER
CONFRONTS HISTORY 5-7 (Penguin 2018).
5. Tegan Wendland, With Lee Statue’s Removal, Another Battle Of New Orleans Comes To A Close, NPR (May 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/H6WP-MFNN.
6. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE ORDINANCES § 146-611 (1956) [hereinafter
CODE ORDINANCES], https://perma.cc/8PQR-QAHM.
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park. The monument was paid for with private funds and was publicly dedicated in 1915. Since its dedication, it had been maintained
through both public and private funds.
The second monument honored Jefferson Davis, the only president of the Confederate States of America. During the construction
process, the street the monument was to be placed on was renamed
Jefferson Davis Parkway. The monument was built by a private association and was publicly dedicated in 1911.
The third monument venerated Robert E. Lee, the commander
of the Confederate army. This monument depicted Lee in his Confederate uniform atop a monolith in middle of a public square. The
monument was authorized by the city in 1877, and although built by
a private organization, it was donated to the city and publicly dedicated in 1884. Since that time, both public and private funds maintained the monument.
Since 1989, Mr. McGraw has invested his time, money, and labor into the monuments. He did so after learning that the city did not
provide funding for their maintenance. In an affidavit, he stated that
he devoted hundreds of hours and thousands of dollars to the monuments’ upkeep. Further, he averred that he did this out of a sense
of civic duty and for their historical preservation.
Shortly after the passage of the ordinance, various groups
brought a suit in federal district court in an attempt to halt the removal of the Confederate statutes. 7 The day after a federal district
judge denied the groups’ injunctive relief claim, Mr. McGraw
brought this suit for injunctive relief in the Civil District Court for
the Parish of Orleans. At the hearing for preliminary injunction, the
district judge denied Mr. McGraw’s request because the city followed the strict mandates of their own ordinance and Mr. McGraw
could not show that he had any property rights vested in the monuments. It is from this judgment that Mr. McGraw sought appeal. He

7. Monumental Task Committee, Inc. v. Foxx, 16-12495 (E.D. La. 2016);
157 F. Supp. 3d 573.
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argued that he had acquired vested property rights in the monuments
by operation of negotiorum gestio because he invested his time and
money into maintenance of the monuments, and thus, without injunctive relief halting the removal of the monument, he would suffer
irreparable harm.
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, in avoiding the politics of
the situation, limited its ruling to “whether the district judge erred in
denying Mr. McGraw’s request for preliminary injunction.” 8 The
court addressed Mr. McGraw’s claims of negotiorum gestio, his
constitutional vested rights claim, 9 and whether the record established that the monuments were public things. In sum, the Fourth
Circuit found “regardless of the theory advanced by Mr. McGraw,
he has failed to establish that he acquired any type of vested property
right in the monuments at suit.” 10 Therefore, he could not prove that
he would suffer any irreparable harm through their removal, and he
was not entitled to preliminary injunction.
The court correctly noted that the rules governing the doctrine
of negotiorum gestio are found in Title V, Book III of the Civil
Code. Negotiorum gestio or management of affairs is “when a person, the manager, acts without authority to protect the interests of
another, the owner, in the reasonable belief that the owner would
approve of the action if made aware of the circumstances.” 11 Further, the court noted that the doctrine applies only when the manager
acts for the benefit of the owner. In contrast, ownership in the Civil
Code is defined as “the right that confers on a person direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing.” 12 After reviewing these

8.
9.
further.
10.
11.
12.

McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 323.
Because this claim is not rooted in civilian theory, it will not be discussed
McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 332.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2292 (2018).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 477 (2018).
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articles, the court concluded “the doctrine of negotiorum gestio confers no ownership rights upon the manager . . . . At most, the manager who acts as a prudent administrator acquires a right of reimbursement against the owner.” 13
Although Mr. McGraw did not argue the issue, the court concluded that the monuments were public things held by the city, a
political subdivision, in its public capacity. The court noted that
Civil Code article 448 divides things into the categories of common,
public, and private. Further, the court restated article 450 paragraph
1 that “[p]ublic things are owned by the state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as public persons” and paragraph 3 of the
same article that “[p]ublic things that may belong to political subdivisions of the state are such as streets and public squares.” Using
these articles, the court concluded that “the monuments at issue are
public things given that the undisputed evidence clearly establishes
that they were erected on public property, owned by the city in its
public capacity, and subsequently dedicated to public use.” 14 As
such, the monuments were “inalienable, imprescriptible and exempt
from seizure.” 15
III. COMMENTARY
This commentary will first discuss the codification, application,
and incompatibility with ownership of the civilian doctrine of negotiorum gestio. Next, a more thorough analysis of the court’s conclusion that the monuments were obviously public things is warranted.
The court did not address that although a public thing is held in public capacity, it is possible to change from the public to the private
domain.

13. McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 330.
14. Id. at 332.
15. Id.
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A. Negotiorum Gestio
The civilian doctrine of negotiorum gestio is codified in Title V,
Book III of the Civil Code. As article 2292 indicates, negotiorum
gestio requires a manager, or a person who “acts without authority
to protect the interest of another,” and an owner, or a person whose
affairs are being managed. Further, article 2292 requires the manager to have “the reasonable belief that the owner would approve of
the action if made aware of the circumstances.” 16 In addition, article
2294 requires the manager “give notice to the owner” and “wait for
directions of the owner, unless there is immediate danger.”
The doctrine of negotiorum gestio has its roots in early Roman
Law. 17 Originally, an intervenor, or gestor, would not be able to recover reimbursement when they intervened to help another, and
therefore, an individual would not feel compelled to be altruistic to
their neighbor. 18 Thereafter, the doctrine of negotiorum gestio was
born through an action called actio negotiorum gestorum contraria,
and on account of this action, a voluntary intervenor could receive
reimbursement through a court if they voluntarily, altruistically
managed the affairs of another. 19 The Louisiana Civil Code adopted
the doctrine based on “[a]ltruism, the duty or need to help and assist
others.” 20
The Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that negotiorum gestio
does not impart the manager with any ownership rights. Further, it
is does not seem likely that Mr. McGraw established that he managed the affairs of the city as required by the Civil Code.
At the outset, the length of time Mr. McGraw claims to manage
the affair seems incompatible with the reason for the provision. Mr.
McGraw maintained the monuments from 1989 until the beginning
16. Id. at 330.
17. ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN QUASICONTRACTS 58 (Butterworth Legal Publ’g 1991).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 58-59.
20. Id. at 68.
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of suit at issue. 21 This appears to be contrary to the notice to owner
requirement in article 2294. Further, the notice requirement implores the manager to wait for direction from the owner, unless there
is a case of immediate danger. The facts of this case do not clarify if
notice was adequately given, and it seems illogical that an event of
immediate danger would span a period of more than twenty-five
years.
Unless an emergency occurred that required citizen intervention,
the general maintenance and upkeep of public monuments also appears contrary to the spirit of negotiorum gestio. Although the Civil
Code does not give an exhaustive list of the types of affairs that may
be managed, revision comment (b) to article 2292 suggests that the
“affair managed may be a material act, such as the protection of
property from fire or flood, or the execution of a juridical act, such
as the sale of perishable things.” These examples reflect a dire situation in which the affair must be managed in order to save it. Although maintenance is a material act, it is not of the same character
as protection from fire or flood.
Finally, and most glaringly, to be reimbursed under negotiorum
gestio, the manager cannot act with his own interest in mind. 22 Here,
Mr. McGraw testified that “[h]is actions were motivated out of a
sense of civic concern, historical preservation, and filial duty, given
that several of his ancestors served under both Generals Beauregard
and Lee.” 23 While civic concern may fit into the city’s interest, it
appears far more likely that Mr. McGraw acted because of his ancestors’ service. Thus, Mr. McGraw would not have been acting for
the benefit of the city’s interest but, instead, for his own benefit as
illustrated by the affidavit he submitted to the court. 24
It is not clear that Mr. McGraw would have been able to benefit
from reimbursement if he tried to recover under negotiorum gestio.
21. McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 325-26.
22. See Kirkpatrick v. Young, 83-CC-2627 (La. 09/10/1984); 456 So. 2d 622;
see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2292 (2018), comment (d).
23. McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 326.
24. Id. at 325-26.
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To be doubly sure, the Fourth Circuit also concluded that the point
was moot because the monument was a public thing held in public
capacity. However, this conclusion is not as easily reached as their
findings related to negotiorum gestio.
B. Classification of Property
The Louisiana Civil Code separates property, which is not common into that which is public and that which is private. However,
the 1978 revision of the Civil Code dispensed with the classification
of property into separate domains, and instead, classifies noncommon property as either public things or private things. 25 When property is a public thing, the classification can be further subdivided
into things that are public through constitutional or legislative provisions or things that are public because they are owned by the state
and put to a public purpose. 26 Further, the state or its political subdivisions may own private things in their capacity as private persons. 27 Therefore, the classification of property owned by the state
depends on the use and pertinent provisions of law because the state
may hold property in either its public or private capacity.
The Fourth Circuit relied on jurisprudence that had previously
interpreted article 450 to include public parks as a thing that the city
owned in its public capacity. 28 With respect, the court could have
conducted a more thorough examination of the city’s capacity in
which it held the monuments. Article 450 paragraph 3 states the following: “[p]ublic things that may belong to political subdivisions of
the state are such as streets and public squares” (emphasis added).
The use of the word may indicates that the listed items are not de-

25.
26.
27.
28.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 448 (2018).
Id. at art. 450 (2018), comment (c).
Id. at art. 453 (2018).
McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 331-32.
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terminate of public capacity. Therefore, if a political subdivision terminates public use, the street or public square would be a thing
owned by the political subdivision in its private capacity. 29
The Second Circuit has previously held that “[w]hen the political subdivision formally determines that the thing dedicated to public use is no longer needed by the public, the thing ceases to be public and becomes a private thing of the political subdivision.” 30 This
holding suggests that the time the political subdivision “formally determines” that a thing is no longer needed for public use is when the
thing ceases to be public. This proposition, however, is only persuasive and has no support in the text of the Civil Code. Here, the New
Orleans City Council voted to remove the monuments from public
display. 31 Given that the city council followed the procedures set in
place for removal, it may seem to appear that they “formally determined” that the monuments were no longer needed by the public.
Upon close inspection of the removal ordinance, subsection (d)
provides that the removed monument “may be displayed indoors at
an appropriate facility, such as a museum or stored, donated . . . or
otherwise disposed.” 32 If displayed in a public museum, the monument would remain public. 33
The monuments at issue were clearly public things held in public
capacity for the years they stood undisturbed in the city’s parks.
However, once the city enacted the removal ordinance, it began a
process to remove the monuments from the public, and thus, a process that might change the status of the monuments from public to
29. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE—
PROPERTY § 3:8 (5th ed., West 2015).
30. Walker v. Coleman, 20309-CA (La. Ct. App. 2 Cir. 2/22/1989); 540 So.
2d 983, 985-86.
31. McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 323-24.
32. See CODE ORDINANCES, supra note 6.
33. There is room for debate, at least in Louisiana, if the museum charges an
entrance fee. In Landry v. Council of East Baton Rouge Parish (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 4/14/1969); 220 So. 2d 795, 801, the First Circuit held that public property is
open to all people “indiscriminately and without charge and which serve no quasicommercial or proprietary purpose.” France has many public museums charging
an entrance fee but nobody would dispute that the exhibits are public things.
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private. The text of the article is not clear, if a public thing becomes
private when the formal determination is made or when the thing is,
in fact, removed from the public space. Only persuasive authority
exists on the topic, and the court did not entertain the possibility that
the monument could have become a private thing when the city
passed the ordinance. Therefore, it is not clear if the monuments
were correctly determined to be public things held in public capacity, or if the monuments cease to be public things as soon as a legal
act is taken, possibly to the contrary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the world continues to evolve, new legal issues expand along
with it. In this technology-centered world, courts are faced with new
challenges and must be ready to adapt and apply new concepts. One
of these new concepts is document metadata, the hidden part of electronic documents that do not appear when in print, and can be useful
when researching documents and sorting the data they contain. 1

* J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May 2019) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Assistant Dean and Director
for the Library and Information Technology Services, Todd Venie for his research
guidance and editing throughout the writing process and Assistant Dean and Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies, Olivier Moréteau for his valuable insights during the editing process.
1. For a definition of “metadata,” see infra, § IV.A.
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When documents are exchanged in the discovery phase of cases,
must they be produced in the original electronic form possibly giving access to the metadata or can they simply be in printed (or electronic) but non-searchable form? The role of document metadata
continues to present a problem for courts as they try to determine
whether metadata should be included or scrubbed from any document production. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal attempts to tackle the procedural issues metadata creates in the process
of producing documents for a discovery request. Even after The
State of Louisiana and the Vermilion Parish School Board v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Company, et al.,2 Louisianans are left
with more questions than answers.
II. BACKGROUND
In Louisiana Land & Expl. Co., the plaintiffs sued for property
damage caused by the defendants’ oil and gas exploration activities.
The trial court found Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL),
one of the defendants, liable for environmental damages, and referred the case to the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources,
Office of Conservation to develop a remediation plan for the environmental damage.
The legal issue of this case is procedural and stems from the motion for costs and attorney’s fees by the plaintiffs. In response to the
defendant’s request for discovery relating to the motion, the plaintiffs produced 153 separate spreadsheets that totaled 1,341 pages. 3
However, the defendants complained that the plaintiffs had converted the spreadsheets into non-searchable, static image portable
document formats (PDF). That is, UNOCAL argued that the plaintiffs removed or altered the metadata from their documents, thereby

2. The State of Louisiana and the Vermilion Parish School Board v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Company, 17-755 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/20/2017); 2017
WL 6503800.
3. Id. at 2.
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limiting their search capabilities and placing a burden on the defendants. Accordingly, UNOCAL filed a motion to compel the production of the spreadsheets in their original electronic form, which the
trial court denied. UNOCAL sought review of the trial court’s ruling
on this issue.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
After many well-reasoned arguments on both sides, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not err or abuse
its discretion in denying UNOCAL’s motion to compel. The appellate court reasoned that UNOCAL had not shown how or why the
information produced in a PDF format was not satisfactory or reasonably useable to its defense. 4
IV. COMMENTARY
A. The Basics of Metadata
It is important to understand the basics of the technology discussed in this case before determining how it impacts legal procedure. While not a new concept within the technology industry or
related fields, metadata has started to play a larger role in the legal
world. Metadata refers to information that is embedded in the native
format of documents that are transmitted in electronic form. 5
Metadata is used to create a document or file and will reflect any
modifications to the document. It also improves the ability to efficiently access, search and sort a large number of documents, and
provides the ability to view the underlying formula output in each
cell. If the document is printed or converted to a static image file,
the metadata is no longer accessible.

4. Id. at 10.
5. FRANK L. MARAIST, N. GREGORY SMITH, JUDGE THOMAS F. DALEY,
THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR. & CATHERINE M. MARAIST, 21 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE—LOUISIANA LAWYERING §9.4 117 (SUPP. 2018) (Thomson/West
2007).
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The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and their comments, which are in force in Louisiana, address the ethical issue of how an attorney should respond if they
were to unknowingly send or receive documents with important
metadata intact. 6 However, the issue in this case developed because
of the intentional scrubbing of metadata, and the ramifications of
that scrubbing in the context of document production for discovery
purposes.
B. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
Metadata of electronic documents becomes a potential issue for
litigation when dealing with production of discovery under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1462. Code. Civ. Pro. Art.
1462(c) reads:
A party who produces documents for inspection shall produce them as they are kept in the usual course of business or
shall organize and label them to correspond with the categories of the request. If a request does not specify the form or
forms for producing information, including electronically
stored information, a responding party shall produce the information in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably usable. When
electronically stored information is produced, the responding party shall identify the specific means for electronically
accessing the information.
This code article first requires that any documents should be produced in the same format that they are kept in the usual course of
business. As the defendants argued, this suggests that any producible Excel spreadsheets should not be converted to PDF files before
being handed over, because they are kept as Excel spreadsheets in
the usual course of the plaintiffs’ business. 7 Unfortunately, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals did not address this issue.

6. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
7. Louisiana Land & Expl. Co., 2017 WL 6503800 at *3.
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The defendants also argued for the interpretation of the second
sentence of art. 1462(c), stating that even though they did not request
a specific form of producing the information, the plaintiffs should
have produced it in the form in which it was ordinarily maintained
or a form that is “reasonably usable.” The next logical question is:
What is “reasonably usable”? The Third Circuit agreed that it would
be burdensome for the defendants to convert the produced Excel
spreadsheets back into searchable text format, but they overlooked
this fact by concluding that the defendants failed to show “how or
why the information produced in a PDF format is not satisfactory or
reasonably useable.” 8
Plaintiffs in this case argued that the PDF format is so commonly
used in civil discovery that litigation has not ensued about whether
this format complies.9 Once again, the Third Circuit did not address
this issue once they determined that the original form of the documents would contain attorney work product.
C. Attorney Work Product
Under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, attorney work
product is not discoverable. 10 Attorney work product is any part of
the writing, or electronically stored information that reflects the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories of an attorney. 11 The court did not accept the defendant’s arguments above
based on the plaintiffs’ counter-argument that the Excel spreadsheets (with metadata intact) contained attorney client work product
protected under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. Putting
aside the issue of the format of the requested documents, in this case,
the plaintiffs argued that their Excel spreadsheets contained privileged information. While this may be the case, not all of the information in the document is attorney work product, and therefore,
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 7.
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1424(A) (2007).
Id.
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some of it would be discoverable. This further shows issues with the
production of metadata; we would presumably also need a general
rule regarding how to handle issues relating to attorney work product. When dealing with physical hard copies of documents, one can
easily leave out work product out or redact it. On the other hand, the
disposal of metadata is not as easy. Perhaps the solution would be to
create a log of redacted items, much like when dealing with medical
records. Once again, the civil law, at least in Louisiana, does not
have an answer to these procedural questions and will soon need
one.
D. The Federal Common Law Solution
In this case, both plaintiffs and defendants relied on United
States federal decisions, attempting to apply common law principles
to this civil law case. The most important argument and source mentioned is the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 34 (hereinafter
“Fed. R. Civ. P. 34”), which is said to be analogous to Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure art. 1462. The defendants in our case attempted to analyze the advisory committee notes of Fed. R. Civ. P.
34 in which the committee stated the following:
But the option to produce in a reasonably useable form does
not mean that a responding party is free to convert electronically stored information from the form in which it is ordinarily maintained to a different form that makes it more difficult or burdensome for the requesting party to use the information efficiently in the litigation. If the responding party
ordinarily maintains the information it is producing in a way
that makes it searchable by electronic means, the information should not be produced in a form that removes or
significantly degrades this feature. 12

12. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 committee’s notes to 2006 amendment, subdivision (b)
(emphasis added).
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While federal court cases are persuasive in Louisiana courts,
they are not controlling. The Third Circuit seems to refuse to interpret and apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but it may still
play a role in helping to come up with a solution for Louisiana.
V. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals seems to side-step the issue
of producing electronic documents with or without metadata by stating that the defendants never fully proved their case. Perhaps if
UNOCAL had shown how, or why, the information produced in a
PDF format is not satisfactory or reasonably useable, the Court
would have ruled differently requiring the production of the Excel
Spreadsheets with metadata. On the other hand, had defendants requested the documents with the metadata intact, would it still be an
issue?
Unfortunately, the Court did not give a full application of the
Louisiana code article, interpreting it in the light of the technological
changes. The Court also had the opportunity to develop and impact
Louisiana law by interpreting and applying the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Regretfully, since the Court did not utilize these
options, the standard for producing document metadata in Louisiana
will continue to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The past is always changing and we have to change with it; to
this historical rule the legal history of Louisiana provides no exception. One important, relatively recent, development has been the
recognition of the role played in that history by the Teatro de la legislación universal de España é Indias, compiled by Antonio Xavier
Pérez y López (1736-1792), and published, with varying imprints,
in twenty-eight volumes in Madrid between 1791 and 1798. 1 And
what little we now know about use of the Teatro raises new and
intriguing questions. Though cited very rarely by Louis Moreau Lislet in compiling what is now known as the de la Vergne volume, it
is evident that he relied on it considerably more than is immediately
apparent. 2 Recognition of this encourages us to ask what other use
was made of it in the early period of U.S. government in what was
then known as the Territory of Orleans. For example, it appears to
have been drawn on by those who drafted the vetoed Act of 1806
that attempted to regulate the relevant sources of the law in the Territory. 3 Further research is needed; but the Teatro is a work that must
have held considerable potential for those in the Territory who dealt
with the law. Understanding of its significance has led to this publication of a translation of its Preliminary Discourse. To explain this
1. ANTONIO XAVIER PÉREZ Y LÓPEZ, TEATRO DE LA LEGISLACIÓN
UNIVERSAL DE ESPAÑA É INDIAS, POR ORDEN CRONOLÓGICO DE SUS CUERPOS, Y
DECISIONES NO RECOPILADAS: Y ALFABÉTICO DE SUS TÍTULOS Y PRINCIPALES
MATERIAS (imprint varies 1791-98) [hereinafter PÉREZ, TEATRO].
2. John W. Cairns, The de la Vergne Volume and the Digest of 1808, 24
TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. F. 31, 52-65, 73-74 (2009) [hereinafter Cairns, De la Vergne
Volume]; what is now known as the de la Vergne Volume or Manuscript is a
printed, interleaved copy of the DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, WITH ALTERATIONS AND AMENDMENTS ADAPTED TO
ITS PRESENT SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (Authority, Bradford and Anderson 1808)
[hereinafter DE LA VERGNE VOLUME]. It contains extensive manuscript annotations, and is described in Cairns, De la Vergne Volume, supra at 38-49. It was
reproduced by photolithography in 1967, and reprinted by Claitor’s Publishing
Division, Baton Rouge, in 1971. The original has very recently been donated to
the Law Library of Tulane University.
3. John W. Cairns, Spanish Law, The Teatro de la legislación de España e
Indias, and the Background to the Drafting of the Digest of Orleans of 1808, 31/32
TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. F. 79, 109-12 (2017) [hereinafter Cairns, Teatro].
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we will examine, first, who was the author, next, the nature of the
work, and finally its use in early Louisiana.
II. ANTONIO XAVIER PÉREZ Y LÓPEZ
Antonio Xavier Pérez y López is a minor figure of the Spanish
Enlightenment. He was born in Seville to parents who originated in
Las Palmas on Gran Canaria. He had a career typical of the letrado
class—that is to say, that of university-educated lawyers—in Bourbon, Spain. After legal studies at the University of Seville, gaining
the degrees of bachelor and licentiate in 1760 and that of doctor in
canon laws in 1761, he sought various university posts in his alma
mater, while also practising as an advocate, as a member of the Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Sevilla. In 1770, he changed tack, and
now sought from the Council of Castille—particularly from the important statesman and economic reformer Pedro Rodríguez, Count
Campomanes—the patronage necessary to rise in royal service as an
alcalde mayor (a judicial and administrative office). Between 1771
and 1773, he accordingly served as alcalde mayor of Motilla del
Palancar in the region of Cuenca in Castille. From 1773, he was
judge of a commission appointed to examine the books of one of the
major prisons of the kingdom, and to organize in Andalusia the archives of the Jesuits, who had been expelled from Spain in 1767. By
1776, he was resident in Madrid, where he was admitted to the Ilustre Colegio de Abogados. He counted among his clients the University of Seville, as well as the Ecclesiastical Chapter of Seville, the
Cathedral Church of the Canary Islands, and the Municipal Council
of Palma de Mallorca. 4

4. José María Vallejo García-Hevia, Pérez y López, Antonio Xavier. Sevilla,
20.VI.1736 – Madrid, 17.X.1792. Jurista, publicista, jurisconsulto y filósofo,
REAL ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA, DICCIONARIO BIOGRÁFICO ELECTRÓNICO,
https://perma.cc/72PS-G3LM.
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In 1781, Pérez published Discurso sobre la Honra y Deshonra
legal. 5 This reached a second edition in 1786. It was a work sympathetic to the Enlightened ideas of Count Campomanes, who sought
to develop and liberalize the Spanish economy partly through the
revival of artisanal trades. Pérez argued against the various civil disadvantages suffered by artisans. In 1783 came the Royal Cédula declaring certain trades as “honourable.” 6 In 1785, Pérez published
Principios del Orden esencial de la Naturaleza, establecidos por
fundamento de la Moral y Política, y por prueba de la Religión.
Nuevo sistema Filosófico. 7 This is not the place to analyse his philosophical and political account of the natural-law foundation of civil
law, state, and politics, described by García-Hevia as his most “personal, original and ambitious work.” 8 Suffice it to say that as an advocate of the Enlightened despotism of Charles III, he saw the necessity of royal legislation to ensure the order and good government
of the country and the happiness of the people. In other words, his
thinking led him to oppose the existence of special group privileges
and to support a centralized absolute monarchy that legislated for
the good of all. This is also a theme that runs through the Preliminary
Discourse. 9 Of course, it was a traditional, if debated, view that also
5. ANTONIO XAVIER PÉREZ Y LÓPEZ, DISCURSO SOBRE LA HONRA, Y
DESHONRA LEGAL, EN QUE SE MANIFIESTA EL VERDADERO MÉRITO DE LA
NOBLEZA DE SANGRE, Y SE PRUEBA QUE TODOS LOS OFICIOS NECESARIOS, Y UTILES
AL ESTADO SON HONRADOS POR LAS LEYES DEL REYNO, SEGUN LAS QUALES
SOLAMENTE EL DELITO PROPIO DISFAMA (2nd ed., Imprenta Real 1786).
6. REAL CEDULA DE S.M. Y SEÑORES DE CONSEJO POR LA CUAL SE DECLARA
QUE NO SOLO EL OFICIO DE CURTIDOR, SINO TAMBIEN LOS DEMAS ARTES Y OFICIOS
DE HERRERO, SASTRE, ZAPATERO, CARPINTERO ... SON HONESTOS Y HONRADOS Y
QUE EL USO DE ELLOS NO ENVILECE LA FAMILIA, ... NI LA INHABILITA PARA
OBTENER LOS EMPLEOS MUNICIPALES (Antonio Marin 1783), https://perma.cc
/Q6NA-FMG9. See, e.g., José de Jésus Olmedo Gonzales, El pensamiento ilustrado y los artesanos tapatíos, 64 CARAVELLE 77 (1995).
7. ANTONIO XAVIER PÉREZ Y LÓPEZ, PRINCIPIOS DEL ORDEN ESENCIAL DE
LA NATURALEZA, ESTABLECIDOS POR FUNDAMENTO DE LA MORAL Y POLÍTICA, Y
POR PRUEBA DE LA RELIGIÓN. NUEVO SISTEMA FILOSÓFICO (Imprenta Real 1785).
8. García-Hevia, supra note 4.
9. See ANTONIO XAVIER PÉREZ Y LÓPEZ, TEATRO DE LA LEGISLACIÓN
UNIVERSAL DE ESPAÑA E INDIAS, Preliminary Discourse, nos. 1, 8, 30, etc. (trans.
H. Barlow Holley) 11 J. CIV. L. STUD. 465 (2019) [hereinafter Preliminary Discourse].
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privileged historically the service to the Spanish monarchy of the
letrados over that of the caballeros. 10
III. TEATRO DE LA LEGISLACIÓN UNIVERSAL DE ESPAÑA É INDIAS
For one such as Pérez who privileged the place of royal legislation, and who valued a rational law, the need to present the Spanish
law in an accessible public form was of paramount importance.
There had been no official collection of the varied Spanish laws for
a considerable time, and Pérez’s work was part of a general movement at this period to make unofficial collections of the laws. 11 The
motto found on the title pages of the Teatro taken from Ovid’s Metamorphoses about Theseus rewinding Ariadne’s thread indicates
Pérez’s view of the Spanish laws as a labyrinth through which he
wished to provide a guide. Indeed, he made this explicit in the Preliminary Discourse. 12
The first two volumes appeared in 1791, and contained between
them a list of nearly four hundred subscribers, both individuals and
institutions, some of whom subscribed for more than one copy. 13
The subscriptions were solicited through a prospectus that Pérez y
López had issued. 14 But he claimed that the costs of producing the
work exceeded the income brought from the subscriptions and that
10. Luis X. Morera, An Inherent Rivalry between “Letrados” and “Caballeros?” Alonso de Cartagena, the Knightly Estate, and an Historical Problem, 16
MEDITERRANEAN STUD. 67 (2007); Ralph H. Vigil, Oidores Letrados and the
Idea of Justice, 1480-1570, 47 THE AMERICAS 39 (1990); Francisco Márques Villanueva, Letrados, consejeros, y justicias: Artículo Reseña, 53 HISPANIC REV.
201 (1985).
11. José M. Mariluz Urquijo, El “Teatro de la legislación universal de España e Indias” y otros recopilaciones indianas de character privado, 8 REVISTA
DEL INSTITUTO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO, 267 (1957); Ana María Barrero García, Los repertorios y diccionarios jurídicos desde la Edad Media hasta nuestros
días. (Notas para su estudio), 43 ANUARIO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL,
311, 333-35 (1973); Antonio Pérez Martín, La legislación del Antiguo Régimen
(1474-1808), in LEGISLACIÓN Y JURISPRUDENCIA EN LA ESPAÑA DEL ANTIGUO
RÉGIMEN 7, 66-67 (U. de Valencia 1978).
12. See Preliminary Discourse, supra note 9, at no. 61.
13. Some of the later volumes (3, 4, 5, & 7) included additional lists of subscribers, amounting to just under another 300 individuals and institutions.
14. See Preliminary Discourse, supra note 9, at no. 23.
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ill health prevented him from continuing to practice as a lawyer. Accordingly, in mid-1791 he sought from the Council of the Indies the
vacant office of a judge in the Real Audiencia of Buenos Aires, with
permission to collect the salary for two years but without taking up
the post in order to allow him to complete the Teatro. He was offered
the post, but without the requested dispensation. He declined it,
partly because he would lack the resources in Buenos Aires to complete the work, and sought another position. However, in July 1792,
with only three volumes published, he was admitted to a hospital in
Madrid, where he died in October. He had recently married a widowed relative, who sought the licence to print subsequent volumes,
four to nine, over 1793-1794. In 1795, along with her son by her
earlier marriage, Juan José Tamariz y Aguayo, she sold the rights to
print the remaining volumes of the Teatro to José Villacorta García.
The work was presumably planned out and already advanced by the
time of his death. Pérez’s stepson claimed to have helped his stepfather in the work of compilation and also that he had continued to
assist in the production, asking the Council of the Indies in 1796 for
permission to examine its archives for laws of the Indies that had
not been collected in a Recopilación. 15 As García-Hevia points out,
it was this that made the work so invaluable in the Spanish overseas
Empire, along with the brief notes on contemporary practice. 16 The
reputation of the work ensured that Pérez’s final, posthumously published book, Conversaciones críticas e instructivas sobre el estudio
de los Derechos civil y canónico de las Universidades was described
as compuestas por el autor del Teatro de la Legislación. 17
In this last work, Pérez wrote that the sources of the laws were
“neither methodical nor suitable for instruction in legal science and
15. García-Hevia, supra note 4.
16. Id.
17. ANTONIO XAVIER PÉREZ Y LÓPEZ, CONVERSACIONES CRÍTICAS E
INSTRUCTIVAS SOBRE EL ESTUDIO DE LOS DERECHOS CIVIL Y CANÓNICO DE LAS
UNIVERSIDADES, COMPUESTAS POR EL AUTOR DEL TEATRO DE LA LEGISLACIÓN
(Viuda e Hijo de Marin 1795) [hereinafter PÉREZ Y LÓPEZ, CONVERSACIONES
CRÍTICAS E INSTRUCTIVAS].
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the administration of justice in Spain”; moreover, he valued the geometric approach to law—with definitions, axioms, and conclusions—associated with Wolff and Heineccius. 18 This rationalist natural-law approach informed his decision to compile the Teatro. To
manage the material, he organized it alphabetically, without employing categories that were excessively broad. This meant that successful use of the Teatro was greatly aided by familiarity with both
the conceptual structure and the terminology of the civilian systems;
some topics were also specific to the Spanish kingdoms and their
government and administration. Pérez was basically gathering together the relevant legislative texts, which he arranged historically,
preceded by explanatory introductions. Within a set pattern the entries would vary, taking into account the nature of the topic and the
legislative sources. A standard entry would start with a list of relevant legislative sources organized by book and title with the number
of the “laws” given. This list would commence with the Roman legal
sources, followed by the Canon-law sources, and then the Spanish
sources. Uncollected laws were not included in these lists, though
mentioned in the detailed “Plan” of the work in the first volume. It
is worth noting that there can sometimes be differences between the
legal texts listed in the “Plan” in the first volume and at the start of
the entries, no doubt reflecting developing research as the work progressed. After the list Pérez provided an explanatory introduction,
headed as “§. I.”; this could be of several paragraphs in length, explaining the laws and practice. Finally, Pérez quoted the relevant
legal texts. He did not include any Roman texts, but started with
those of the Canon law, followed by those of the Spanish laws by
date. He describes his practice at some length in the Preliminary
Discourse.

18. FRANCISCO SÁNCHEZ-BLANCO, LA ILUSTRACIÓN GOYESCA: LA CULTURA
EN ESPAÑA DURANTE EL REINADO DE CARLOS IV (1788-1808) 227-28 (CSIC Press
2007) (quoting PÉREZ Y LÓPEZ, CONVERSACIONES CRÍTICAS E INSTRUCTIVAS, supra note 17).
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Pérez himself explained his method by reference to the concept
of “theatre.” 19 It is therefore necessary here to say a little about the
title—Teatro de la legislación universal—that he chose for his
work. The use of Theatrum in titles had a long and complex history
of which he would have been aware. 20 Though of ancient origin, the
metaphor of the theater had been understood from the Renaissance
onwards as providing a means of organizing and displaying
knowledge, whether in the mystical or Hermetic memory systems
associated with Giulio Camillo or Robert Fludd, or in the apparently
more prosaic Theatrum orbis terrarum of Abraham Ortellius. 21 It
was an idea that bore enormous symbolic potential. A theater could
be a reflection of reality; it could also be a site where knowledge
was displayed, as in an anatomical theatre, such as, famously, that
of Leiden. The “theater” could accordingly signify a display or spectacle of a body of universal knowledge, such as in Jean Bodin’s Universae naturae theatrum, or the more general idea of the theatrum
mundi created by God and observed by human beings. 22 One of the
most influential of these collections was the Theatrum humanae vitae of the Swiss Protestant Theodor Zwinger, first published in
1565, a collection of supposedly ethical material in an elaborate type
of common-place book that aimed to collect knowledge in an organized encyclopaedic way. 23 It was followed by the Magnum theatrum vitae humanae, first published in 1631, an enormous and
overtly Catholic reference work, the last edition of which was issued
19. See Preliminary Discourse, supra note 9, at no. 69.
20. ANN M. BLAIR, THE THEATER OF NATURE: JEAN BODIN AND
RENAISSANCE SCIENCE 153-79 (Princeton U. Press 2017); Louis Van Delft,
L’idée de théatre (XVIe-XVIIIe siècle), 101 REVUE D’HISTOIRE LITTÉRAIRE DE LA
FRANCE 1349, 1357-65 (2001); LYNDA G. CHRISTIAN, THEATRUM MUNDI: THE
HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1987) (a discussion of it as a topos in comparative literature
from the ancient to the early-modern world) .
21. FRANCES A. YATES, THE ART OF MEMORY 135-62, 310-29 ([1966] 2012).
22. BLAIR, supra note 20; see also FLEMMING SCHOCK, DIMENSIONEN DER
THEATRUM-METAPHER IN DER FRÜHEN NEUZEIT: ORDNUNG UND
REPRÄSENTATIONEN VON WISSEN (Flemming Schock, Oswald Bauer, & Ariane
Koller eds., Wehrhan 2008).
23. ANN M. BLAIR, TOO MUCH TO KNOW: MANAGING SCHOLARLY
INFORMATION BEFORE THE MODERN AGE 186-88, 193-202 (Yale U. Press 2010).
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in 1707. 24 A theatrum was thus also an encyclopaedia of knowledge,
a means of trying to organise information in a way that made it accessible. Though the title “Theatrum” is most often associated with
works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the research of
Van Delft shows it remained common through the eighteenth. 25 Pérez stated that since the collections (códigos) and laws (leyes) are
the originals that underlie all legal and political acts, they should be
preferred, just as a portrait is only a simulacrum of the sitter; he had
accordingly entitled his work Teatro, which in the moral or ethical
sciences stands in the same way as a depiction does in the physical.
What goes on in a theatre is a reflection of the world, which in itself
can be viewed as a stage set by God. But his theatre, through its
organization and structure provides the thread through the labyrinth
of legal knowledge. In a way his Teatro is an anthology—another
meaning commonly found. 26 The image of a theatre and the relationship of its presentations and appearances to reality is rich and
complex, and would be worth reflecting on further in connection
with Pérez’s work.
IV. LAW IN THE EARLY TERRITORY OF ORLEANS AND PÉREZ’S
TEATRO
After 1803, there had been uncertainty over the law in force in
the newly acquired Territory; even when it became clear that the law
in force was Spanish colonial law, there were problems in operating
this complex system. To be certain about the law it was necessary to
examine a variety of sources and collections, and also to search for
“uncollected” laws. But such evidence as there is suggests that initially there were problems in accessing copies and sources of the
Spanish laws. 27 Following Pérez’s Ovidian motto and comments,

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 202-6.
Van Delft, supra note 20, at 1357-65.
BLAIR, supra note 20, at 176-78.
Cairns, Teatro, supra note 3, at 91-98, 107-12.
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Urquijo has described the Spanish laws as having constituted a “labyrinth” for the lawyer trying find the law and contemporary doctrine. 28 But Pérez’s collection provided not just the thread through
the maze, but also the actual Spanish texts, anthologized, organized
historically, and placed in a helpful context. In other words, a set of
Pérez’s volumes would have been invaluable as a resource.
There seems to be no easy way of determining whether or not
those charged with codifying the laws in Louisiana under the statute
of 1806 used Pérez’s work, given the Digest of the Civil Laws now
in Force in the Territory of Orleans (as it was entitled) was primarily
drafted in French with a translation into English. This said, the Preliminary Discourse provided a short history and description of the
sources of the laws of Spain and of the Indies. This would have
helped orient readers in the material. The Teatro also purports to
quote the actual Spanish sources. The redactors obviously made use
of texts of the Spanish Recopilaciones, but whether as found in Pérez or in other editions there is no easy way to know. 29 But it seems
very likely that the redactors did in fact use Pérez’s Teatro, though
such evidence as there is proves inconclusive.
First, as I have argued elsewhere, some remarks of the Preliminary Discourse, if misinterpreted, seem to have influenced the content of the vetoed statute on sources of law enacted in 1806. 30 Secondly, it was certainly a work known later to Louis Moreau Lislet,
one of the redactors of the Digest of 1808. Here it is interesting to
look at the notarial inventory of Moreau’s possessions at death, in
which is found a listing of his relatively extensive personal library,
which contains very few books on subjects other than law. Though
known and readily accessible since being printed in 1943, this inventory has not been subjected to the careful discussion, much less
28. Urquijo, supra note 11, at 267.
29. For example, one way to recognize would be if there were a grave error
in Pérez’s quotation from a source that is then transmitted to an article of the Digest, influenced by the Spanish or Castilian law: but no one has so far identified
such an occurrence, which is, I suspect, extremely unlikely.
30. Cairns, Teatro, supra note 3, at 105-12.
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the detailed analysis that it deserves. 31 Without making a statistical
breakdown of what the inventory counts as 1008 items, it is evident,
at the merest glance, that it is predominantly a collection of French
legal material, with a substantial English-language collection. But it
contains some groupings of relevant Spanish works, and some scattered entries of a few others. As one might expect, there are the major legislative collections mentioned by Pérez: the Siete Partidas
(notably in the edition of Gregorio López), the Nueva Recopilacion
de las leyes de Castilla, the Autos Accordados, the Fuero Real, and
even the Fuero Juzgo, though no copy of the Recopilación de las
reinos de las Indias is listed. It is also no surprise to see the works
of Febrero, whose treatise was used in codifying the Digest of 1808,
and relied on extensively in the Spanish colonies in America. 32 Also
listed is some other secondary literature, such as the Commentatorium juris civilis in Hispaniae regias constitutiones of the wellknown sixteenth-century jurist, Alfonso de Azevedo, which was a
noted work on the Nueva Recopilacion, and the Commentaria of
Juan de Matienza, another sixteenth-century Spanish jurist who
worked in the Americas, whose work is a commentary on the fifth
book of the Nueva Recopilación of the laws of Castille of 1567. Matienza’s book also contained the relevant text of the Recopilación in
Spanish. 33 But there is no copy of Pérez’s Teatro. Towards the end
31. See, e.g., Mitchell Franklin, Libraries of Edward Livingston and Moreau
Lislet, 15 TUL. L. REV. 401 (1943); I have also examined a copy of the Act No.
1,185, 19 Dec. 1832, by Notary L. T. Caire, Notarial Archives, New Orleans,
which contains the inventory of Moreau’s moveable property, including his library, which indicates the format of the book—folio, quarto etc.—and which allows the correction of very occasional trivial errors of transcription or printing in
the published text.
32. On Febrero and his use in the Digest, see Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana
Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV.
4, 34, 38-44 (1971); AGUSTÍN PARISE, OWNERSHIP PARADIGMS IN AMERICAN
CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS: MANIFESTATIONS OF THE SHIFTS IN THE LEGISLATION
OF LOUISIANA, CHILE, AND ARGENTINA (16TH-20TH CENTURIES), 86-87 (Brill
Nijhoff 2016). See more generally, Alberto David Leiva, Aportes para un studio
de la Librería de escribanos de Joseph Febrero, 22 REVISTA DEL ISTITUTO DE
HISTORIA DEL DERECHO 302 (1971).
33. It is impossible to identify with any confidence the editions owed by Moreau of these works: ALFONSO DE AZEVEDO, COMMENTATORIUM JURIS CIVILIS IN
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of the inventory of books, however, the following group of works is
found, all described as manuscript, and consisting of one volume in
folio:
Table alphabétique des titres du Digeste
Teatro de la legislacion de España
Table raisonnée des lois Espanoles
Table des titres du Digeste &c
Abrégé du Traité de Febrero, &c
Table des matieres des Sept Partidas
[Table des matieres] de la Curia Philipica
[Table des matieres] du droit &c
As it seems impossible that Moreau owned a one-volume, folio
manuscript of the Teatro, this entry, as with the others with which it
is connected, is probably a reference to some kind of analytical table
of contents. The “Digeste” referred to twice will be a reference to
Justinian’s Digest, as by this date the Digest of the Civil Laws of the
Territory of Orleans is invariably referred to as the “old” or the “ancien” Code, the term Digest being now reserved for the three-volume Digest of the Acts of the Legislatures of the Late Territory of
Orleans and of the State of Louisiana and the Ordinances of the Governor passed under the Territorial Government prepared on behalf
of the legislature by François-Xavier Martin and published in 1816,
or the similar Digest prepared by Moreau Lislet himself, and appearing in two volumes in 1828. 34 Even if Moreau did not own a copy
of the Teatro at his death, evidently he had at one stage ready access
to one, whether or not he had owned it himself.

HISPANIAE REGIAS CONSTITUTIONES (Bellerus 1612), is just stated to be 3 volumes
in folio; JUAN DE MATIENZO, COMMENTARIA IOANNIS MATIENZO REGII
SENATORIS IN CANCELLARIA ARGENTINA REGNI PERU IN LIBRUM QUINTUM
RECOLLECTIONIS LEGUM HISPANIÆ (Franciscus Sanctius, 1580).
34. LOUIS MOREAU LISLET, A GENERAL DIGEST OF THE ACTS OF THE
LEGISLATURE OF LOUISIANA: PASSED FROM THE YEAR 1804, TO 1827, INCLUSIVE,
AND IN FORCE AT THIS LAST PERIOD, WITH AN APPENDIX AND GENERAL INDEX
(Benjamin Levy 1828).
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V. MOREAU LISLET, TRANSLATIONS OF THE SIETE PARTIDAS, AND
THE TEATRO
These analytical, manuscript listings of source material must derive from Moreau Lislet’s work—one suspects—both on the codes
and on his collaborative translations of the Siete Partidas. 35 Moreau
was involved in three projects to translate the Siete Partidas. The
first, dating from 1813, involved the distinguished lawyer Etienne
Mazureau, and the aim was to publish, by subscription, a translation
into French. 36 For the second, Moreau collaborated with Henry Carleton, publishing in 1818 a translation into English, with facing
Spanish text, of the titles of the Partidas on promises and obligations, sale and purchase, and exchange. 37 The third, again with Carleton, was the more extensive, consisting of those laws of the Siete
Partidas still thought potentially to be in force; this time there was
no Spanish text facing the English. 38
A. The Proposed Translation of 1813, the Moreau Manuscript, and
the de la Vergne Volume
I have suggested elsewhere that there is an obvious and complex
relationship between the notes made by Moreau Lislet in a copy of
the Digest of 1808, preserved in the Hill Memorial Library in
Louisiana State University (which I have called the Moreau
Manuscript or Moreau MS 39), the de la Vergne Volume, and the

35. In the inventory of Moreau’s books, it is possible to recognize four MS
volumes of a translation of the Siete Partidas, but whether into French or Spanish
is not specified.
36. Cairns, De la Vergne Volume, supra note 2, at 51-52.
37. LOUIS MOREAU LISLET & HENRY CARLETON, A TRANSLATION OF THE
TITLES ON PROMISES AND OBLIGATIONS, SALE AND PURCHASE, AND EXCHANGE:
FROM THE SPANISH OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS (Roche Brothers 1818) [hereinafter
MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, TITLES ON PROMISES AND OBLIGATIONS, SALE
AND PURCHASE, AND EXCHANGE].
38. THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, WHICH ARE STILL IN FORCE IN THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA (Louis Moreau Lislet & Henry Carleton trans., Claitor’s
1978) (1820) [hereinafter LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS].
39. The Moreau Manuscript (MS) consist of extensive marginal annotations
written by Louis Moreau Lislet in a copy of the Digest of 1808, see DE LA VERGNE
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1813 Proposals 40 to translate the Partidas in French. 41 One obvious
link between them all is Moreau Lislet’s use of Pérez’s Teatro. The
Proposals of 1813 established the pattern followed in the
subsequent, realized translations.
1. The Moreau Manuscript
Since I have already discussed this manuscript at some length in
an earlier article, it is unnecessary to say more than a little about it
here. 42 The notes are holograph of Moreau Lislet and the title page
bears his name, though not in his hand or signature. There can be no
doubt but that the general listings of sources of Roman-law texts and
Spanish-law texts in this manuscript, usually in the top and bottom
margins, have almost always been directly taken from the lists of
such sources found at the beginning of the related titles in the Teatro.
Moreau has excluded the Canon-law sources where found in Pérez’s
lists, presumably as it was considered inappropriate to include them
in the U.S. His use of the Teatro is normally explicit, with a citation
of the relevant volume and page. Lengthy lists usually start on the

VOLUME supra note 2. The Moreau MS can be found at the Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University, Hill Memorial Library, La Coll KFL30 1808 A213 [hereinafter LSU, Moreau MS].
40. Proposals for the Printing of a French Translation of the Laws of the
Siete Partidas, LOUISIANA COURIER, COURRIER DE LA LOUISIANE 23 (28 Apr.
1813 (English text), 15 Oct. 1813 (French text)) [hereinafter cited as 1813 Proposals]. I have not had direct access to copies of this newspaper, but I am drawing
on a transcription of the English text of the proposals, which can be found on the
Civil Law Online website of the Center of Civil Law Studies at Louisiana State
University, available at https://perma.cc/N8W4-Q6K7. Versions of the beginning
of the text may be found in ALAIN LEVASSEUR, MOREAU LISLET: THE MAN
BEHIND THE DIGEST OF 1808, 130-31, 189-91 (rev. ed. with the assistance of
Vicenç Feliú, Claitor’s 2008). The English version reads as if a translation from
French, given the choice of vocabulary, and though there are some evident errors
in the transcription, it seems reliable.
41. Cairns, De la Vergne Volume, supra note 2, at 51-52; LSU, Moreau MS,
supra note 39; on the initial identification of the notes as holograph of Moreau,
see Robert A. Pascal, A Recent Discovery: A copy of the “Digest of the Civil Laws”
of 1808 with Marginal Source References in Moreau Lislet’s Hand, 26 LA. L.
REV. 25-27 (1965).
42. Cairns, De la Vergne Volume, supra note 2, at 49-65.
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bottom margin of the French-language page and continue on the bottom margin of the opposite English-language page, occasionally
even describing a circle, running clock-wise to finish on the top margin of the French-language page. Specific citations are linked to individual articles of the Digest. The citations are almost exclusively
to legislative material, with only a few infrequent citations of Febrero, and three of Domat. But we can be absolutely certain that he
is using Pérez’s lists of sources from the beginning of the titles on
topics in the Teatro, as he once even copied from Pérez a printing
confusion, thereby introducing error, later correcting it. 43
2. The de la Vergne Volume
The general lists in the Louisiana State University manuscript
(Moreau MS) are usually the foundation of the general lists in the
later de la Vergne volume, though those in the latter are generally
considerably fuller, incorporating more in the way of secondary
source material, including French, so one finds citations to Domat,
Pothier, Febrero’s Librería de escribanos, and the Curia Philippica
of Juan de Hevía Bolaños, and some other works and authors, such
as Rodriguez’s translation into Spanish of Justinian’s Digest. 44 I
have discussed the de la Vergne volume, and its relationships with
other manuscripts, at some length elsewhere. 45 All that it is necessary to note here is that it is an interleaved copy of the Digest of
1808, containing extensive listings of general sources, usually
headed as “titles” of Roman and Spanish laws (and sometimes acts
of the legislature), generally on the recto pages of the interleaves,
normally described as related to or dealing with the material in the
title of the Digest. Specific references to Spanish, French, and other
sources (including Louisiana statutes) are found on the verso, directly linked to individual articles. The manuscript is plausibly dated

43. Id. at 53-60.
44. Id. at 72-74.
45. Id. at 38-72.
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1814. Contrary to some claims, these references are not to the juridical sources of the articles, but to related material. The exception is
when Louisiana statutes are cited, but they were probably not cited
specifically to indicate the source of an individual article. 46 Though
drawing on the Moreau MS, the de la Vergne volume is a very much
more elaborate manuscript, with its own title page, a preface entitled
Avant-Propos, an explanation of the abbreviations used for laws and
secondary literature, and an extensive manuscript alphabetical index.
In contrast to the Moreau MS, the de la Vergne volume never
cites the Teatro in the general lists of titles of relevant Roman and
Spanish laws, even if they are in part derived from Pérez’s work.
One can be confident, however, that it was being consulted. Moreau
cited it for six articles. The first was in the preliminary title in the
chapter on the promulgation of laws, and refers to an “auto
acordado” of April 1, 1767, on the publication of laws. In the de la
Vergne volume is written (here translated): “see the ‘resolution Royale’ of April 1767, not included in the recopilación, but quoted in
the Teatro of Xavier Perez vol. 19. P. 124.” 47 This is also found in
similar terms in the Moreau MS. 48 The second is in the title on Husband and Wife, in the chapter on contracting marriage, cited, with
other material, for an article on the need for parental consent for the
marriage of a minor and another on the validity of a marriage contracted without such consent. The note states “pragmatique du 23
mars 1776 qui se voit au Théatre de Xavier Perez vol. 19. p. 393.
art. 1 et 2.” The second reference simply refers to the Pragmatica

46. JOHN W. CAIRNS, CODIFICATION, TRANSPLANTS AND HISTORY: LAW
REFORM IN LOUISIANA (1808) AND QUEBEC (1866) 444-61 (Lawbook Exchange
2015).
47. DE LA VERGNE VOLUME, supra note 2, at verso of interleaf facing 3, art.
4.
48. LSU, Moreau MS, supra note 39, at 3. The reference is accurate: PÉREZ,
TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 19, at 124.
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cited above, article 3. 49 This is also found in the Moreau MS. 50 The
third is another reference to the third article of the same Pragmatica,
cited for an article on the duties of children to aliment their parents. 51
This provision of the Pragmatica is on disinheritance of children. It
is again found cited in the Moreau MS. 52 The very same provision
of this Pragmatica is further cited in the de la Vergne volume with
reference to a provision on succession dealing with disinheritance
of children. 53 Once more one can spot it in the Moreau MS. 54 The
two final mentions of the Teatro in the de la Vergne volume are in
adjacent articles of the Digest on servants being dismissed without
serious cause and servants quitting without legitimate cause, and are
to the same passage, both being citations to the same law of the
Fuero Viejo, as quoted by Pérez. 55 There is no such reference, either
to the Fuero Viejo or to the Teatro in the Moreau MS, which only
cites the Fuero Real (also cited in the de la Vergne volume). 56
It is obvious that the citations to the Teatro for the auto acordado
of 1767 and the pragmatica of March 23, 1776 were necessitated by
the lack of any other accessible source for these “uncollected” laws.
Moreau likewise cited Febrero’s work for other “uncollected” Spanish laws. 57 That Moreau also cited the Teatro for the Fuero Viejo
49. DE LA VERGNE VOLUME, supra note 2, at verso of interleaf facing 27,
arts. 11 and 15.
50. LSU, Moreau MS, supra note 39, at 27. The reference is accurate: PÉREZ,
TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 19, at 393.
51. DE LA VERGNE VOLUME, supra note 2, at verso of interleaf facing 55, art.
58.
52. LSU, Moreau MS, supra note 39, at 55. The reference is accurate: PÉREZ,
TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 19, at 393.
53. DE LA VERGNE VOLUME, supra note 2, at verso of interleaf facing 237,
art 130.
54. LSU, Moreau MS, supra note 39, at 237. The reference is accurate:
PÉREZ, TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 19, at 393.
55. DE LA VERGNE VOLUME, supra note 2, at verso of interleaf facing 383.
The reference is accurate: PÉREZ, TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 4, at 195.
56. LSU, Moreau MS, supra note 39, at 383. It is worth noting that the citations to these laws quoted in the Teatro have almost certainly been added to the
Moreau MS subsequent to the surrounding annotations; it is difficult to know what
to make of this.
57. DE LA VERGNE VOLUME, supra note 2, at recto of interleaf facing 458 and
at verso of interleaf facing 465.
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strongly suggests that a copy of it was unavailable to him in Louisiana. These two were the only specific references to the Fuero Viejo
attached to an article. He cited it four times in his general listings of
Roman and Spanish laws related to the titles of the Digest. 58 Other
than in one instance, these are also found in the general listings of
sources found in the Moreau MS and derived from the Teatro. 59 He
is clearly not consulting the Fuero itself; and the one reference that
is not found in the Moreau MS clearly came directly from the
Teatro. 60
3. The Proposals of 1813
What was intended in 1813 is known from advertisements in the
Courrier de la Louisiane. 61 From this, we learn that, at the time of
the Proposal, Moreau had already made the translation “for his private use,” and that he wished to be “seconded in his undertaking”
by Mazureau “another jurisconsult of this city, well versed in the
Spanish language, and known by his talents in jurisprudence.” Not
all of the Partidas, however, was to be published in the translation. 62
The Proposals stated that:
At the head of each title, the translation of which will be
given, will be placed a list of the several titles of the institutes, of the pandects, of the code & the novels of Justinian,
of the different Spanish codes, & of the canonical law, as
well as the several works treating of the same matter such as
Domat’s civil laws, Pothier’s writings, Febrero’s library, and
the Curia philipica. 63
If one puts aside the citations of the secondary literature, French and
Spanish, this proposed list very much resembles the general lists that
58. Id. at recto of interleaves facing 344, 372, 452, and 478.
59. LSU, Moreau MS, supra note 39, at 344 (PÉREZ, TEATRO, supra note 1,
vol. 7, at 412 (correcting the MS’s mistaken page reference of 442)), 372 (PÉREZ,
TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 4, at 187), 459 (reference forward form 453) (PÉREZ,
TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 23, at 470).
60. PÉREZ, TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 24, at 2.
61. 1813 Proposals, supra note 40.
62. Id.
63. Id.

2018]

INTRODUCTORY ESSAY

451

one finds at the start of the titles of the Teatro, even to the inclusion
of the Canon-law sources. If, however, one includes the secondary
sources, and excludes those of the Canon law, this is very obviously
the same type of list as the lists that one finds on the recto interleaves
of the de la Vergne volume.
The Proposals also explained that, at the end of each law, it was
intended to add:
[…] a note showing all such laws of the civil code of this
state, and of the recopilation de castilla, which contain provisions on the same subject, in such manner that it will be
easy to verify what alterations the ancient law contained in
the seven Partidas, may have experienced in modern or actual legislation. 64
The thinking behind this strongly resembles that behind the concordance provided for specific articles of the Digest in the de la
Vergne volume. It provided a way of moving from the Partidas to
the modern law, just as the references linked to the individual articles of the Digest allowed one to move from the provisions of the
Digest to related Spanish and French material, as well as Territorial
legislation.
The planned publication of a French translation of the Siete Partidas is obviously connected very closely with Moreau’s compilation of the Moreau MS and the de la Vergne volume. In all three, his
consultation of the Teatro exercised significant influence. That Moreau wrote the Proposals of 1813 with a copy of the Teatro in front
of him is very readily demonstrated. The Proposals describe the Partidas thus:
The code of seven parts which draws its name, from being
thus divided, contains every thing relative as well to the public as well as to the private right of Spain. The first part is an
exact digest of the Church-laws such as they stood at that
time. The second part is a summary of the ancient usages and
customs of the nation, of which it is in some measure the

64. Id.
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legal history. The 3d, 4th, 5th and 6th, parts contain a summary of the provisions of the Roman Law, about persons,
things and actions, and besides several decisions which serve
in regulating some dubious points of the civil law. The fourth
part is a compendium of the canons and of the laws relative
to Bethrothing matrimony and other matters thereto belonging, finally the 7th part is relative to crimes and offences and
their punishment, and is terminated as the pandects and decretals with titles on the meaning of words and regulations
of right. 65
We find in the Teatro’s Discorso Preliminar:
The Partidas, which King Don Alfonso the Wise finished in
the year 1260, is the complete Body of Law that gathers together Public Law as much as Private Law, and it comprehends it all with a scientific, sound, Christian, just, and equitable method. [It is] in all respects and truly a Code and
[one] which will perhaps not have an equal in Europe. Indeed, the first Partida is a detailed compendium of the
Canon Law that flourished in that epoch. The second is a
tried and true summary of the ancient fueros and customs of
the Nation, which forms a legal history of the same, and it
also comprehends the most wholesome Politics. The third,
fifth, and sixth Partidas, in short, contain the best [Law], including Roman Law on lawsuits, contracts, and last wills
[and testaments], all adjusted to the constitution of the Monarchy in that time, and deciding various uncertain points in
the Civil Law. The fourth Partida is a compendium of the
Canons and Civil Laws pertaining to betrothals and marriages and their incidental subjects. The seventh and last
Partida is the same [i.e., a compendium] regarding crimes
and punishments, ending in the style of the Pandects and Decretals with titles on the meaning of words and rules of
Law. 66
There is no real need to comment; even in the translations, the close
correspondence stands out. Moreau has mentioned the fourth Partida in his listing of the contents of the Partidas where Pérez had
not, but he still followed Pérez in discussing its contents just before

65. Id.
66. See Preliminary Discourse, supra note 9, at no 29.
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considering those of the seventh Partida. This suggests he was copying without much reflection.
The cost of the subscription for the work was sixty dollars. Since
it never appeared, it must have proved prohibitive. Moreau recognized the cost was high. 67 Significant too in the failure of the project
must have been the fact that the Constitution of 1812 had recently
made English the official language of the law. 68
B. The Translation of 1818
Moreau and Carleton’s limited translation of 1818 covers the
fifth, sixth, and eleventh titles of the fifth Partida. After a brief Preface, there is a list of sources for the translation and text of the title
on promises and obligations that includes four titles of Justinian’s
Digest, four of his Code, six from his Institutes, a title from the fifth
book of the Recopilación, a section of Febrero’s treatise, and the
third title of the third book of the Digest of 1808. The list of sources
is derived from the de la Vergne volume, with some additional titles
taken from the Corpus iuris civilis, while omitting its references to
Rodriguez’s translation of the Digest, Pothier, Domat, the Ordenamiento de Alcalá, and, of course this very title of the Partidas; 69
the list in the de la Vergne volume is an obvious development of a
short list in the Moreau MS. 70 This is partially derived from the list
in the Teatro. 71 The next list of sources is for the text and translation

67. 1813 Proposals, supra note 40.
68. LA. CONST. of 1812, art. VI, § 15: “All laws that may be passed by the
Legislature, and the public records of this State, and the judicial and legislative
written proceedings of the same, shall be promulgated, preserved and conducted
in the language in which the constitution of the United States is written.”
69. MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, TITLES ON PROMISES AND OBLIGATIONS,
SALE AND PURCHASE, AND EXCHANGE, supra note 37, at [vii] (5.11); DE LA
VERGNE VOLUME, supra note 2, at recto of interleaf facing 260 (under the heading
“Des obligations en general etc.”).
70. LSU, Moreau MS, supra note 39, at 61, bottom margin.
71. PÉREZ, TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 9, at 179; LSU, Moreau MS, supra
note 39, at 60 bottom margin, also cites PÉREZ, TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 22, at
4.
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of the title on sale and purchase. 72 This is very closely derived from
that in the de la Vergne volume, though excluding both some laws
and secondary literature cited in the latter. 73 This is an elaboration
of a list in the Moreau MS, which is copied from two lists of sources
in the Teatro. 74 The final title, that on exchange, has a list of sources
that is again closely related to that in the de la Vergne volume, which
is essentially copied, with additions, from that found in the Moreau
MS, which in turn is copied exactly from the Teatro, omitting the
last reference to a source of Canon law. 75 The lists of sources always
end with the relevant title of the Digest, referred to as the Civil Code.
C. The Translation of 1820
This translation was made viable by the support of the Louisiana
Legislature. 76 It consists of two volumes, continuously paginated.
The first volume starts with a relatively lengthy Translators’ Preface. 77 Those titles of the Partidas selected by Moreau and Carleton
for translation as still in force were: the first two titles of the first
Partida; none of the second Partida; the entirety of the third, fourth,
and fifth Partidas; only the fifth and eleventh titles of the sixth; and
of the seventh, only the sixth, ninth, tenth, fifteenth, thirty-third and
thirty-fourth titles. This has a strong resemblance to what Moreau
had proposed in 1813 for his French translation. As in the translation
of 1818, each title of the Partidas is preceded by a list of relevant

72. MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, TITLES ON PROMISES AND OBLIGATIONS,
SALE AND PURCHASE, AND EXCHANGE, supra note 37, at [79]-80 (5.5).
73. DE LA VERGNE VOLUME, supra note 2, at recto of interleaf facing 344.
74. LSU, Moreau MS, supra note 39, at 342-343; PÉREZ, TEATRO, supra note
1, vol. 7, at 397, and vol. 28, at 442.
75. MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, TITLES ON PROMISES AND OBLIGATIONS,
SALE AND PURCHASE, AND EXCHANGE, supra note 37, at [186] (5.6); DE LA
VERGNE VOLUME, supra note 2, at recto of interleaf facing 370; LSU, Moreau
MS, supra note 39, at 371; PÉREZ, TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 5, at 391.
76. See Agustín Parise, Introductory Essay on the Translators’ Preface to
Law Siete Partidas, 7 J. CIV. L. STUD. 311, 320-21 (2014) [hereinafter Parise,
Introductory Essay].
77. This has been recently reprinted with the Introductory Essay, see id. at
336-53 (2014).

2018]

INTRODUCTORY ESSAY

455

related laws. To take one example, that of the title on donations (the
fourth title of the fifth Partida), we find the list headed: “Titles, Of
the Roman and Spanish Laws, and of the Civil Code, which relate
to the title of Las Siete Partidas, on Donations.” The list itself consists of two titles of Justinian’s Digest, one of his Institutes, four
titles from his Codex, and one of the Novellae; two titles from Domat’s work; two titles from the Fuero Juzgo, one from the Fuero
Real, four provisions from the Leyes del Estilo, and one title each
from the Ordenamiento Real, the Recopilación, and the Autos
Acordados, before finishing with a citation of the “Civil Code, book
3, tit. 2.” 78 Just as with the translation of 1818, this list is closely
related to a similar but more extensive list in the de la Vergne volume (the latter includes citations to Domat and Pothier); but, notably, it is virtually identical to that found in the Moreau MS, which
is drawn from the Teatro, but which included much more Roman
material, while explaining in a note that a lot of material had been
united in the list. It also includes titles from the Canon law. 79 It is
clear that the list of material in the translation is drawn from the
Teatro, but has been filtered through the Moreau MS and the de la
Vergne volume. In connection with hypothecs, I have elsewhere
demonstrated the same practice in developing and changing these
lists, ultimately deriving from Pérez’s work, through to the 1820
translation. 80
In numbered footnotes at the end of the translation of some of
the laws, Moreau and Carleton have often included references to the
Recopilación, and the Digest (called the Civil Code). In footnotes
indicated by letters, there are sometimes references to other sources,
and sometimes comments such as: “The civil code does not require
the same number of witnesses to the nuncupative wills. C. art. 92 &
96, p. 228,” or “By the civil code, art. 99, p. 228 & 230, the presence
78. LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 38, vol. 2, at 641-42.
79. LSU, Moreau MS, supra note 39, at 208-209; PÉREZ, TEATRO, supra note
1, vol. 11, at 221-22.
80. Cairns, De la Vergne Volume, supra note 2, at 54-59.
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of a notary public is also required.” 81 This reflects what was proposed in 1813. Though providing the texts of the Partidas, the translators were indicating where the modern law in Louisiana varied
from it.
D. The Significance of the Lists in the Manuscripts and Translations
In the Moreau MS, Moreau was not simply giving the standard
sedes materiae of Roman and Spanish law, but was in fact deliberately and consciously copying the lists he found in the Teatro. Thus,
he usually followed the Teatro in giving the number of laws in each
title; he also copied what he found without initially checking its accuracy, and so transcribed errors, as pointed out above. He evidently
started to annotate what is now the Moreau MS by starting to write
out the relevant Spanish sources, usually, as noted, starting on the
bottom margin of the right hand page on his copy of the Digest, continuing on the bottom margin of the facing page, and then on the top
margin of that page and finishing on the top margin of the right-hand
page (incidentally indicating his right-handedness). 82 He did not
usually reflect on the sources or choose from them; this was a simple
act of copying, indicating the trust he necessarily put in the Teatro.
Such reflection as he made came later. As also noted, he even copied
Pérez’s practice of generally giving the number of laws found in
each title, if a whole title were cited. The only editing Moreau seems
routinely to have carried out was to exclude Pérez’s Canon-law citations, as inappropriate and irrelevant.
It is obvious that the lists of sources that Moreau developed, expanding them and contracting them as they served different purposes, all derived from the Teatro’s lists of sources for each title.
The lists in the de la Vergne volume are always the most elaborate.
Those in the two translations are quite pared down in comparison.
81. LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 38, vol. 2, at 962-63.
82. See, e.g., LSU, Moreau MS, supra note 39, at 208-9.
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But the lists in the Teatro always held the potential for consultation
in drafting the lists in the translations of the Siete Partidas.
E. The Prefaces
The Preliminary Discourse to Pérez’s Teatro also provided material that could be used in Louisiana to understand the Spanish
sources and their history. We have already seen how the Proposal of
1813 drew on its description of the Partidas. It is easy to demonstrate this further by examining the Avant-Propos to the de la Vergne
volume, and the prefaces to the translations of the Siete Partidas.
These indicate the power of Pérez’s work in shaping the approach
to these sources in the Territory and early State. In earlier studies, I
have already suggested that in Territorial Louisiana both the understanding of Domat as a commentator on Roman law and the
knowledge (and sometimes misunderstanding) of the Spanish
source material initially came through his Preliminary Discourse. 83
What follows serves to support this interpretation.
1. The Avant-Propos to the de la Vergne Volume
The Avant-Propos is a relatively short piece. 84 It places the
Spanish sources in context and gives a short history of their development. The pattern and structure of the discussion indicate that it
is very obviously following Pérez’s Preliminary Discourse, but it is
much abbreviated. One quotation readily demonstrates that Moreau
had Pérez’s work directly in front of him as he wrote. It is more
obvious in French and Spanish and will be quoted accordingly in
these languages. Pérez wrote:
Desde el año de 992 en que se publicó el Fuero Viejo hasta
83. Cairns, De la Vergne Volume, supra note 2, at 73; Cairns, Teatro, supra
note 3, at 109-10.
84. It is found translated into English in Mitchell Franklin, An Important Document in the History of American Roman and Civil Law: The De La Vergne Manuscript, 33 TUL. L. REV. 35, 39-42 (1958); Joseph Dainow, Moreau Lislet’s Notes
on Sources of Louisiana Civil Code of 1808, 19 LA. L. REV. 43, 44-49 (1958).
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el de 1255 en que se promulgó el Real, ó de las leyes, occurrieron dos sucesos notables en el Orbe literario, señaladamente el el jurídico: uno fue la enseñanza pública del Digesto, y demas partes del Derecho Civil, llamado Comun,
que se empezó á hacer en la Universidad de Bolonia; y otro
la formacion del Decreto executada privadamente por el
Monge Graciano en el año de 1151 . . . . 85
In the Avant-Propos, we find:
Depuis l’année 992 que se publia le Fuero Viejo, jusqu’en
l’année 1255 que le Fuero Real fut promulgué, il arriva un
événement que servit beaucoup à répandre en Europe, des
lumieres plus saines que celles qu’on avait eues jusqu’alors
sur la Jurisprudence. Ce fut l’enseignement public qu’on
commença à donner dans l’université de Boulogne en Italie,
des principes du Digeste et des autres parties du Droit civil
appelé droit commun. 86
This is little more than a translation of Pérez’s text, indicating
just how closely Moreau was following it. And as he excluded from
his lists the Teatro’s citations of Canon law, so here he excludes its
mention of Gratian’s Decretum. Another example that confirms this
is to be found in the discussion of the Fuero Real and the Partidas.
Pérez writes: “[E]l primero es el Fuero Real, y el segundo las Partidas, formando aquel en el año de 1255 para que sirviese de precursor á este.” 87 In the Avant-Propos we find: “Le premier de ces
codes qui est le Fuero Real parut en l’année 1255, comme pour servir de précurseur aux Partidas . . . .” 88 One could carry on, pointing
out that Moreau is simply making a condensed copy of the discussion of the sources found in the Preliminary Discourse. 89 But his
working method is abundantly clear.

85. PÉREZ, TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 1, at VII (no. 9).
86. Avant-Propos, in DE LA VERGNE VOLUME, supra note 2.
87. PÉREZ, TEATRO, supra note 1, vol. 1, at XIX (no. 28).
88. Avant-Propos, in DE LA VERGNE VOLUME, supra note 2.
89. Compare the discussion of the sources from Ordenamiento de Alcalá to
the Recopilación de Castilla in id., the Avant-Propos,with the discussion in the
Preliminary Discourse, supra note 9, at nos. 35-38.
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2. The Preface to the Translation of 1818
Moreau Lislet and Henry Carleton’s extensive use of the Preliminary Discourse of the Teatro in composing the short Preface to their
translations of the three titles of the Siete Partidas in 1818 is also
easily demonstrated. Indeed, the account of the Siete Partidas is
again little more than a translation from the description in Pérez’s
Teatro:
Indeed, the first Partida is a detailed compendium of the
Canon Law that flourished in that epoch. The second [Partida] is a tried and true summary of the ancient fueros and
customs of the Nation, which forms a legal history of the
same, and it also comprehends the most wholesome Politics.
The third, fifth, and sixth Partidas, in short, contain the best
[Law], including Roman Law on lawsuits, contracts, and last
wills [and testaments], all adjusted to the constitution of the
Monarchy in that time, and deciding various uncertain points
in the Civil Law. The fourth Partida is a compendium of the
Canons and Civil Laws pertaining to betrothals and marriages and their incidental subjects. The seventh and last
Partida is the same [i.e., a compendium] regarding crimes
and punishments, ending in the style of the Pandects and Decretals with titles on the meaning of words and rules of
Law. 90
In Carleton and Moreau’s Preface to the translation of 1818, we find
the following:
The first part contains a system of canonical law, such as was
observed at that period of the Christian æra.
The second is a summary of the ancient usages and customs of the Spanish nation, of which it is in some sort a legal
history.
The third, fifth, and sixth contain an abridgement of all
the principles to be found in the Roman laws upon the subject of actions, process and judgement, contracts and last
wills, together with decisions upon various points left doubtful by the civil law

90. See Preliminary Discourse, supra note 9, at no. 29.
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The fourth is a compendium of the laws relative to betrothing and marriages; to the state of man, liberty, slavery
and enfranchisement.
The seventh, treats of crimes and punishments, and terminates as do the pandects with two titles; one upon the signification of words, and the other upon the rules of law. 91
The source is obvious, and this is very close to what was written in
the Proposals of 1813. What is most interesting, perhaps, are the differences between the two texts. 92
3. The Preface to the Translation of 1820
In 1958, Mitchell Franklin perceptively commented:
There is a marked similarity between the content of the preface of the de la Vergne manuscript and the translators preface which Moreau-Lislet and Henry Carleton attached to
their famous two volume translation of the Partidas
pubished in 1820. Indeed, the content of the preface of the
de la Vergne manuscript gives the impression of being a
summary or early draught of the introduction published in
1820. 93
Of course, this is true largely because both are founded in the common source, namely Pérez’s Preliminary Discourse. The narrative
account of the history of the sources of Spanish law in the Preface
of 1820 is very clearly derived from Pérez’s Preliminary Discourse.
This is very easily demonstrated. Pérez explained in the Teatro:
Afterward, the sacred Literature flourished among the Ecclesiastics, and the two Powers, spiritual and temporal, being
consummately united, appropriate regulations of both species of Powers were established in the National Councils . . . .
From these rulings, and from other ones authorized and published by the Gothic Kings, was formed the Fuero Juzgo,
which was promulgated in the year 693 of the Christian Era.

91. MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, TITLES ON PROMISES AND OBLIGATIONS,
SALE AND PURCHASE, AND EXCHANGE, supra note 37, at [iii]-iv.
92. I hope to pursue this elsewhere.
93. Franklin, supra note 84, at 38.
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This Code, the first of the Nation and of its own law, is divided into 12 books, and is subdivided into several titles. 94
Moreau and Carleton followed:
[T]he intimate union that prevailed at that time between
them [the clergy] and the government, soon produced divers
rules and regulations in the national councils, upon subjects
both of a spiritual and temporal nature: these together with
others, enacted by the gothic kings, formed the Fuero Juzgo,
which was published about the year 693.
This code, the first made by the Spanish nation, is divided
into twelve books, and each book into different titles. 95
We find in the Preliminary Discourse:
In the time that spanned from the formation of the Partidas
to their first publication done in the Cortes of Alcalá, only
the Leyes de Estilo, which added up to the number of 252
without the least division into books or other members or
parts, were promulgated in the year 1310. 96
And in Moreau and Carleton’s Introduction:
During the period which elapsed from the commencement of
the Partidas, to their first publication in the Cortes of Alcala
in the year 1348, the laws relative to the forms of legal proceedings (del Estilo) made their appearance in the year 1310.
That work contains two hundred and fifty laws, not divided
however into books or titles. 97
Pérez wrote:
Nevertheless, the Kingdom’s political constitution continued in this way until the Mohammedan invasion occurring
in the year 714 changed and almost annihilated it. That fatal
catastrophe made the remains of the tottering Monarchy retreat to the mountains of Asturias. From here, Don Pelayo
[Pelagius of Asturias], descendent of the Royal blood of the
Goths, and afterward his august Successors, were little by
little shaking off the Muslim yoke, and extending our Holy
Religion with their victorious arms up to the Peninsula’s borders.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Preliminary Discourse, supra note 9, at nos. 2-3.
LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 38, vol. 1, at v.
See Preliminary Discourse, supra note 9, at no. 32.
LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 38, vol. 1, at xii.
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In those calamitous times, the Kings needed the immediate aid of the Grandees and Hidalgos, those who served them
with their persons, and people funded at their expense. For
this reason, it was necessary to remunerate such good services made to the State and to the Fatherland with lands that
were being acquired in the conquests, dividing them among
the same Grandees and Hidalgos . . . . These circumstances
occasioned the publication of the fuero called [the fuero] of
the Hidalgos, and finally it was equally necessary to promulgate a fuero for government in general and the conduct of
actions [lawsuits], like the Fuero Viejo, which was published
in the year 992 and other similar ones. 98
Moreau and Carleton wrote:
But about the year 714, soon after the publication of this
code, its authority was almost entirely overthrown by the invasion of the Moors, who conquered with incredible rapidity, the whole of Spain, except the Asuturias, whither the
Spaniards who had escaped their fury, fled under Don Pelage, a descendant of the Gothic kings . . . . During this bloody
struggle, the kings of Spain, having frequent need of the nobles and grandees who followed them in the field, were under necessity of granting them many important privileges
and of establishing them a code in their favour. Hence the
origin of El Fuero delos hijos dalgos, the code of the nobles
. . . . [I]n order to remedy this evil and establish a uniform
mode of judicial procedure in civil matters, El Fuero Viejo,
the ancient code was published in the year 992. 99
What had been said about the Partidas in the Proposals of 1813 and
the Preface of 1818, copied from the Teatro, was basically repeated. 100 Other parts were essentially copied, such as the account
of the Recopilación and the Autos Acordados. 101 The view of the
Teatro was overtly preferred to that of another Spanish author. 102

98.
99.
100.
101.

See Preliminary Discourse, supra note 9, at nos. 4-5.
LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 38, vol. 1, at vi.
Id. at ix.
See Preliminary Discourse, supra note 9, at no. 39; LAWS OF LAS SIETE
PARTIDAS, supra note 38, vol. 1, at xiv-xv.
102. LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 38, vol. 1, at xiii-xiv.
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VI. FINAL REMARKS
Moreau Lislet undoubtedly made extensive use of the Teatro. It
helped him to find his way around the Spanish material. It provided
him with access to relevant source material that he could not otherwise get. His understanding and accounts of the Spanish source material are based on it. It evidently shaped his knowledge and approach. One starts to see its influence on him as pervasive. Given
that Moreau made extensive use of the Teatro at various stages of
his life as a lawyer in Louisiana, it does seem probable that he had
earlier used it for access to basic Spanish source material in his work
with James Brown on the Digest of 1808. But whether or not he did
so is probably unknowable and perhaps unimportant.
It is difficult to believe that Moreau was the only lawyer who
found the Teatro useful, a realization that tends to support the argument that it was used in drafting the vetoed Act of 1806. One wonders how many of the references to the Spanish laws found in litigation in the Territorial period and during the early statehood of Louisiana were in fact silently drawn from a copy of the Teatro. In the
Proposal for a French translation in 1813, Moreau had written as
part of his sales pitch that he hoped that such a translation would
gather “merit in the eyes of the public” so that “that merit [would]
give it in the courts of this state as an authority, which may dispense
from the representation of the original, a work of four large volumes
in folio and extremely difficult to be purchased at any price, even in
the Spanish settlements in America.” 103 The same argument might
support the idea of the utility of the Teatro, even though it may also
have been difficult to obtain.
Given that Pérez’s more substantive and extensive titles not only
have the lists of sources that Moreau found so useful, but also have
a concise, contextual discussion of the law, it may be that his work
also offered a simple interpretative approach, one that was up-to-

103. 1813 Proposal, supra note 40.
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date and basically contemporary, and easier to use than more sophisticated books, and that was accordingly found useful. However this
may be, it is clear that the Teatro was an important work in the era
of the Territory and the early State, so that publication of a translation of its Preliminary Discourse will help raise awareness of this
and should provoke thought about new lines of research.

TEATRO DE LA LEGISLACIÓN UNIVERSAL
DE ESPAÑA E INDIAS:
PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE
Antonio Xavier Pérez y López †
Translated by H. Barlow Holley *
Keywords: Spanish law, legal history, fueros, canon law, colonial
law, codification/compilation

Book I
Janua difficilis filo est inventa relecto.
[“The difficult door was found by the thread (of Ariadne) gathered up again.”]
Ovid. Metamor. Bk. VIII.

† Don Antonio Xavier Pérez y López, Of the Faculty and Union of the
Royal Literary University of Seville in the Faculty of the Sacred Canons, its Deputy at Court, Attorney of its Illustrious Bar, and member of the Royal Academy
of Fine Letters of the said City.
The Teatro was published in Madrid, at the Printing Press of Manuel Gonzáles, in 1791
* B.A., College of Arts and Sciences, University of Pennsylvania; J.D.,
D.C.L., Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. The translator
would like to express his deep gratitude to Agustín Parise; Julio Romañach, Jr.;
Valerie Matejowsky; and Benjamin F. Howland for their valuable comments on
earlier drafts of this translation. N.B.—All numbered and lettered footnotes are
original to the text, and uncommon or legally relevant abbreviations in the original
text have been fully elongated. Words in English, Spanish, and Latin have been
made to conform to their respective modern orthographies, except in the case of
direct citations or quotations.
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1 Although Natural Law and the Law of Nations should be the
foundation and rule of the civil Legislation of every Catholic and
cultivated Nation, nevertheless, as the same laws may necessitate
that legitimate Powers determine, confirm, and contract [Natural
Law and the Law of Nations] to the times and circumstances of the
State, these determinations, or positive laws, and the Codes that contain them are most desirable and absolutely necessary, as much for
the sound judgment of forensic [i.e., judicial] affairs as for the governance of civil life.
2 Causes of the multitude of Spain’s Codes and Laws. In our
Spain, as a result of the revolutions which its political constitution
has suffered with the victories of the Goths, the invasion of the Mohammedans, and other lesser [invasions], the number of Codes,
called Civil, Canon, and Royal, has grown considerably, as have
those of uncompiled Resolutions on one or the other Law[s]. When
that same Spain was subject to the Roman Empire, it obeyed its
laws, 1 but as soon as the Goths dominated it, [such obedience]
ceased, or at least the observance of that Jurisprudence was weakened in the extreme. Given that the Gothic Nation [was] as inclined
toward arms as it was alien to letters, it did not substitute other laws
until after many years had passed [after the establishment of] its
Monarchy, and it appears that it governed itself by usages and customs. Afterward, the sacred Literature flourished among the Ecclesiastics, and the two Powers, spiritual and temporal, being consummately united, appropriate regulations of both species of Powers
were established in the National Councils.
3 Origin and idea of the Fuero Juzgo. From these rulings, and
from other ones authorized and published by the Gothic Kings, was
formed the Fuero Juzgo, which was promulgated in the year 693 of
the Christian Era. This Code, the first of the Nation and of its own
law, is divided into 12 books, and is subdivided into several titles.
1. Arthurus [Arthur] Duck, de Usu et auctoritate Jur[is] Civ[ilis] Rom[anorum in dominiis principum Christianorum (London, Richard Hodgkinson, 1653)
(U.K.),] Bk. II. ch. 6. § 4.
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In the first of those [books] is set out the election of the Princes, the
Legislator, and the laws; in the second, that of the Judges, civil trials,
and the persons and instruments that intervene in them; in the third,
that of matrimony, venereal [i.e., sexual] crimes, kinship, inheritance, and tutors, concluding with the title on foundlings; in the
fifth, that of alienation of things belonging to Churches, donations,
and contracts; and [the Code] lastly discusses manumissions. Accusations and the sentences corresponding to various crimes are addressed in the three following books; in the ninth, that of fugitive
slaves, deserters, and the immunity of Churches; in the tenth, that of
partitions of lands, prescriptions, and public boundaries; in the eleventh, that of [medical] Doctors and patients, the violation of sepulchers, and Merchants; and in the twelfth and last [book], that of equity, heretics, and injuries. Now, it is seen that the more excellent
this Code is in certain respects, the more typical it is of an elective
Monarchy rather than of Spain’s present Monarchy, which is heritable for the Kingdom’s happiness, and the former [Monarchy] conforms more to a warlike Nation not well consolidated and which
cares little for agriculture, the arts, and commerce, which are the
bases of a strong and cultivated Empire, as the Spanish [Empire] is
today.
4 Causes of the observance of the Fuero Juzgo having been
altered. Nevertheless, the Kingdom’s political constitution continued in this way until the Mohammedan invasion occurring in the
year 714 changed and almost annihilated it. That fatal catastrophe
made the remains of the tottering Monarchy retreat to the mountains
of Asturias. From here, Don Pelayo [Pelagius of Asturias], descendent of the Royal blood of the Goths, and afterward his august Successors, were little by little shaking off the Muslim yoke, and extending our Holy Religion with their victorious arms up to the Peninsula’s borders.
5 Necessity and origin of other fueros. In those calamitous
times, the Kings needed the immediate aid of the Grandees and Hidalgos, those who served them with their persons, and people funded
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at their expense. For this reason, it was necessary to remunerate such
good services made to the State and to the Fatherland with lands that
were being acquired in the conquests, dividing them among the
same Grandees and Hidalgos—[these lands being] already inhabited
by vassals or with the purpose of being populated afterward—along
with other corresponding privileges. When some considerable City
or Village was won, it was normal, and almost necessary, to bestow
to their Conquerors and Settlers various Royal land grants, and the
fuero, named from the population, like that of Toledo, Seville, etc.
Also, it was necessary to promulgate the Hidalgos’ own fuero. Their
rights were many and considerable, and their observance then, more
indispensable than ever. These circumstances occasioned the publication of the fuero called [the fuero] of the Hidalgos, and finally it
was equally necessary to promulgate a fuero for government in general and the conduct of actions [i.e., lawsuits], like the Fuero Viejo,
which was published in the year 992 and other similar ones.
6 Dr. Don Francisco [de] Espinosa el Tío [“the Uncle”] addresses all these ancient fueros with erudition and soundness in the
valuable manuscript that he created in the sixteenth century; but I,
considering that many of such fueros are peculiar and for this same
reason [that] they do not correspond to the plan of my Work and
[also considering] that others are not printed and consequently lack
the necessary publication of all laws, [for] which in subjects so remote it was necessary that today the printing press facilitated [the
publication], I will give only a brief idea of the Fuero Viejo, which
in the year 1771 two illustrious Jurisconsults 2 printed and published.
7 Analysis of the Fuero Viejo. This Fuero comprises the ancient and general usages and customs of the Nation, especially
th[ose] which correspond to the administration of particular [i.e.,
private] law and justice and also several past fazañas or rulings that
2. Drs. Don Ignacio Jordán [Claudio] de As[s]o [y del Río] and Don Miguel
de Manuel y Rodríguez [el malogrado (“the ill-fated”). IGNACIO JORDÁN CLAUDIO
DE ASSO Y DEL RÍO & MIGUEL DE MANUEL Y RODRÍGUEZ, EL FUERO VIEJO DE
CASTILLA (Madrid, Joachin Ibarra, 1771) (Spain).]
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had acquired the authority of [a] thing adjudged [res judicata (or
causæ finitæ) and] which then served as rules to determine similar
cases and actions. All of it is divided into five books, each one composed of divers titles. In the first of those [titles] are prescribed the
laws corresponding to royal prerogatives, surrenders of the Castillos
[Castles] to the King, and rights and government of the vassals,
Grandees who are expelled by the King from his land, the settlement
of duels, prohibition of [private] forces, and the mode of preventing
them [the raising of such forces], [and] vassals [who resided on
lands belonging to the King], towns with elective rather than hereditary lords [behetrías], and their fueros. [The first book] concludes
with a title on investigators against the powerful who caused vexations against the said vassals and in their towns, unduly demanding
of them [obedience to] some provisions. The penal laws against various classes of crimes are included in the second book; in the third,
those corresponding to the régime for persons who intervene in judicial proceedings, and to their evidence and sentences. [The third
book] ends with some titles that address debts and their sureties and
securities. In the fourth are discussed some contracts, the mode of
acquiring ownership of things, public works, and the building of
mills. In the fifth and last book are found dispositions relating to
dowry pledges, inheritances, [and] partition of lands that are given
on terms, and it concludes with titles pertaining to tutors, disinherisons, [and] legitimate and illegitimate children, with an appendix
of this same fuero.
8 State of the Monarchy which the Fuero Viejo denotes. In
this work were lacking, as in the Fuero Juzgo, appropriate regulations so that agriculture, the arts, and commerce might flourish, and
besides, it is recognized in the titles that discuss duels, forces, investigators, and other such things, that the Monarchy and its Government did not then have the just and necessary power—for the purpose of containing the powerful within the limits of reason—and due
subordination to the Sovereign and to the Fatherland [which are]
jointly indispensable to public tranquility and happiness. Thus, this
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Legislation, no matter how esteemed it may be, and although necessary in order to understand many modern laws that address vassalage, allodial lands [i.e., lands held in allodium], towns with elective
lords, duels, the Grandees’ and Hidalgos’ prerogatives, and other
things in this vein, it was, nevertheless, as the Critics say, typical of
feudal Anarchy; and it neither agrees nor can be reconciled in many
points with the flourishing and vigorous state of our [present] Monarchy.
9 Notable events that altered Jurisprudence in Spain and in
all of Europe. Since the year 992, in which the Fuero Viejo was
published, until that of 1255, in which the [Fuero] Real or [Fuero]
de las leyes was promulgated, two notable events occurred in the
literary World, especially in the juridical one: one was the public
teaching of the Digest, and other parts of the Civil Law, called Common [ius commune], which began to take place at the University of
Bologna; and the other was the formation of the Decretum [Gratiani], privately executed by the monk Gratian in the year 1151, and
the compilation of the Decretals [or Liber extra] in the year 1236 by
St. Raymond of Peñafort [or Penyafort], by virtue of the Supreme
Pontiff Gregory IX’s order, and also, above all, the public teaching
of this Canon Law in the same University of Bologna.
10 Reasons why Civil and Canon Ius Commune were extended to all of Europe. As, on the one hand, there had not been at
that time other general Studies in Europe and all the professors happened [to be] at that University and [since], on the other hand, the
said Civil and Canon Bodies [of Law] had been more organized and
had contained more enlightened principles and rules in all branches
of Jurisprudence than the particular principles and rules of each Nation, these [Bodies of Law] spread throughout all of Europe with
such universal praise and fame that each Kingdom was adopting the
study of the same Civil and Canon Codes in the subsequent erection
and establishment of their respective Universities, where their study
survives up to today.
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11 What merit Roman Law may have. I disregard the orderliness or disorderliness of these Civil Bodies [of Law] and the justice
and utility of their decisions [i.e., rulings], about which there is currently a very lively and intense controversy among the Law Professors, and in my opinion, it is well that [those Bodies of Law] contain
much learning. I see that the famous [Jean] Domat did nothing more
than sort them out, methodizing them in his work known by the
name of The Civil Law [Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel], [a
work] arranged by [a] natural order. I see that the celebrated Wolfius
[Christian Wolff] and other Authors of Natural Law and the Law of
Nations, who address Jurisprudence in a philosophical and geometric way, differ very little from the Civil Law as regards contracts,
last wills [and testaments], and other parts of particular [private]
Law. Finally, I see that the same occurs with the Institutes or Code
that the famous Frederick II [the Great], King of Prussia, formed for
the good government of his Kingdoms.
12 Reasons why Civil Law is inserted into this work. But, in
all honesty, captivated by a species of enthusiasm toward the Civil
Law, I have almost involuntarily drawn myself away from the principal object of my Work, since to include [the Civil Law] in my
Work it suffices that in ancient [times] it was the Law of Spain, that
almost all had been adopted and authorized by King Don Alfonso
[X] the Wise in his celebrated Code of the Partidas, which is currently studied in our Universities, that it [the Civil Law] is the language of our Laws and Jurisconsults, and that it is permitted to cite
in the absence of Royal laws. 3
13 Origin and idea of the Pandects or Digest. The continuous
study of this [Civil] Law that the Professors in our Universities and
accurate histories make, like those of [Giovanni Vincenzo] Gravina
and [Antoine] Terrasson which explain it, causes few Jurists to ignore the origin, formation, and method of the Civil Codes. For this

3. Aut[o Acordado] I, tit. I, bk. II, Recop[ilación].
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reason, and that of [the Codes] not having legislative force in Spanish dominions, I will give only a general idea of such Bodies of Law
as may be conducive to my ends. It is widely known that the Emperor Justinian ordered the formation of the Digest and that by his
order the Jurisconsults Tribonian, Theophilus, and Dorotheus composed it, giving to it such a name because they oversaw it, shall we
say, or [because] they selected from innumerable Codes and Roman
laws that had been scattered as much as if the same were executed
now in Spain. This work was published in the year 533, composed
of 50 books, each one divided into divers titles. [The Digest] thus
comprehends private Law, or that corresponding to persons considered in a private state, which addresses contracts and other subjects
of this class, as well as public [Law], which pertains to the State of
the Empire, such as the establishment and government of Tribunals
and many other topics of the same nature.
14 Its general method is reduced to addressing persons first, afterward things or property, and lastly actions. [It is a] certainly very
well-organized method, given that the first are the subjects of all
Law; the second, [those] on which [the first] rests; and the last, the
means of acquiring that which is due to each [person]. But it is suitable to note that persons are legally different when considered in
relation to private Law than with respect to public Law. In the first
concept, it is required only to examine the difference between those
who have rights and those who do not, that is to say, between the
parents and children of a family, lords and servants, in order for
them to know if they can or cannot acquire ownership of things, enter into contracts, and appear in court, those subjects and similar
topics about which private Law revolves; but public Law resulting
directly in the good of the State, the consideration of persons in this
Law and their differences consist in the degree and employment that
they obtain in the Kingdom, that is to say, if they are Nobles, or
[part] of the general State, Ministers, Judges, etc.
15 Of the Institutes. For this reason, persons under one or the
other concept [i.e., Private or Public Law] are addressed in the first
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book of the Digest, but [it is] not so in the Institutes, called Civil,
because, being only one compendium of private or particular Law,
[it] only discusses them in the first book. One need not notice anything notable in this work, except that it was formed in the same year
of 533 for the easy and brief study of Roman law.
16 Of the Codex. In the following [year] of 534, another collection of the same Law reformed by the Emperor Justinian was published, and it is known by antonomasia with the name of Codex.
Since it is composed of only twelve books, this [work] differs in its
method from the Digest in the number of books: in view of the [fact]
that from one of this work’s title[s] are formed several titles in that
work [i.e., the Digest]. Lastly, [the Codex differs from the Digest in
that] the Digest for the most part includes the decisions of the ancient Jurisconsults of Rome; and the Codex, the constitutions and
rescripts of the Emperors who preceded Justinian. Furthermore, the
Codex [also diverges from the Digest in that it] addresses with more
individuality and extent the topics pertaining to Public Law.
17 Of the Novellæ. The already indicated method of the Digest
and Institutes so much conforms to any class of Jurisprudence that,
as [Zeger Bernhard] [v]an Espen notes, Saint Raymond of Peñafort
followed it in the collection of the Decretals, which is the same
[method] that the Sexto [the Sixth Book of the Decretals] and other
Canon Bodies [of Law] follow, and which [v]an Espen himself, [Julius Laurentius] Selvagius [Julio Laurencio/Laurentio Selvagio], and
other famous Jurisconsults observe. Lastly, the Novellæ is nothing
other than a collection of the Emperor Justinian’s new constitutions
and rescripts which was formed in the year 571, Justin II being
[then] Emperor of the East.
18 Civil Law’s connection with Royal Law. Despite the repeated derogations from the Civil Law made at divers times by
Royal laws, which refer to an Auto Acordado, 4 its [the Civil Law’s]

4. Aut[o Acordado] I, bk. II, tit. I, Recop[ilación].
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connection with that of Castile and other Kingdoms of Spain, including those of the Indies, is so great that Sr. King Don Alfonso the
Wise inserted and in large part authorized it, especially the private
Law of the Civil Bodies [of Law], in his Code of the Partidas. Thus,
many of the Kingdom’s other, subsequent laws referred to it [the
Civil Law], and in Aragon, Navarre, and Catalonia, it enjoys yet
more acceptance. It is, of course, true that in the absence of these
Provinces’ private law, Roman law must not be resorted to, as some
Authors want. Rather, to the Royal [law] of Castile [must resort be
taken], as [Juan Martínez de] Olano and A[r]mendáriz 5 formerly
considered, and it must now stand with more [of a] basis by virtue
of two Royal Resolutions promulgated in this century, which give
greater force of law to the latter opinion. 6
19 Differences between Roman Law and Royal Law. Despite
the close connection between the Civil Law and Spain’s Law, there
are innumerable important topics in the latter that are lacking in the
former, many other [topics] are absolutely altered, and the political
[laws] or public law almost cannot be adapted to our Monarchy’s
current constitution.
20 When and why the study of Roman and Canon Ius Commune spread in Spain. The Romans’ legal bodies came down with
5. [Juan Martínez de] Olano, in Præfat[io,] Concord[ia et nova reductio antinomiarú] Jur[is] Com[unis,] ac Regi[j] [Hispaniarum: in qua veræ horum iurium differentiæ, & quàmplurium legum regiarum, communiúque intellectus, &
recepta praxis causarum forensium explicantur. Cui additæ differentiæ, ac
concordiæ inter iur regium, & regni Nauarræ. Et superadditus est perutilis
epilogus legum septem partitarum, quæ per alias leges posteriores, & per
desuetudinem, aut contrarium usum, in totum, vel partem correctæ, atque
abrogatæ inueniuntur: per ordinem ipsarum partitarum, & titulorum digesstus:
in gratiam studiosorum iudicum, & advocatorum totius Hispanæ. Authore Ioáne
Martinez de Olano, in supremo region Senatu & curia Catholica Advocato. Ad
illustrissimum dominum Didacum Couarruuias à Leiua Episcopum Segobiésem,
& suppremi regij Senatus Præsidem. (Burgos, Felipe de Junta, 1575) (Spain)], no.
11. A[r]mendáriz in the Prologue of the Recopilación of Navarre [Prólogo de la
RECOPILACIÓN DE TODAS LAS LEYES DEL REYNO DE NAVARRA A SUPLICACION DE
LOS TRES ESTADOS DEL DICHO REYNO CONCEDIDAS, Y JURADAS POR LOS SEÑORES
REYES DEL. ESTAN RECOPILADAS POR EL LICENCIADO ARMENDÁRIZ, NATURAL, Y
VEZINO DE LA CIUDAD DE PAMPLONA, Y ABOGADO DE LAS AUDIENCIAS REALES
DEL DICHO REYNO (Pamplona, Carlos de Labàyen, 1614) (Spain)].
6. Aut[os Acordados] III and X, tit. II, bk. III. Recop[ilación].
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the fall of the Roman Empire in such a way that they were enshrouded or hidden among [the Empire’s ruins] until the Digest appeared in Bologna at the beginning of the twelfth century. Irnerius,
a Professor of Humanities in the school of that City, enamored with
its doctrine, explained it publicly. From there, [Roman Law] spread
throughout all Europe with utmost regard, causing one of the notable
revolutions in the Republic of Letters, especially that of Astræa, as
I have [already] noted. The other [Body of Law (Canon Law)] proceeded from the formation of the Decretum and Decretals and from
the establishment of its public study and teaching, firstly in the same
University [of Bologna] and afterward in all the [Universities] in
Spain and the Indies. This outcome intimately and essentially links
these Canon Bodies [of Law] with all those uncompiled Royal [Bodies of Law] and Resolutions of both Kingdoms, and [this in turn]
makes me have to insert the subsequent Decretals and Codes in my
Work and give some idea of them here.
21 Canon or Ecclesiastical Law’s Authority on certain
points. It seems to me accurate to assume that Canon Law, taken in
a strict sense, obliges all the faithful on matters of Faith, Evangelical
Morality, and [other] spiritual subjects conducive to the means and
attainment of the unearthly and ultimate end goal of true Catholics.
Furthermore, the Sacred Law has been the most important branch of
public [law] of all civilized Nations, and even of the barbarians, and
by innumerable laws of the Kingdom it has been confirmed and
commanded to be observed. It has even been inserted almost entirely
into the Partidas and other Royal Bodies [of Law].
22 What is the authority of the Collections of Canons, and
which correspond to the Monarchy’s current state. Such [acceptance] did not happen to each particular collection of Canons,
and disregarding those previous to the Decretum and Decretals,
which are not within my examination, the [collections] corresponding to this Monarchy can be reduced to the National Councils, the
Decretum, Decretals of the Supreme Pontiff Gregory IX up to the
Extravagantes communes, the Holy Council of Trent, and the Bulls
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and Briefs admitted in Spain and the Indies. The national Councils
are a precious treasure of the Catholic Faith’s purity, wholesome and
truly Evangelical Morality, and Ecclesiastical Discipline, adjusted
to the Kingdom’s times and circumstances in the respective epoch
[in which] they took place. For this reason, many Canons and Decretals have been and are famous in the universal Church. Nevertheless, the difference[s] of those times and circumstances and other
causes have made it that many points of external Discipline cannot
adjust to the current constitution of Spain’s Church, nor are these
[Canons and Decretals] admitted by [Spain’s] laws and customs.
Even those jurisdictional points, which certain Authors celebrate
with enthusiasm, seen in another respect have some drawbacks that
not many years ago a wise Minister of State demonstrated in a censure or manuscript [i.e., handwritten] opinion that he gave by order
of the Government on such matters. 7 These considerations prove
that the National Councils should not be included directly in my
Work.
23 What authority or order does the Decretum Gratiani
have? No Canonist doubts that the Decretum lacks legislative force,
since the Monk Gratian privately formed it and the Supreme Pontiffs
have never given this collection such authority. On the other hand,
the darkness that obscured the Republic of Letters in the twelfth century gave rise to Gratian inserting into his Decretum many truncated
Canons and even several apocryphal Decretals, as our celebrated
Archbishop of Tarragona Don Antonio Agustín [y Albanell], [Jean]
Doujat, [v]an Espen, and the same [C]orrección [R]omana demonstrate. The said darkness and a lack of review occasioned the scarce
method, or properly speaking, the disorder of this collection, of
which I can testify by my own experience, since, having made the
greatest of efforts to accommodate the Decretum’s distinctiones,

7. His Excellency Don Manuel de Roda [y Arrieta] of the Council of State
and Secretary of the Universal Office of Mercy and Justice.
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causæ, quæstiones, and Canons to the articles of this Teatro in topical order, I have not been able to achieve it exactly because of its
miscellany, which comprehends that work in an appropriately called
quæstio. In such terms so as not to lengthen and confuse my [Work]
with the insertion of a Body [of Law] which is neither legislative nor
useful, I have omitted inserting its extracts, contenting myself with
indicating the corresponding distinction, causa, and quæstio in the
small plan that precedes each article. For the same reason and having
no more room in the Plan that precedes the Teatro, I have quit including it [in the Teatro]. Nevertheless, I offered to put it in the prospectus that I published for the subscription.
24 Of the authority of the Decretals in general. Although
many Canonists hold that the Decretals of the Supreme Pontiff
Gregory IX and other Canon Codes up to the Extravagantes Comunes have the force of Canon law, even so the learned Theologian
and Canonist Eusebius Amort holds in the prologue of the Summa
or compendium of those very Decretals, not long ago published in
the same Roman Curia, that neither that Supreme Pontiff nor any
other one has issued them as legislative Bodies [of Law], but only
so that the [Decretals] may be publically taught and expounded in
the University of Bologna, because the Bull that is at the beginning
of that Collection is addressed to it and to its Drs. and only aims at
their public teaching in the School of that City.
25 Of the authority of the Decretals in these Kingdoms. But,
whatever the case on this point, the enduring [truth] is that the aforementioned Canon Bodies [of Law] in almost all matters of judicial
discipline and order are authorized by the Laws and customs of the
Nation and the indisputable practice of its Tribunals, as much Ecclesiastical as Secular. King Don Alfonso the Wise adopted and inserted these same Decretals in the first and fourth Partida[s] of his
aforementioned famous Code, to which many other laws of the
Kingdom refer, and, to say it once [and for all], which, joined with
the rulings of the Holy Council of Trent, and amended by that General Synod, by the laudable customs of Spain and the Indies, and by
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the Bulls and Briefs admitted in both Kingdoms, form the Nation’s
surviving Practical-Canon Law. From this incontrovertible assumption are deduced the two following consequences: one, that the said
Canon Bodies [of Law] are extremely [or intimately] connected with
the Royal [Bodies of Law], and the other, that for the same reason
they are conducive to the goal of my Teatro, and [that, therefore,] I
must insert [in my Teatro] the [Canon Bodies of Law] joined with
the uncompiled Canon decisions.
26 Analysis of the Decretals. As I have noted with [v]an Espen,
Saint Raymond of Peñafort kept the method of the Pandects in the
formation of the Decretals; since, although he divided them into
only five books, each one [is] composed of different titles. In the
first, after several preliminaries of a Canon Collection, Ecclesiastical Dignitaries and Persons are addressed, concluding with some titles concerning ecclesiastical trials, which is the subject of the second book. After returning to discuss the same Ecclesiastical Persons
in another capacity and Benefices and Prebends, in the third book
follow titles on the arrangement of various contracts [and] what
should be understood of those [contracts] that deal with ecclesiastical property or that pertain to their jurisdiction on the grounds of the
persons sued. This book thus continues discussing the immunity of
Churches, of the Regular [Clergy], and like things. The fourth occupies itself absolutely in setting out matrimony and its antecedents
and consequents, and the fifth and last occupies itself with criminal
trials and the punishments corresponding to ecclesiastical crimes,
such as simony, and also Ecclesiastical Persons. Hence, in the fifth
book are found treatises on Censures, and it concludes in the style
of the Pandects with titles on the meaning of words and rules of Law.
As the Sexto and other later Collections keep the same order, I need
not detain myself in their explication.
27 Reasons why Saint King Don Fernando and his son Don
Alfonso the Wise pondered and finally executed a new Code of
general Legislation. In this state of Civil and Canon Jurisprudence,
Saint King Don Fernando III gave much more extension, strength,
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and soundness to the Spanish Monarchy in the middle of the thirteenth century than it had had in previous times with the glorious
conquests of the Kingdoms of Cordoba and Seville and with his consummate prudence and sound governance. Thus, that Monarch and
his son and successor, Don Alfonso the Wise, knew that the multitude of particular fueros and the exorbitant privileges conceded to
the Grandees and Hidalgos divided the Kingdom and, therefore, that
in order to avoid its desolation, a Body of Laws or general Code was
needed that, grouping all the classes of the State, notwithstanding
difference[s] and ordered ranking, would prevent the fearsome and
harmful effects of feudal Anarchy, restrain the Powerful within the
limits of the obedience owed to the Sovereign, guard against factions and discords among the wealthy families and their respective
vassals, and give general rules for good judicial order and the upright administration of justice.
28 Analysis of the Fuero Real. The death of the Saint King,
having befallen shortly after the Conquest of Seville in the year
1252, prevented him from executing a project so salutary, but his
son Don Alfonso the Wise carried it out through the formation of
two legal Codes. The first is the Fuero Real, and the second, the
Partidas, forming the former in the year 1255 so as it might serve
as a precursor to the latter. The said Fuero is divided into four books,
each one composed of several titles. The first of those titles begins
with the laws that command observing the Catholic Faith, the King’s
guard and that of his children, thus prescribing the proper obligations of a Christian and a Vassal, which are the fundamental bases
of true Religion [and] wholesome Morality and Politics. Afterwards
follow the titles on the alienation of the property of Churches and
regarding the laws [relating thereto], and it concludes with those
pertaining to public offices, such as those of Mayors, Lawyers, Notaries, etc. The second book occupies all of itself in giving rules
about judicial proceedings and, therefore, discusses the competent
Forum, summons, the complaint’s answer, all manner of evidence
and exceptions, and it concludes by decreeing what is proper relative
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to final judgments, appeals, and res judicata [causæ finitæ]. The
third [book] first discusses matrimony, dowry pledges, community
property, and partitions of lands that are given on terms. Afterwards,
[the third book discusses] legacies and fideicommissa, inheritances
and tutors, and the matters incidental to these subjects. From title 10
to the 20th and last title of this book are found laws pertaining to
various classes of contracts. Finally, the fourth and last book begins
discussing apostates, Jews, Saracens, and their slaves. It continues
indicating the punishments for all manner of crimes and ends with
titles on adoptions, emancipations, foundlings, pilgrims, and ships.
From this short analysis, it follows that the Fuero Real is a Code
formed principally for the upright administration of commutative
and criminal justice among all the classes and Provinces of the Kingdom and, in a word, that it is a Body [of Law] similar to the Institutes
of the Emperor Justinian or the Codex Frederico[-Augustinus],
whose primary object is private law and judicial proceedings, in
which the said Code is excellent. But, Public Law not being its principal end, [the Fuero Real] only indicates these subjects of State incidentally or as accessories to those of private Jurisprudence.
29 Description of the Partidas. The Partidas, which King Don
Alfonso the Wise finished in the year 1260, is the complete Body of
Law that gathers together Public Law as much as Private Law, and
it comprehends it all with a scientific, sound, Christian, just, and equitable method. [It is] in all respects and truly a Code and [one]
which will perhaps not have an equal in Europe. Indeed, the first
Partida is a detailed compendium of the Canon Law that flourished
in that epoch. The second [Partida] is a tried and true summary of
the ancient fueros and customs of the Nation, which forms a legal
history of the same, and it also comprehends the most wholesome
Politics. The third, fifth, and sixth Partidas, in short, contain the best
[Law], including Roman Law on lawsuits, contracts, and last wills
[and testaments], all adjusted to the constitution of the Monarchy in
that time, and deciding various uncertain points in the Civil Law.
The fourth Partida is a compendium of the Canons and Civil Laws
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pertaining to betrothals and marriages and their incidental subjects.
The seventh and last Partida is the same [i.e., a compendium] regarding crimes and punishments, ending in the style of the Pandects
and Decretals with titles on the meaning of words and rules of Law.
30 Excellence of the Partidas. This work, for whose praise the
Nation’s Politicians and Wise Men 8 do not find words sufficient,
comprehends so many and so sound rules of Religion, Justice, and
pure and Christian Politics that a thick volume would be necessary
to gather together the principal rules, and in all honesty, what more
orderly and useful disposition [could there be] than that which prescribes the Kingdom’s succession? 9 What more convenient and advantageous [means could there be] than that which provides that the
King should honor all the classes of serviceable vassals with inclusion of craftsmen and artisans by the reasons that it proposes? 10
Where [else] is found another thing more in accordance with the
spirit of the Gospels than that which commands honoring and supporting the true, recent convert to our Holy Catholic Faith? 11 What
is more humane and equitable than that which subdues the infamy
of true criminals without transcendence to their families? 12 And finally, what is more advantageous to the people than that which promotes marriages with the most persuasive reasons? 13
31 When the Partidas were published. Nevertheless, because
the Powerful already knew of the blow that the publication of the
Partidas was going to give to their excessive privileges and for other
political reasons that intervened shortly after their formation, [publication] was not done until the year 1348 in the Cortes that took
place in Alcalá de Henares under the reign of Don Alfonso XI, and
it is probable even that the death of this Monarch, having befallen
8. Among others, Don Diego de Saavedra Fajardo and Don Gregorio
Mayáns y Siscár.
9. L[aw] 9, tit. 9, Part[ida] I.
10. L[aw] 3, tit. 10, Part[ida] II.
11. L[aw] 6, tit. 24, Part[ida] VII.
12. L[aw] 9, tit. 31, Part[ida] III.
13. L[aw] 1, tit. 20, Part[ida] II.
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shortly afterward in the year 1350, impeded the effects of its publication, and [the Partidas] were not completely effective until the
year 1505 when [such effect] was given by King Don Fernando [II
the Catholic] and Queen Doña Juana [I the Mad] in the Cortes that
took place in the City of Toro.
32 Of the Leyes de Estilo. In the time that spanned from the
formation of the Partidas to their first publication done in the Cortes
of Alcalá, only the Leyes de Estilo, which added up to the number
of 252 without the least division into books or other members or
parts, were promulgated in the year 1310. Most [of the laws] address
judicial proceedings, civil as well as criminal, and, therefore, the
persons and evidence that intervene in them, and some also discuss
contracts and last wills [and testaments]. As the[ir] style is the custom of the Courts and Tribunals in proceedings to conduct trials, it
is a natural consequence that the said laws include all that which in
that time was practiced in the conduct of actions and forensic affairs
besides that which was not contained in the fueros, and even sometimes in particular cases against what was provided in [the fueros],
just as a legitimately introduced, special custom derogates the general Law. Finally, [there is] that which later laws of the Kingdom
provide regarding these same Leyes de Estilo, [which] is that they
are to be observed inasmuch as they have been well received in practice. 14
33 In what National [i.e., Domestic] Jurisprudence consisted
until the middle of the fourteenth century. In accordance with
these antecedents, until the middle of the fourteenth century Spain’s
Jurisprudence consisted of the ancient and general usages and customs of the Nation reduced to Codes, which are the Fueros, and in
those pertaining to judicial proceedings, which were written afterward, in this way forming the Leyes de Estilo, since, even though
the Partidas—which include besides a considerable multitude of

14. L[aw] 3, tit. 1, bk. II, Recop[ilación].
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Canon and Civil decisions corresponding to all the branches of Private and Public Law—were already composed, they could not govern in forensic and political affairs, as they were not published until
the year 1348 in the Cortes of Alcalá
34 From the beginning of the sixteenth century the aspect of
National [i.e., Domestic] Jurisprudence changed. From this time
and markedly after the Cortes that took place in Toro in the year
1505, National [i.e., Domestic] Legislation took on another aspect.
[This was so] because, [on the one hand,] the Laws of the Partidas
[were] already authorized and published in order that they govern
when there was no Fuero on the matter 15 and, on the other hand, the
inclination of the Practitioners of the last centuries being very impassioned, no less toward the Civil Law as toward the Canon Law
of the Decretals with which the same Partidas concur, such Laws
continued to be introduced and observed, which survive until today
with certain modifications.
35 Of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá. These reforms and many
new Laws or Pragmatics were published in accordance with how the
cases arising and the times and circumstances of the State demanded
it. After there were a considerable number of them or many were
formed in one go, the [Laws or Pragmatics] were compiled into one
or more volumes by virtue of Royal Orders, giving them legislative
force. Of this latter class the first Code is the Ordenamiento de Alcalá made and authorized in the said Cortes [of Alcalá] and in the
year 1348, which [Code] is divided into thirty-two titles, each one
composed of divers laws relating to the order of conducting proceedings, arranging some contracts and testaments in part, and curbing
and condemning crimes with corresponding punishments.
36 Of the Laws of Toro. The second [of this class of compilations] is that one which comprehends the 83 Laws that were made
and published in the celebrated Cortes that took place in the City of
Toro in the year 1505 in order to arrange solemnities of testaments;
15. L[aw] 3, tit. 1, bk. II, Recop[ilación].
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testamentary and abintestate successions; special, extra portions of
the one-third and one-fifth; the order of succeeding in Spain’s Primogenitures; the alimonies that fathers must pay to illegitimate children; the right of rescission [i.e., the right of first refusal]; the punishment for adultery; and other incidental subjects. [Since all of
these] laws [are] inserted into the corresponding titles of the Recopilación, I summarize them in this Body without making particular
mention of them.
37 Of the Ordenamiento Real. Before and after the Cortes of
Toro, several collections of the Pragmatics, Cédulas, and other
Royal rulings that have been successively published, were made, as
the circumstances of the Monarchy and arising affairs had demanded it. The first of them is that known by the title of Ordenamiento Real, authorized and published by the Catholic Monarchs Don Fernando [II of Aragon] and Doña Isabel [I of Castile] in
the year 1496, [itself] laid out into eight books, and these, into divers
titles, in which are located absolute or partial derogations from the
ancient Fueros and Laws and also the newly established Laws in
some matters. [As it is the case] that the greatest part of these Laws
are inserted into the Recopilación and that the titles of that former
Body [of Law] correspond with those of the latter, I should not detain myself anymore in their explication.
38 Of the Recopilación. The Recopilación was thus first published in the year 1567 by virtue of King Don Felipe II’s order,
which authorized it and made it include the laws of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá, the [Ordenamiento] Real, all the [Laws] of
Toro, and others that had been published in the interval, that were
not found derogated. From the said year of 1567 until that of 1777,
several editions of this Body [of Law] have been made with some
short additions, unless this title be given to the Autos Acordados, or
rulings and reports of the [King’s] Council authorized and published
by the King and that by virtue of Royal Order were gathered together
in a volume divided into books and titles under the same method as
that of the Recopilación. [The Autos Acordados] were published for
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the first time in the year 1745, forming the third and last volume of
the same Recopilación, with which it concordantly runs and [which]
has been reprinted with small additions.
39 The Recopilación’s method. These two Bodies [of Law, i.e.,
the Recopilación and Autos Acordados] are divided into nine books,
each one composed of divers titles. With the purpose of including
the derogations or amplifications of the antecedent laws and only
some new ones for resolving doubts, cases and actions that ensued
in accordance with arising circumstances and which presupposed an
arranged Code, which are the Partidas. [As] the Compilers of the
Recopilación and Auto Acordados also assumed [the applicability
of] the general, scientific principles and rules of private and public
Jurisprudence, [the two Bodies of Law] did not keep any other
method than that conducive to their principal end, [that method]
which is reduced to giving a species of manual and collection in
which the proper modifications and new laws published for insinuated reasons, might be found with ease.
40 Analysis of the Recopilación. Indeed, in the first book after
the title on the Catholic Faith, there are up to twelve [titles] that address Ecclesiastical subjects added to the old ones, in whose number
it is worthy of noting the title on Royal Patronage [el patronato real]
and that of other Patrons and the title on the Commission of the Crusades. The second [book] begins to discuss the laws, and there follow many titles which prescribe the obligations of Presidents and
Judges of the Audiencias and Chancelleries and of their subaltern
Ministers. The fourth [title], which addresses [the obligations] of the
King’s Council, is especially significant. The third book begins with
the establishment and arrangement of various Audiencias, afterward
discusses the Corregidores [or Alcaldes Mayores] and Residencias,
and continues [by] providing [laws] about the Alcaldes de Sacas, the
Jurisdiction of the Prior and Consuls of Bilbao, the Council of the
Mesta, [and] the Court’s Chamberlains. It concludes with titles concerning the First Physicians [to the King] and Examiners of Medicine, Apothecaries, Blood-letters, and Veterinarians.
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41 In the first title of the fourth book are found the proper rules
for maintaining the just rights of the Royal Jurisdiction. Afterward,
up to title 22, [there] are discussed judicial proceedings with some
novelty regarding old Jurisprudence, prescribing the circumstances
of the Court’s cases and what term there is for the answer of the
demand, pleading dilatory or peremptory exceptions, and impeaching witnesses. The order of conducting actions in the first and second instance; of proceeding in case of the litigants’ default; of the
Cédulas [i.e., letters patent] that are issued against the law, recusals,
sentences, appeals, first and second petitions, executions, deliveries,
and of costs and their assessment are addressed as well. From title
23 to the 33rd and last title, the obligations of Court and Chancellery
Bailiffs and of Jailers are laid out, and [the fourth book] concludes
with some court fees of various officials of justice.
42 In the fifth book, these three subjects with ones incidental
thereto are principally included: first, that of betrothals and marriages; second, that of inheritances and successions; and the last, that
of contracts, concluding with titles regarding Mints and their officials, silversmiths and goldsmiths, and the rate of bread. In this book
are notable titles: the fourth [title] that discusses the agents empowered to make testaments, a peculiar subject and one not very old in
our Jurisprudence; the sixth [title] that gives powers for the extra
portions of one-third and one-fifth, albeit today these are found to
be restricted by the Royal Decree issued on the 28th of April of
1789; the seventh [title] that provides the rules for succeeding in
Primogenitures, which title, being the first one that is found in our
Codes, proves that its foundations were not previously so common
and known; lastly, title 15 is special for prescribing the rules that are
to be observed in the annuity land rents, about which there were previously several debates.
43 The treatises or titles of the sixth book are more in conformity
with Spain’s ancient Fueros and with those that are contained in the
second Partida than are the other titles, since they [the treatises and
titles of the sixth book] address the Noblemen and Hidalgos, towns
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with elective lords, vassals, and jointly castles and forts, the King’s
Court and Attorneys, Ambassadors and the chief Messenger, imposts, tributes, tolls and state-run shops, yantares, treasures, gold
and silver mines, and things prohibited to be taken out of the Kingdom. It concludes with titles on huntsmen, poulterers, the King’s
hunters, and the Kingdom’s cartwrights, among which are found [titles] concerning the breeding of horses of good stock and another
[title], which is the last, concerning servants in general.
44 The seventh [book] begins with the important subjects that
lead to the good government of City Councils: [the] guardianship of
the privileges of Cities [and] municipal offices [and] resignations
from public offices, the property and rents of Councils, apportionment, public boundaries, and hunting and fishing. Then follow several titles that have no connection among themselves or with their
antecedents, like the tenth [title], that discusses ships; the eleventh,
which discusses artisans and workers; the twelfth, which discusses
dress and clothes; the thirteenth and following titles up to the seventeenth, which discuss textile mills. It concludes with those titles that
address wax and tallow chandlers, tanners, and the Kingdom’s boilermakers.
45 The eighth book retains more connection among its titles and
subjects, since it begins with [the title on] investigations and investigators for uncovering and punishing crimes. The punishments corresponding to each class of crimes are imposed in the following titles up to title twenty-three, among which the eighth title—which
imposes the ultimate punishment [i.e., death] to him who challenges
to duel or who accepts the duel, along with other grave punishments,
like that of outlawry—is worth noting. In this imposition is seen the
difference between the [current] Monarchy and the ancient and
modern Laws, since, the State not then having the forces sufficient
to contain by the processes of justice the excesses of the Grandees
and Hidalgos and the injuries that were reciprocally made to each
other, aided by their families and partisans, it was a stroke of excellent and useful policy for the Houses and the Kingdom to permit and
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authorize dueling under certain rules which curbed the excesses in
order not to run the risk of such a terrible quarrel and which prevented homicides. [This was so] because convincing evidence of a
real and grave injury was now necessary to proceed to the duel, and
because Hidalgos were classified as perfidious and infamous who
would go on to take justice by their [own] hand[s] without these requirements, [just as] those [Noblemen] who did not accept just dueling or who broke the peace or the established truce among the
same Hidalgos [were so classified], so that the hideous circus prepared for the duel, that seemed like the bloody theater of homicides,
was [precisely] that which timely prevented the homicides. Thus,
few of those solemn duels are mentioned in the History of Spain,
and the Hidalgos subdued the torrent of their power and factions and
properly had to prefer the judgment pronounced by the Judges and
Tribunals to that of a haphazard and fatal sword strike.
46 Nevertheless, as[, on the one hand,] duels were frequent after
that Epoch without observing the solemnities of dueling and under
the ridiculous pretexts of a fantastic honor and, on the other hand, as
the King and his Government had fortunately acquired from the Nation the forces sufficient to contain the most powerful noblemen and
to classify their grievances in the Tribunals in accordance with the
limits of reason and justice, dueling, which, [besides], is a species
of direct contempt for Royal and legitimate Authority, has been
justly prohibited with such grave punishments. But, returning to my
intent, from which I have almost involuntarily separated myself
through the importance of such [an] event [i.e., dueling], the book
[to which I] referred concludes with titles leading to those convicted
by Justices, pardons, and punishments from Chambers [in camera].
47 The ninth and last book occupies itself in addressing all the
branches of the Royal Treasury and, therefore, discusses in the first
place the great Comptrollers and Judges of the Revenue Office who
today compose the Royal Treasury Council and right after [them]
the High Revenue Office. Afterward, it discusses the judicial proceeding in actions involving taxation, their [the tax collector’s]
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leases [of], biddings [for], and commitments [on condemned property], and the administration of the same. Next, are found titles on
sales taxes and confiscations, tax-free fairs and markets, [and] Royal
one-third tithes, and those [titles] that arrange various species of import and export duties, such as that of the Archbishopric of Seville,
that of the Kingdom of Granada, etc. The book ends with titles on
the Royal tithes, legal tender, and the Armies’ suppliers. It has
seemed to me convenient to make more extensive analysis of these
two Bodies [of Law] than of the previous ones, because among all
the laws compiled or reduced to Codes, theirs are the ones that
should be observed in the first place, informing with regard to this
issue that there are many titles lacking in the Autos Acordados that
are found in [the Recopilación], since there have been no novelties
after the Recopilación that may have been worthy of repeating in the
Autos Acordados.
48 Since the sixteenth century the Monarchy began to decline until the present, in which it has been reestablished. Although the Monarchy arrived at its greatest splendor and grandeur
along all lines in the sixteenth century, whether by the Crowns of
Aragon and Navarre uniting with that of Castile, [or] whether by the
conquest of the Kingdom of Granada and absolute expulsion of the
Mohammedans from those Kingdoms, and finally by the discovery
of America and other political causes, nevertheless, one observes
that from the end of the same sixteenth century up to the beginning
of the present [eighteenth century] the Monarchy was little by little
falling from that degree of opulence until the reigning August House
[of Bourbon], especially Señor Don Carlos III, Father of the Fatherland, and his August son and successor, climbed to the Throne of
Spain and began to reestablish [that degree of opulence], as much
its heroic virtues as its vast Dominions, carrying out the wise policies that have recognized and remedied the ills that weakened the
State and establishing other wise laws that lead it to its previous
splendor.
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49 These three notable states of peak, decline, and reestablishment demonstrate that since the middle of the sixteenth century various maxims, laws, and customs that were perverting the Body politic were being introduced into legislation and the political constitution, just as sicknesses corrupt the human [body], and they also evidenced that the remedies applied in these last times, especially in the
previous Reign, are appropriate and effective for the reestablishment
of public health. Neither is it fitting for me nor is it typical of my
intent to discover the causes of those ills, nor to single these out, but
only to indicate them, proposing a small idea of the same remedies
applied in order to reestablish no less the true Ecclesiastical Discipline than useful and suitable Public Law, in consideration of [the
fact] that these wise regulations are found scattered over the Pragmatics, Royal cédulas, Decrees, Instructions, [Papal] Bulls, and
Briefs accepted in Spain and the Indies and uncompiled until now. I
say uncompiled since there are only three copies of them, although
I do not disregard that the Council’s order has had a Collection made
of all these Resolutions belonging to the Government of Castile,
which compose more than 30 volumes in folio, and thus that is consequently why, as containing many reformed [resolutions] for other
later ones, they are like a hidden treasure that needs to be discovered
and purified so that it may serve public uses.
50 New Regulations to reestablish National Ecclesiastical
Discipline. In truth, in this collection, or accumulation of uncompiled resolutions, many [resolutions] are found that have reetablished the Discipline of Spain’s Church, for example the celebrated Concordats with the Holy See of the years 1737 and 1753;
the Bulls obtained at the King’s bidding to reduce the immunity or
the right of asylum to their due limits; the establishment of the Rota
of Spain or the new arrangement of the Nunciature, by virtue of
which no Ecclesiastical case leaves the Kingdom and all the provisions of Benefices and Prebends are made in the same, except those
corresponding to the 52 [provisions] reserved to the Apostolic See.
To this class also belong the dispositions relating to the good use of
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the Ecclesiastical State’s censures, fuero[s], and contributions; the
residence[s] of Benefices; and many other [dispositions] that have
given force and effect to that [régime] decreed by the Holy Council
of Trent and to that which conforms with the true spirit of the
Church.
51 Other regulations for the establishment and improvement
of Public Law. Not less salutary are the resolutions relating to other
branches of Public Law, such as the creation of Procurators [i.e.,
mandataries] of the Community and Deputies for supplies; the arrangement and administration of Public Property and rents; the prudent freedom of commerce, as much in Spain as in the Indies; [and]
the promotion of the mechanical arts, whether by exempting raw
materials from contributions or by honoring artisans. To the same
end of the public benefit contribute the reform and new method of
Education, the creation of patriotic Societies and maritime and land
Consulates, the creation of montepíos for widows and orphans, the
strength and increase in land and sea arms, the establishment of the
new Audiencia of Extremadura and the extension of territory conceded to the Audiencia of Seville, the arrangement of the Corregimientos and [the] new Rules governing Corregidores, and innumerable other dispositions that would be bothersome to point out, given
that all of them are to be inserted in this work.
52 The close and essential link between all the ancient and
modern Laws and Codes. I have insinuated the successive order of
the Legislation of Castile and of all its scattered Codes and Resolutions, including those pertaining to Canon Law and National Ecclesiastical Discipline in order now to demonstrate the close and essential connection and relations that the same Codes and Laws have
between themselves from the first to the last. That link is as reciprocal and great as that one that is between the referent [i.e., reality]
and the tale and between light and visible objects, since each Code
and Law, or later Laws, certainly and evidently refer to previous
ones, and most times those later Codes and Laws do nothing more
than modify [these earlier Codes and Laws], derogating or adding to
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them in part and leaving them to survive in other parts. Thus it is for
this reason, but also because the last Auto [A]cordado, which discusses this subject, decrees that the reasoning of the same derogated
law should be preferred, in the absence of another legal disposition,
to the opinions of Authors, especially foreign ones, 16 for the defense
and determination of forensic and political affairs; [that] the study
of the ancient laws is known to be indispensable to each Practitioner
of Law for the understanding of the modern ones; and that the ones
and the others are closely and essentially linked and joined.
53 The necessity of learning and studying the ancient Laws
and Codes. The necessity of the said study is recognized more and
more [when] attending to that which the aforementioned Auto
[A]cordado by the entire Council [of Castile] decree[d] on the 4th
of December of 1713, with reference to many prior laws that are
found in the Fuero Juzgo and other ancient [codes], in the Partidas,
Ordenamientos, the first [of the] Law[s] of Toro, the Pragmatic that
is at the beginning of the new Recopilación, and various others, inasmuch as they provide this. In order to act upon as much as to determine the actions and causes [i.e., lawsuits] that may be brought,
the Laws of the Recopilación of these Kingdoms, the Ordenamientos and Pragmatics, [and] the Laws of the Partida[s] and the other Fueros (in that they were still in use)
are to be entirely observed despite that it is said of them that
they are neither used nor observed, and that in the event that
there be no law in all of them that decides the question, or in
the event that there be one, it itself being uncertain, there
must be recourse precisely to His Majesty so that he may
explain it.
Sr. D. Felipe V confirmed the same on the 12th of June of 1714,
mandating that the laws of the Kingdom be observed although it is
said that they are not in use. 17 Therefore, one comes again to deduce
as a necessary consequence the close connection of the modern
Codes and Laws with the ancient ones and that the knowledge and
16. Aut[o Acordado] I, tit. 2, bk. II, Recop[ilación].
17. Aut[o Acordado] II, same tit. [tit. 2, bk. II].
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study of one and the other is indispensable to defending and determining actions and political matters. For how else is it possible that
Lawyers and Judges might acquire a complete instruction of each
juridical subject, not to mention represent and decide causes according to ancient laws in the absence of modern ones?
54 [This] now being a legal demonstration that all the aforementioned Bodies and Laws are closely and essentially linked, as much
in form as in substance, I must not detain myself in corroborating it,
whether by means of repeating that the Partidas are the meeting
point of the prior Fueros, of the Civil and Canon Law that they insert
and authorize, and of the Codes and uncompiled Resolutions of both
Laws which refer to the laws of the same Partidas: recollecting the
reasons for this close link, for example, that legal and political alterations successively fall upon the government of a particular Nation
which with difficulty varies its character and moral and physical
constitution [and which] absolutely impedes changing it, and it was
normal that many ancient customs and fueros always be preserved
and that the new ones might do no more than modify them, leaving
them surviving in large part. Thus, for truth’s sake[,] the aforementioned essential connection being a proved fact, whatever might be
added to its confirmation would be superabundant.
55 Of the Laws of the Indies and of their connection to those
of Castile. The Laws and Jurisprudence of the Indies have the same
link with those of Castile and also among themselves. The certainty
of the first [point] is recognized, considering that Civil and Canon
Law is equally studied in the Universities of those Kingdoms as in
those of this Peninsula and above all that, as it is provided in repeated Laws of the Recopilación of the Indies, in their absence the
Laws of Castile must be observed there. 18
56 Connection between the ancient and modern Laws of the
Indies. The connection that the Law of the Indies has within itself
is more regular and clear. This [Law] can be divided into three
18. L[aw] 2, tit. 1, bk. II, Recopilación of the Indies.
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epochs and classes: first, the Royal Cédulas and dispositions that
preceded their Compilation [i.e., the Recopilación de Leyes de las
Indias] and served to form it in the year 1661, inserting and summarizing those [Cédulas and dispositions] that the Government considered appropriate; second, the same Recopilación; and the third and
last, subsequent Resolutions, as much Royal as Canon, admitted but
not compiled until the present. Although the first class is a copious
and useful source for the understanding of the later [Resolutions],
nevertheless, it does not enter into the Plan of my Work, and besides,
its inclusion would have made it drawn-out and irritating enough, as
the Royal Cédulas and dispositions from which the aforementioned
Code is drawn and formed are innumerable.
57 Reasons why Legislation of the Indies is inserted into this
Work. But, I have considered it appropriate to insert in this Teatro
the summulæ of the compiled laws and subsequent rulings that have
been published to date for the Government of those Kingdoms and
that are still found [to be] scattered. The principal reason for this
insertion is the importance and utility of the Law of the Indies, as
much for the Practitioners who aspire to obtain Judgeships and
Robes therein as for those who are destined to represent actions and
litigants in this Court and in other considerable towns of the Kingdom. Our Indies are a new world whose great distance, diversity of
climates and customs, and both its immense extension and riches
demand in many particulars a different law from the one that is observed in the Peninsula, and they require it more than any other
Province or Kingdom located in our continent, whose physical,
moral, and political constitution differs little within its borders. For
this reason, I have likewise not inserted the general Laws for a given
Kingdom or Province of Spain, especially considering that, in accordance with the spirit of two Autos Acordados, juridical uniformity regarding the general points of Jurisprudence is desired in
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all of them, save the particular Fueros that each Kingdom or Province enjoys and that remain untouched. 19 But, since it is not possible
even to touch upon these due to their infinite number, it has seemed
appropriate to me to note only by way of an appendix the notable
differences that are found between the Law of Castile and those of
other Kingdoms and dominions united with the Crown of that [Kingdom (Castile)].
58 Analysis of the Recopilación of the Indies. Returning now
to address the Law of the Indies, the intimate and essential connection that is found among the compiled laws and the Pragmatics and
other Royal and Canon Resolutions that are still scattered, is evident
because almost all of the latter are mere explications, confirmations,
or partial derogations of the former. The Recopilación of those
Kingdoms [i.e., the Indies] is very similar to that of Castile in the
order of its formation and even on the subjects of which [both]
Law[s] are formed. Thus, that [Recopilación of the Indies] is divided
into nine books and subdivided into titles. In the first book, all the
dispositions concerning Ecclesiastical points are inserted. In the second [book], after discussing the laws, the order and arrangement of
the Council of the Indies and their other Superior Tribunals are prescribed, together with that of all their dependent or subaltern [Tribunals]. The third [book] begins by addressing the Royal Dominion
and provisions of Offices; afterward discusses Viceroys, Presidents,
Governors, and military things or those typical of fortifications and
war, and it concludes with titles that discuss ceremonies, courtesies,
messengers, and Chasquis [or Chaskis] Indians.
59 The fourth book begins with treatises relating to discoveries
by land and sea; afterward discusses cities and settlements and of
their property, grain barns, and taxes; immediately afterward addresses public works and roads, gold and silver mines, and things
incidental thereto; and concludes by discussing fishing, pearl hunting, and textile mills. The fifth [book] first addresses the boundaries
19. Aut[o Acordado] III and X, tit. 2, bk. III, Recop[ilación].
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and divisions of Governments, after which follows a miscellany of
titles, such as the fourth [title] that discusses the Holy Brotherhood,
the fifth [title that discusses] the President and Council of the Mesta,
the sixth [title that discusses] First Physicians [to the King] and Examiners [of Medicine], albeit from the ninth [title] onwards [the fifth
book] addresses judicial proceeding and various recourses, like that
of appeal. The [fifth book] concludes with the title on residencias.
60 The sixth book occupies itself almost completely in addressing the Indians, Encomenderos [i.e., the Holders of Encomiendas]
and Encomiendas, and points incidental to the same subjects. The
largest part of criminal Jurisprudence is found in the seventh [book],
beginning with the title on Investigators and concluding with that on
crimes and punishments. The eighth [book] contains that [title] regarding the Royal Treasury, such as its Revenue Office, Comptrollers, Tribunals, Treasurers, its Administration, sales taxes, seizures,
customs duties, medias anatas, one-ninth tithes and vacancy taxes
of Bishoprics, and other things of this sort. The ninth and last [book]
occupies itself principally with two matters which have disappeared
or which at least have the most notable difference [in nature] today;
such are the Audiencia de la Contrataci[ó]n, that has just become
defunct, and navies and fleets, that are governed in another way
since the establishment of free Trade to the Indies.
61 All the titles of the same class should have been united,
and [of the] detriment that continues to be found [because they
are] scattered. In this state of national Jurisprudence, in which the
ancient Codes and Laws are found [to be] closely and essentially
linked with the modern ones, each title or subject had to form a
united Body [of Law] and also, in order so to explain to myself, organized so that the spirit of the ones and the others may be communicated amongst each other. But, as a result of the said political revolutions, all the subjects are found dismembered, such as that on
Lawyers in 16 titles all separated, most of which are placed in a different Code, besides many scattered and uncompiled decisions.
From this comes the difficulty of finding all of them today, when
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knowledge of them is necessary. From this comes the doubt and
confusion in which at every turn Practitioners find themselves about
whether the title or law that they have in view is derogated by a subsequent one or whether it depends upon the lights that earlier ones
offer. It is from this that Practitioners normally find themselves isolated, some in the Civil Law, others in Canon Law, and [still] others
in Royal and Practical Law. Finally, from this [it] arises that enlightened Persons desire with longing [to find] a thread that leads with
certainty from one extreme of this species of labyrinth to another.
62 No printed work contains the essential meeting point between ancient and modern Legislation. It is true that there are
many works of Jurisprudence and excellent, both foreign as well as
national, formed under divers method[s] and order[s]. Some are
mere expositions or glosses of the texts, others address one or more
juridical subjects, and there are Dictionaries of Civil and Canon Law
jointly in the French and Latin languages and two in Castilian [Spanish], of which one explains various terms or words of our Jurisprudence and the other, the antiquated Laws of the Partidas. Additionally, there are different indices and repertoires of some national
Bodies [of Law]. Finally, there are the concordances that in recent
times have been incorporated into the Civil Institutes [Institutionum
Imperialium] commented upon by [Arnold] Vinnius [or Vinnen],
Selvagius’s Canon Institutes [Institutionum Canonicarum], and [Lucio] Ferraris’s Library [Bibliotheca, that is] likewise [on] Canon
[Law].
63 Foreign and National [i.e., Domestic] Dictionaries do not
contain this meeting point. But, in truth, none of these Works fulfill the desired idea, although they show the way of arriving to it. In
order to demonstrate this proposition, I do not have a reason to detain myself on the foreign Works, including those that address Civil
and Canon Ius Commune. Since, how can they reveal the link that
the Fueros, Partidas, Ordenamientos, Recopilación, Pragmatics,
and other uncompiled Royal and Canon Resolutions have among
themselves, Works that do not include any of these laws, except only
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seldom and by chance, that do not keep a chronological order, and
that do not conform this [order] to their object and subject? The Dictionaries that there are of our Law are the one that Sr. Don Andrés
Cornejo, Knight of the Order of Santiago, [member] of His Majesty’s Council and his Alcalde de Casa y Corte at that time, and
today on the Supreme [Council] of Castile, published in the year
1779, entitled Historical and Forensic Dictionary of the Royal Law
of Spain [Diccionario histórico y forense del Derecho Real de España], to which he added an Appendix in the year 1784. The other
[Dictionary] is that of the antiquated terms of the Partidas, to which
the Lawyer Don Diego Pérez Mozún, a long-standing Attorney of
the Illustrious Bar of this Court, has just given birth. [They are] both
excellent along their own lines, but as this latter [Dictionary] limits
[itself] to the explication of terms and none of their Authors aimed
to point to the central meeting [point] of all the ancient and modern
Laws and Canons of Spain and the Indies, it is not strange that they
had not arrived at this end.
64 Neither do the repertoires and indices of any National
[i.e., Domestic] Code [contain this meeting point]. The repertoires
and indices that there are of some national Code or Codes are reduced to that one that Dr. Hugo [de] Celso published in the year
1540, [which] includes some Laws of the Fuero Juzgo, the [Fuero]
Real, and other decisions that had been published up to that time. If
this Work had been composed now, [making it] more complete,
placing it in chronological order, and putting in notes on derogations, it would have prevented my Teatro [from being written]; but
as two and a half centuries have run from its publication to the present, in which [time] our Law has been considerably increased and
differentiated, it does not make up for [my Teatro’s] absence, especially [since] such a repertoire is difficult to find, and it provides
merely 786 articles or, properly speaking, words without a chronological order, note[s] on derogated [Laws and decisions], or other
[guides] conducive to the illustration of our Jurisprudence.
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65 The other repertoires and indices are only of this or that national Code, like that of the Partidas that Dr. Alonso Díaz de Montalvo published in the year 15[5]0, and that most exact [repertoire]
of the same [Partidas] that was printed in the year 1611, composed
by Dr. Gregorio López de Tovar, grandson of Sr. Gregorio López,
the famous interpreter of those very own Partidas. Not to bother the
Public with other [repertoires] of less moment, the most modern and
significant are that [index] of the Recopilación that Dr. D. Santiago
Magro [y Zúrita] composed until the year 1724 and that he printed
in the year 1726 and those [indices] that are found at the end of the
Recopilación and Autos Acordados, especially in the [Recopilación]
of the Indies, which is more copious. But, nevertheless, the same
difference of times; the considerable increase of our Legislation
from the year 1724 to the present; the giving of a new order or place
to the Autos Acordados in this interim; and [the fact] that each one
of the aforementioned indices is [only] partial and does not include
the succession of our Jurisprudence, nor does it contain notes on
derogated [Laws], or other illuminating features, make it such that
such [repertoires and indices] are very far from containing the meeting point of the reciprocal relations that there are between the ancient and modern Codes and Laws and between the diverse classes
of Jurisprudence.
66 Neither do the concordances put into various foreign
works [contain this meeting point]. The concordances of our Law
with the Civil and Canon Ius Commune are ultimately very useful
and conform to that which an Auto Acordado 20 provides and also
lead more directly to the goal of this Work. But, on the one hand,
such concordances keep to Civil subjects of private Law and to the
Canon subjects that this or that foreign Author has addressed. On
the other hand, these same works lack innumerable matters, the most
important ones, as much o[n] our Royal Jurisprudence as o[n] our
Canon Jurisprudence, and for the same reason they cannot fulfill the
20. Aut[o Acordado] III, bk. II, tit. 1. Recop[ilación].
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indicated idea that is desired. Besides the fact that they do not keep
a chronological order and that a Work will always be better by having our Jurisprudence in the first place, in accordance with what is
proper, the Civil and Canon Ius Commune are made accessories to
it [i.e., our Jurisprudence] rather than, to the contrary, forming it in
an inverse order.
67 Possible methods of forming a work conducive to the indicated goal, and the difficulty of the first [method]. In this situation and [set of] circumstances, three ways of composing a Work
conducive to presenting from one point of view on each subject the
close link and relations between the ancient and modern Jurisprudence, are offered. The first is to follow a method similar to that kept
by [v]an Espen in his Work entitled Universal Ecclesiastical Law
[Jus Ecclesiasticum universum], in which the reasoned order[ing]
shines, as much among the earlier and later chapters as in the placement of points that each one addresses separately. Recounting with
criticism and soundness the Church’s spirit and that which it has
observed from its establishment up to now in matters of Discipline,
[van Espen’s Work] offers the most complete idea of each one. A
Work of this sort could also have been made in alphabetical order,
despite not being the most suitable for the sound study of the sciences; it is so, nevertheless, in order to easily and quickly find the
points that are desired and to learn them with little work.
68 Difficulty of the second [method]. The second method
would be to place in chronological and alphabetical order the repeated resolutions on the same subject scattered in all the ancient
and modern Laws and Codes. But, here is the work and the difficulty. Some quick-witted persons do not believe this operation difficult because they find it feasible in one or another subject, which
they examine separated from the others. But, if they got into discovering the almost infinite multitude of laws that some same sentences
repeat on innumerable points, they could see by their own experience a similar Work to be almost impossible.
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69 Execution of the third [method] and the idea of this Work
in general. As regards myself, I confess in good faith that forming
[this Work] under one of those two methods exceeds my strength,
and I recognize it [is] so after having laid out the plan in both [methods] and executed repeated attempts at its formation. Nevertheless,
desirous of replacing them with another, equivalent method, the idea
was offered to me that I would be able to achieve [my goal by] bringing together all the principal titles and subjects of Civil and Canon
Jurisprudence and of the Royal [Jurisprudence] of Spain and the Indies, which are found separated in many Codes and uncompiled Decisions, in alphabetical order and placing each one thus brought together in temporal [i.e., chronological] order, beginning with the
most ancient and descending by degrees up to the most modern. Indeed, I made some attempts at this operation, in which by the
method indicated I placed extracts of the uncompiled Laws and Resolutions pertaining to each title and subject, and it seemed to me that
success corresponded to my desires, even with more advantages
than I thought in the beginning. Since, on the one hand, the Codes
and Laws are the rule and the origin of forensic and political acts
and, on the other hand, this method presents [the Codes and Laws]
with more vividness and exactitude than any other, it seems that it
should be preferred so that the portrait may be more similar to its
original, this being the reason why I gave my Work the title of
Teatro, [a thing] which equates in the moral vein to that of a portrait
in the physical.
70 Various enlightened persons approved of the project.
Nevertheless, not trusting myself on my own judgment, I discussed
the idea and its plan with various enlightened and impartial Persons,
all of whom approved of [them]. In addition, Señor Don Rafael
Antúnez y Acevedo, of the Council of His Majesty in the Supreme
[Council] of the Indies, generously allowed me to insert in the same
Work the extracts from the Laws of the Recopilación and Autos
Acordados of Castile made by his immediate kin, Doctor Don

502

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 11

Alonso María de Acevedo, well known in the Republic of Letters
for his precious productions.
71 In high spirits over a donation and the most appreciable opinions, I formed the Juridical Teatro that I now have the satisfaction
of offering to the Public. It being convenient to give to the same
Public an idea of this Work and of its ends and external causes, so
that it may be at the disposal of their judgment, it seems to me that
there is no means more commensurate to present [the idea of my
Work] with suitable clarity than to manifest its analysis, both in general and of each article, with its notes, references, and appendices.
72 Of the Plan and chronological index of universal Jurisprudence, previously necessary to the formation of this Work.
With regard to the first [i.e., the general analysis of my Work], in
order to form this same Work it was necessary beforehand to gather
in alphabetical order all the titles and principal subjects that comprehend the Civil, Canon, and Royal Codes of Castile and the Indies,
together with the uncompiled Decisions of one or the other Law,
which the plan denotes “number 1.” All the articles of a certain species were [also] thus gathered to place each one in chronological
order. This necessary operation having been previously executed—
and that is the Teatro’s key—I judged that its publication would be
useful not only by being a plan and index of the Work itself and of
its articles, but principally by being both [a plan and index] with
respect to universal Legislation, since, as with the ease of Dictionaries, it points out in temporal order the Code or an uncompiled
Canon or Royal Decision, in which there might or might not be
found a treatise or title on the infinite principal subjects of all the
Law. For this reason, I have given birth to the said plan and index
before the principal Work, no less for the Public’s utility than in order that this [Public] may recognize that all [of the Work] is found
[to be] ordered and arranged with mature reflection and thus that it
is not difficult to finish [the Work], perfect it, and give it to the printing press.
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73 Analysis of the articles. The analysis of each article is reduced, considering, on the one hand, that the Civil Law enters into
many articles according to the proposed plan and that it would be
tedious and almost useless to extract it law by law and, on the other
hand, that it would also be disagreeable and confusing to begin the
principal articles with the aridity of the extracts, it seemed to me
convenient and even necessary that each one of those [articles]
should begin, as [indeed] occurs, with an introduction that includes
the definition or description of the respective subject, its nomenclature, and principles and rules transcendental to divers Laws that [the
article] includes, so that it may serve as a light to all. Moreover,
[when] concurring with the Civil Law, if divergent from Royal dispositions, [the article] note[s] their differences in a summary of its
content; yet, [if the Civil Law] conforms with the same Royal Law,
[the article] refers [to the Royal Law], by which means bothersome
repetitions are avoided.
74 Of the extracts. Immediately after this introduction [of each
article’s subject] follow specific extracts from the Canon Bodies [of
Law], if there are any, and from the Royal [Bodies of Law] as well
as uncompiled Resolutions of Spain and the Indies, observing in
those [extracts] the order of their titles, that is to say, the placement
that the laws have in these [extracts], so that the portrait may be
more in conformance with its original.
75 Of the notes conducive to repeated, concordant, and derogated laws. As in the Work’s progress I noted that there are laws
completely repeated in several Codes, others that are repeated in
part, and many derogated in whole or in some points, it seemed to
me conducive to make use of this economy with respect to the aforementioned particulars. With a view to the first [group], I omit the
extract of the law completely repeated in the first Codes, instead
putting a note or reference regarding the last [Code] in which it is
extracted. With regard to the second [group], [I realized] that the
laws repeated in part are innumerable and that for the same reason
to indicate their concordance would be difficult, as it demonstrates
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the scant accuracy of the [repetitions] that are found already put in
some Codes; besides, it would be bothersome and above all useless,
since one living law in each matter suffices for the direction and
determination of political and forensic affairs. Thus, I refrained from
noting these partial concordances, even though I began to put them
[in the Work] as the first articles might demonstrate. But, since it
happened all to the contrary with respect to derogated or surviving
laws, whose discernment is so necessary that without it accuracy is
impossible in the same affairs, I have put the greatest care in noting
the laws derogated in whole or in part with some simple references
to the surviving laws, that may serve as a lodestar for Practitioners
and the Public.
76 Of the laws corresponding to a title, scattered in other
[laws]. Considering also that, besides the laws included in the titles
of each Code, there are many [laws] scattered in others of the same
Body [of Law], whether pertaining to different subjects or including
diverse matters, that I have not thought it convenient to dislocate
them, and also for other reasons, I put at the end of the title of each
Code of the principal [laws] for the practice [of Law], the laws scattered in it that correspond to the intent [of the Code], summarized in
brief sentences and regarding their site of origin, where they are specifically extracted. I do not execute this in the less important Bodies
[of Law] to avoid annoyances and more [book] volume without considerable utility.
77 Of the Pragmatics and other uncompiled Canon and
Royal Resolutions. It is true that almost all the scattered Cédulas
and other Resolutions are some mere modifications of the compiled
laws, to which they add or derogate in part, and, therefore, these
[Resolutions] ought to be placed right after those [laws they modify]. But, upon reflecting that many of the compiled [laws] are in
titles in which it is not common that they be searched for, such as
the Law, which apparently considered mechanical trades to be vile
and base, found in the title on Knights, which has little connection
with craftsmen and artisans, or at least for which it is not common
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that this subject be searched with that on Knights, it has seemed to
me more useful to put the Royal Cédulas that declare the said trades,
artisans, and craftsmen to be honorable [professions] under those
names rather than in the word Knights, and thus I practice this
method in other like cases, inserting the decision[s] of the most important uncompiled Resolutions to the letter for the absolute certainty of Practitioners.
78 Of the Appendices to various articles. Although, strictly
speaking, my Work should have been reduced to the method already
expressed, nevertheless, consulting public utility more, especially
that of the studious youth, whose approach to the laws is to be more
strict in analysis, I have made some additions which, without altering the project, contribute to the common benefit. In such terms,
considering in the first place that there are many words through
which, despite not indicating principal juridical subjects, Practitioners can go look up the point that they seek, I have intercalated among
the articles these same words reduced to short sentences [and] regarding the titles and principal subjects so that those [Practitioners]
might with greatest rapidity and ease find the matter that they may
seek or at least a guide that might lead them to this very term.
79 These references are not made to all the Bodies [of Law], but
rather, like the preceding ones, to the principal [Bodies of Law],
which are the Partidas, Recopilación, and Autos Acordados of Spain
and the Indies, by being the most important [Bodies of Law] both in
temporal and political matters—on which there is no doubt—and in
Canon matters, in regards to the fact that in those laws are inserted
and confirmed almost all the decisions included in the Decretals, the
Holy Council of Trent, and Bulls admitted in both Kingdoms. Therefore, [on the one hand,] the multiplication of references would be
useless and, on the other hand, bothersome, voluminous, and almost
impossible to be verified.
80 Although references only refer to the articles and paragraphs
of this Teatro, of which many will not be printed until some time
[has] passed, the [references] are, nevertheless, useful because
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Readers can, of course, find them in the corresponding Codes, looking up the article which is referenced in the general plan in this way:
[under] the word “Abad” is put its definition in accordance with a
Law of the Partidas, which is cited in this way: “L. 16. §. Partidas,
art. Regulares.” Now then, see the word “Regulars” in the said plan,
and it will be found that the Law cited is Law 16 of title 7, Partida
I. By this means, this and other like citations can be found with the
greatest brevity in their respective Codes. And, here is another reason for having the aforementioned plan printed before the Work [is
printed] and other evident proof that this [Work] is found [well] ordered and oriented, so that it can go be published without considerable difficulty or delay.
81 Of the Authors. Besides, the inclination of many Practitioners toward the opinions and sentences of the practicing Authors is
widely known and, ignoring the criticism that is made against them,
it suffices for their esteem that an Auto Acordado recommends
them. 21 For this reason, I cite two or three of the best national Authors on various subjects by way of [my] appendix so that, by resorting to them, readers may find the desired point without the necessity of specifying them one by one, which would cause annoyance without any known advantage.
82 Of practical notes and forms. Lastly, having reflected [on
the fact] that the whole, principal end of Jurisprudence is an accurate
and enlightened practice [of Law], to whose attainment contribute
the Authors who are its witnesses, besides the forms which are conductors of the same, I also put by [means of] the appendix practical
notes and models of the principal documents of petitions in any action or injunction, of those that include dilatory and peremptory exceptions, and of ordinary and extraordinary recourses, or at the least
I propose the clauses that differentiate one document from the other.
Because even though there are ancient and modern practices that are
notable, it has seemed to me useful to give a taste of them so that
21. Aut[o Acordado] I, tit. 1, bk. II, Recop[ilación].
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studious youths might find gathered in one work all that is found
scattered in many [others].
83 The judgment that various enlightened Persons have
formed of this work. These are the reasons and external aims and
also the analysis of my Teatro, of which I should now repeat that
which I published in its prospectus: that the intelligent Persons who
have examined it judge that its disposition offers to Practitioners the
ease typical of Dictionaries for finding whatever they may desire,
the certainty of all the decisions on a matter being found together in
the same place with notes on their principal derogations, and the
light that the earlier laws diffuse to the later, and that it also presents
to the Historian the apparatus for forming our legal History, which
we absolutely lack. 22 To him [who undertakes] Critic[al study of the
Law], [my Teatro] offers the means of discerning between the diverse states of our Jurisprudence from the time of the Romans until
today, and to the Government, it provides the scope of making a new
Code, when it considers one convenient. Nevertheless, the enlightened Public will grade its true merit and rectify the defects, of which
a work of such volume, formed with precision between the forensic
hassle and the representation of Litigants, cannot be exempt. While
the accuracy of the extracts from the Recopilación and Autos
Acordados of Castile made by Dr. Acevedo [was] recognized and
[they were] placed in the corresponding sites, inserting the decision[s] of the most important Pragmatics and Resolutions, [both]
compiled and scattered, to the letter, frees [my Work] from errors in
the principal Codes and practical Decisions and offers at the same
time a word-for-word collection of the selected laws.

22. In effect, there is no[t a comprehensive legal History] in Spain because
that [account] entitled Sacra Thermidis Hispanæ arcana [jurium legumque ortus,
progressus, varietates et observantiam cum præcipuis glossarum, commentariorumque quibus illustrantur, autoribus et fori hispani praxi hodierna, publicæ luci
exponit D. Gerardus Ernestus de Franckenau (Hannover, Nikolaus Föster, 1703)
(Ger.)] known by the name of “Franckenau” [its author], is only on the Royal
Bodies [of Law].
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PLAN
Years

533
533
534
571
1151
1236
1300
1305
1322
1335
1564

693
992
1255
1263 23
1310
1348
1496
1567
1745

1661

Codes
Civil
Digest
Institutes
Codex
Novellæ
Canon
Decretum [Gratiani]
Decretals [of Gregory IX]
Sexto
Clementines
Extravagantes of [Pope] John
XXII
Extravagantes comunes
Tridentine Council [Council of
Trent], Bulls admitted in both
Kingdoms, etc.
Royal
Fuero Juzgo
Fuero Viejo
Fuero Real
[Las Sietes] Partidas
Leyes de Estilo
Ordenamiento de Alcalá
Ordenamiento Real
Recopilación
Autos Acordados
Pragmatics and other Resolutions, etc.
Recopilación of the Indies

Books

Titles

Laws and
Canons

50
4
12
9

431
99
765
168

9,148
709
4,636
683

149
5
5
5

71
185
75
52
12

3,824
1,734
445
105
19

4

35

73
∞

12
5
4
7

55
33
72
182

8
9
9

32
115
214
110

560
229
549
2,479
252
125
1,133
3,391
1,134
∞

9

218

6,447

23. In the preliminary Discourse, it is said that the Partidas were completed
in the year 1260, according to [Gerhard Ernst Franck von] Fra[n]ckenau; but, as
recognized in their Prologue, it is evident that they were finalized in the year 1263.

2018]
Years

PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE
Codes

509

Books

Titles

Laws and
Canons
∞

306

2924

37, 675

Royal Resolutions on them,
etc.

Ex omnibus unum. [Out of all, one.]

